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In some remote corner of the sprawling universe, twinkling among the countless solar
systems, there was once a star on which some clever animals invented knowledge. It was the
most arrogant, most mendacious minute in world history, but it was only a minute. After
nature caught its breath a little, the star froze, and the clever animals had to die. And it was
time, too: for although they boasted of how much they had come to know, in the end they
realized they had gotten it all wrong. They died and in dying cursed truth. Such was the
species of doubting animal that had invented knowledge.
Peacerich Nothing
vi
In irgendeinem abgelegenen Winkel des in zahllosen Sonnensystemen flimmernd
ausgegossenen Weltalls gab es einmal ein Gestirn, auf dem kluge Tiere das Erkennen
erfanden. Es war die hochmütigste und verlogenste Minute der ‘Weltgeschichte’; aber doch
nur eine Minute. Nach wenigen Atemzügen der Natur erstarrte das Gestirn, und die klugen
Tiere mußten sterben. Es war auch an der Zeit: denn ob sie schon viel erkannt zu haben sich
brüsteten, waren sie doch zu letzt, zu großer Verdrossenheit, dahinter gekommen, daß sie
alles falsch erkannt hatten. Sie starben und fluchten im Sterben der Wahrheit. Das war die Art
dieser verzweifelten Tiere, die das Erkennen erfunden hatten.
Friedrich Nietzsche
vii
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Abstract
Causal loops are loops in cause-effect chains: An effect can be the cause of that ef-
fect’s cause. We show that causal loops can be unproblematic, and explore them from
different points of view.
This thesis is motivated by quantum theory, general relativity, and quantum grav-
ity. By accepting all of quantum theory one can ask whether the possibility to take
superpositions extends to causal structures. Then again, quantum theory comes with
conceptual problems: Can we overcome these problems by dropping causality? Gen-
eral relativity is consistent with space-time geometries that allow for time-travel: What
happens to systems traveling along closed time-like curves, are there reasons to rule
out the existence of closed time-like curves in nature? Finally, a candidate for a theory
of quantum gravity is quantum theory with a different, relaxed space-time geometry.
Motivated by these questions, we explore the classical world of the non-causal. This
world is non-empty; and what can happen in such a world is sometimes weird, but not
too crazy. What is weird is that in these worlds, a party (or event) can be in the future
and in the past of some other party (time travel). What is not too crazy is that this
theoretical possibility does not lead to any contradiction. Moreover, one can identify
logical consistency with the existence of a unique fixed point in a cause-effect chain. This
can be understood as follows: No fixed point is the same as having a contradiction (too
stiff), multiple fixed points, then again, is the same as having an unspecified system
(too loose).
This leads to a series of results in that field: Characterization of classical non-causal
correlations, closed time-like curves that do not restrict the actions of experimenters,
and a self-referential model of computation. We study the computational power of this
model and use it to upper bound the computational power of closed time-like curves.
Time travel has ever since been term weird, what we show here, however, is that time
travel is not too crazy: It is not possible to solve hard problems by traveling through
time.
Finally, we apply our results on causal loops to other fields: an analysis with Kol-
mogorov complexity, local and classical simulation of PR-box correlations with closed
time-like curves, and a short note on self-referentiality in language.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Wenn [. . . ] Raum, Zeit, und
Causalität als gänzlich unbedingte
Gesetze von allgemeinster Gültigkeit
behandelt [werden, dann ist] die
blosse Erscheinung, das Werk der
Maja, zur einzigen und höchsten
Realität zu erheben und sie an die
Stelle des innersten und wahren
Wesens der Dinge zu setzen und die
wirkliche Erkenntnis von diesem
dadurch unmöglich zu machen, d.h.,
nach einem Schopenhauer’schen
Ausspruche, den Träumer noch fester
einzuschläfern.1
Friedrich Nietzsche [185]
A causal structure describes (possible) cause-effect relations between events. In rel-
ativity theory, for instance, an event is said to be in the causal future of another if it
resides in the future light cone of the latter. By that, the latter — the cause — can
influence the former — the effect. In circuit models of computation, then again, causal
structures are given by the configurations of the gates and wires. To have an intuitive
picture of causal structures, one can imagine them as directed graphs, where the ver-
texes are events (or computer instructions), and where every edge points from a cause
to an effect (see Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2).
Causal structures are usually assumed to reflect definite partial orderings of events.
For a causal structure to be definite means that the causal relations — the configurations
1If space, time, and causality are treated as totally absolute laws with the most universal validity, then
this serves only to raise the mere appearance, the work of Maja, to the single, highest reality and to set it
in place of the innermost and true essence of things and thus to render actual perception of this essence
impossible, i.e., in the words of Schopenhauer, to put the dreamer asleep even more deeply.
1
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A
B
C D
E
(a)
A C
E
B D
(b)
Figure 1.1. (a) Events in space-time with respective light cones. (b) Causal structure
from the setup in (a).
— are predefined. This does not rule out probabilistic relations, but asserts that the
relations are independent of any observer. Furthermore, that causal relations describe
a partial ordering implies that they do not contain causal loops, cycles: An effect cannot
be a cause of the effect’s cause. These assumptions seem to be built into our intuition
(one could say we have been conditioned to that point of view), and guide use in how
we perceive the world and fantasize.
In this thesis, we trespass any such perception or fantasy and imagine the non-
causal: indefinite causal relations, causal loops, or combinations of both. Although
we take the reader to that world, this thesis is best read causally: Sentence after the
sentence.2 The following part is of particular relevance since it motivates this expedition
on physical grounds and presents the possible implications for computer science.
1.1 Motivation and consequences
The work performed in this thesis is motivated by quantum theory, relativity theory,
and quantum gravity. We successively comment on each of the motivations. A detailed
account of the motivations is found in the next chapter.
• Since ever quantum theory has been formulated, debates [63] on how to inter-
pret the theory are lasting: How should one interpret the wavefunction, what is a
measurement, where does a measurement happen, etc.? So, quantum theory con-
fronts us with a series of foundational questions that many people tried to solve.
Possibly these barriers can be overcome by waiving the Newtonian notion of abso-
lute space and time, and by approaching the problems from a Leibnizian [76] view
2As opposed to the magnum opus of Schopenhauer [223] (which is kind of non-causal), in which the
author tells to the reader: “Es ergibt sich von selbst, daß, unter solchen Umständen, [. . . ] kein anderer
Rath ist, als das Buch zwei Mal zu lesen [. . . ].” — “It is self-evident that under such circumstances no other
advice can be given than to read the book twice.” Schopenhauer backs this recommendation by saying
that obviously the end of his book depends on the beginning, but so does the beginning on the end.
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x0
x1
x2
y0
y1
y2
y3
Figure 1.2. A redrawing of a circuit from Reference [162]. It is clear that such a circuits
admits a definite partial ordering of the applications of the gates.
instead: Space and time are subject to the physical laws as well. Furthermore, so-
called Bell [40] non-local correlations seem to avoid our classical intuition on how
nature should behave, and forces many to attribute some “spookiness” to the the-
ory. However, it cannot be stressed enough that this latter inconvenience might
be a consequence of some (hidden) assumptions: e.g., the specific causal struc-
ture used to describe the correlations. Quantum theory motivates this research
even more by allowing physical quantities to be in superpositions or entangled
with others. So, it seems natural to allow causal structures to be in superpositions
too [15, 16, 52, 68, 114, 167, 173, 191, 192, 194, 201] (which has been verified
experimentally [207, 217]).
• General relativity motivates this study because some geometries thereof contain
closed time-like curves [131, 165] — causal loops. A system traveling on such a
curve potentially meets its younger self and interacts with it. Questions that arise
in that context are the following two. Are such geometries simply a mathematical
artefact? What are the dynamics such systems undergo?
• Finally, if we want to combine quantum theory with general relativity — to form
some theory of quantum gravity — then it seems reasonable [146] to drop some
assumptions on causal structures: Relativity theory is a deterministic theory with
a dynamic space-time, and opposed to that, quantum theory is probabilistic (at
least as claimed by many) with a fixed causal structure. So, if both theories would
be merged, then the resulting theory is speculated to contain the less restrictive
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features of both “mother” theories. The interplay between quantum theory and
relativity motivates this study even further: Are Bell non-local correlations simu-
latable in geometries that contain closed time-like curves?
These motivations can be put in two categories: (1) the idea of replacing the “spook-
iness” of quantum theory with weaker assumptions on causal structures, and (2) the
idea of accepting quantum theory as it is to apply it to causal structures, e.g., to allow
causal structures to be in superposition.
Studies in this field might have wide-ranging consequences. Following the motiva-
tions, such studies might (1) allow us to have a classical understanding of the quantum
phenomena, or (2) force us to change our view on the notion of causality. New views
on causality, then again, have radical impact on other concepts like time. Further-
more, insights might facilitate to combine quantum with relativity theory (e.g., Refer-
ences [64, 114, 256]). In computer science, potential consequences of such studies
are improved information-processing capabilities, e.g., faster computation. The role of
computer science should not be underestimated: In this thesis, computer science ap-
proaches proved themselves useful to make statements on the physical nature of closed
time-like curves.
1.2 Antinomies
Dropping the assumption that causal structures are definite and do not contain cycles
comes with a caveat: logical inconsistencies. In a causal loop, for instance, nothing
seems to forbid an effect to suppress the cause of the effect’s cause, leading to the problem
best known as the grandfather antinomy.3 Suppose someone travels to the past and
kills his or her grandfather before that time traveler was conceived. By doing so, he or
she cannot be born, and by that cannot travel to the past to kill the grandfather. But
since the grandfather was not killed, the person is born and can travel to the past to
kill. . . — a logical contradiction.
Another antinomy in the same spirit (it can be understood as the other extreme)
is the information antinomy. Suppose one morning someone wakes up to find a book
on the table that he or she never has seen before. This person then publishes this
book (which is irrelevant for the antinomy), and travels to the past to place the book
on the table in the night before the very same person has found the book. Here, no
logical contradiction in the above sense seems to arise. However, this causal loop has
another problem: The content of the book is unspecified, i.e., it arises ex nihilo. This
means, any such causal loop leaves open what states the physical systems should be in
— multiple consistent solutions exists. Deutsch [93] sees this antinomy as more severe
3This antinomy is often called “grandfather paradox,” which however is not accurate. The noun “para-
dox” originates from the Greek word paradoxon, which is composed out of para (against) and doxa opinion.
So, a “paradox” is a seeming, as opposed to an actual, contradiction. Instead, we use the term antinomy
to refer to logical problems.
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than the grandfather antinomy because it undermines any scientific theory, and follows
the doctrine of creationism. The states on the loops spring fully formed into the universe
without emerging from some process (every consistent solution is equally justified).
We hope to make these antinomies clearer by giving two analogies: A definition of
the form “x is defined as not x ,” (contradiction) is of the first kind, and “x is defined
as x” (tautology) is of the second kind.
In this thesis, we circumvent these antinomies by the assumption of logical consis-
tency, which depends on the model considered. In one model, logical consistency is the
assumption that probabilities, under any choice of operations of some parties, are well-
defined. In another model, we replace probabilities with dynamics. In the computational
model, then again, these two antinomies are explicitly avoided. One can understand
the works performed in this thesis as an expedition to the world between the logically
consistent and the causal — similar in spirit to the studies of Bell non-local correlations
that are non-signaling.
1.3 Main results and outline
We study relaxed causal structures in different contexts: Correlations, closed time-like
curves, and computation.
• A classical4 model for correlations is designed, where local assumptions and
the assumption of logical consistency only are made (see Chapter 4). We show
that this model allows for non-causal correlations and causal loops. This model is
proven to be the classical special case of the process-matrix framework — a quan-
tum model with local assumptions only. We give different characterizations of the
allowed processes in the model, which lead to a better understanding of logical
consistency. Then, we show that all processes in that model can be made re-
versible. By that, the model is not only non-causal but also reversibly non-causal.
This last result allows us to design a unitary (reversible) quantum operation that
violates the causality assumptions as well. Thus, either not every reversible dy-
namics is physically realizable, or causal loops are. Some of these results appear
in some of our articles (see References [28, 31, 32, 34]).
• The dynamics of closed time-like curves have been partially studied in the con-
text of general relativity. Researches around Thorne [97] analytically throw a
billiard ball into a closed time-like curve to let it interact with itself. Their stud-
ies, however, are limited to the case where at some point, the initial conditions
are set, and afterwords, the billiard ball is left to the dynamics. Interestingly, for
all initial conditions studied, an infinity of consistent dynamics were found where
4Throughout this thesis a “classical model” is understood as a model where the underlying states are
constructed out of bits or out of probability distributions over bits.
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the billiard ball self-interacts. A drawback of these studies is that a potential ex-
perimenter interfering with the time-traveling billiard ball is disregarded. The
actions of such an experimenter, however, might forbid any consistent dynamics.
We show (see Chapter 5) that this is not the case by explicitly designing a closed
time-like curve where some experimenters in closed regions are allowed to inter-
act arbitrarily — in any way they wish — with the time traveling systems. These
dynamics, just as in the first part, can be made reversible. Finally, we compare
this model to other models to predict dynamics of closed time-like curves. Some
of these results appear in some of our articles (see Reference [36, 37]).
• In the last main part of this thesis, we describe a circuit model of computa-
tion that avoids the grandfather and the information antinomies. This model
is shown to be more powerful in terms of query complexity when compared to
classical circuits. Then, we study the computational power of that model and find
it to be characterized by the complexity class P ⊆ UP∩coUP ⊆ NP. A known
problem within that complexity class is integer factorization. We use this problem
as a case study and design a circuit that factorizes integers efficiently within that
model. This result has implications fo the middle part of the thesis: The com-
putational power of the closed time-like curves is upper bounded by UP∩coUP.
Thus, in stark contrast to other models of closed time-like curves [6, 48], this
model cannot solve NP-complete problems efficiently (unless UP∩coUP = NP,
which is highly doubted). Some of these results appear in some of our articles
(see References [30, 33]).
The final chapter contains some applications of the results to other fields: Kolmogorov
complexity (see Reference [29]), PR-box correlations from classical closed time-like
curves (see Reference [38]), and self-referentiality in language.
In the next chapter, we give a detailed account of the motivations for the works
performed here. After that, the main part of the thesis begins with a forgoing chapter
on causality followed by the three building blocks of the thesis: Correlations, time travel,
and computation. We approach the end with a chapter where results are applied to
different fields and with more speculative content. Finally, we list some open questions
and conclude the thesis. The appendix consists of a short remark on the notation and
on preliminaries, which serve as a reference. This thesis comes with an epigraph —
a short and personal notice on anti-realism. It does not contain technical results, but
puts them in a philosophical and sociological context.
Chapter 2
Motivations
In dieser Weise erinnert uns [. . . ] die
Quantentheorie daran, daß man beim
Suchen nach der Harmonie im Leben
niemals vergessen darf, daß wir im
Schauspiel des Lebens gleichzeitig
Zuschauer und Mitspielende sind.1
Werner Heisenberg [151]
Newton advocated a view where space and time are absolute. By that, he considered
“space and time as a ’scene’ upon which the drama of the evolution of the [u]niverse was
taking place” [190]. Newton’s view can be contrasted by Leibniz’s: There is no absolute
space and time, but space and time are formed through relations. Corresponding to
the analogy above: Space and time emerge with, and are part of, the drama. This
dichotomy led to a long debate between Leibniz [76] and Clarke — a supporter of
Newton.2 Nowadays, it seems as if Newton won that debate: Relativity as well as
quantum theory presuppose some form of preexisting space-time.
Both of general relativity and quantum theory — as good as they are — come with
peculiarities that timidly call after Leibniz. In the next two sections, we present some
of these peculiarities, and use them as motivations for this thesis. Furthermore, ever
since these two theories have been developed, it remained a quest to merge them to a
unified theory of quantum gravity. That quest motivates the works presented here as
well; details on that are given in the third section of this chapter.
1In this way, quantum theory reminds us that in the search of the harmony in live one may never forget
that we are simultaneously a spectator and performer of the play of life.
2It is believed that Newton contributed substantially to Clarke’s replies (see, e.g., References [166,
240]).
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2.1 Quantum theory: EPR correlations
KaÈ tä ílon tou˜ mèrous me˜izìn
âin.3
Euclid of Alexandria [110]
Quantum theory allows for correlations among parties that shatter our classical per-
ception of how nature should behave: Physical quantities seem to arise from nowhere
and yet, distant quantities are correlated.4 Already Einstein [100, 101] was doubtful
about the formulation of quantum theory because of that issue. Let us elaborate. Within
quantum theory, it is possible to design quantum systems that cannot be described by
the sum of their parts. By this we mean that the attempt to describe the whole system
by describing its subsystems only fails. This, however, at most questions the mathemat-
ical formalism. A seminal critique of the formalism — based on this inseparability —
was undertaken by the trio Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen [107] (EPR). This critique
is reproduced in the following section. Their concerns led to a series of works on the
issue and eventually to experimental demonstration of so-called Bell [40] non-local
correlations. Drastic implications of these correlations seem unavoidable as long as we
hold to the classical world-view. But are these implications avoidable at the expense of
allowing causal loops in physical theories?
After the reproduction of the EPR critique, we discuss the underlying assumptions
that the trio made. Then, we present the implications, and some ways out: Relative,
retro, and emergent causality.
2.1.1 The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument
Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen conclude that the quantum-mechanical description of re-
ality is incomplete. They do so by holding on to a certain notion of reality and based
on that, question the theory. To understand their argument, we first need to clarify the
terms reality, description of reality, and completeness of a theory.
• The notion of reality, in a basic form, asserts the existence of entities independent
of the observer (see, e.g., References [25, 96]). In other words, realism is the
concept that nature’s answers to questions we pose by performing experiments
exist prior to having performed the experiments. Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen do
not give a full account of reality, but give a sufficient condition for what counts as
element of reality: “If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with
certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity,
3And the whole is greater than the part.
4Note that some would disagree with this first statement that correlations arise from nowhere; they
would counter by saying that the correlations do come from the quantum states being measured. In that
case, we ask the reader to bare with us and we repeat: They seem to arise from nowhere and are correlated.
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then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical
quantity.” Note that this form of reality is independent of any physical theory.
• Description of reality is an expression from philosophy of science and it means that
some elements of reality have their corresponding elements in a physical theory.
Crucially, this notion is bound to a physical theory.
• Finally, for a theory to be complete, “every element of the physical reality must
have a counterpart in the physical theory” [107].
The argument with which they show that the quantum-mechanical description of reality
is not complete is the following. First, consider a single physical system S and two
physical quantities corresponding to the observables P and Q that do not commute e.g.,
the observables corresponding to the position and to the momentum of S. If the physical
quantity corresponding to P of S is known, then the quantum-mechanical description
of the state of S does not contain any information about the quantity corresponding
to Q, and vice versa. This is known as the Heisenberg [150] uncertainty principle. By
this first consideration, either the quantum-mechanical description of the state of S is
incomplete or both quantities are not simultaneously real.
Towards a contradiction, assume that the quantum-mechanical description is com-
plete, and consider two physical systems, S1 and S2, which initially interact in way that
the joint state becomes entangled. After that interaction, suppose that both systems be-
come space-like separated by sending them in opposite directions. Since both systems
are in a specific entangled state, if we now measure system S1 with some observable P,
then we can predict with certainty the physical quantity corresponding to P of the other
system. The same holds if we measure system S2 with the observable Q; then, the phys-
ical quantity corresponding to Q of S2 can be predicted with certainty. At this point, it is
crucial that both systems are space-like separated. This means that a measurement on S1
cannot influence S2, i.e., system S2 remains unchanged. By this, since S2 did not undergo
any change and since both quantities can be predicted perfectly, both correspond to el-
ements of reality. But that would mean that the theory is complete (by assumption) and
that both quantities have simultaneous reality, as just demonstrated. This statement,
however, is in contradiction with the considerations of the single system S above. The
resort at first sight is to consider the quantum-mechanical description of reality as in-
complete. By that, Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen “have shown that the wave function
does not provide a complete description of the physical reality,” and they “left open the
question of whether or not such a description exists” [107]. Other presentations of the
argument are given by Bohm [49] (see also Reference [50]) and Redhead [210].
2.1.2 Local realism and Reichenbach’s principle
The assumptions of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen are sometimes summarized by the
term local realism.
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A B or A B or
A B
C
Figure 2.1. Reichenbach’s principle: If two physical quantities (A, B) are correlated,
then either one is the cause of the other, or both have a common cause C . The arrows
describe cause-effect relations and point to the effect.
Definition 1 (Local realism, as formulated in Reference [58]). Local realism is the as-
sumption that results of the observations on the individual systems are predetermined
and independent of whatever measurements might be performed distantly.
Local realism can be seen as a combination of realism and locality. The former asks
for the results of some experiment to be predetermined. That is, the physical quantities
exist prior to the experiment as opposed to emerging through the observation. Thus,
it should not be the case that “[d]ie ’Bahn’ [. . . ] erst dadurch [entsteht], daß wir sie
beobachten”5 [150]. The latter assumption of locality asserts that an object is not influ-
enced by manipulations on space-like separated objects. This assumption is motivated
by Einstein’s theory of relativity, where the speed of influences cannot exceed the con-
stant speed of light.
A local-realistic theory is a theory obeying the above definition. One might wonder
how such a theory functions and how correlations within such a theory come about.
At this point, we bring in the seemingly natural principle of Reichenbach [212], what
might be considered as at the heart of understanding correlations.
Reichenbach’s principle. If two quantities are correlated, then one quantity directly
influences the other, or both have a common cause (see Figure 2.1).
This principle, however, is substantially debated; especially since the so-called Bell
non-local correlations have become undeniable (see the following section). To com-
ply with Bell non-local correlations, Reichenbach’s principle must either be dropped or
modified. An attempt of a quantum version of Reichenbach’s principle is undertaken
by Allen et al. [12]. Note that Reichenbach formulated his principle in the context of
macrostatistics — measurement settings and outcomes are clearly within that realm,
this, however, is not necessarily the case for the quantum systems per se.
With the formulation of local hidden-variable models, Bell aimed at describing a
model as general as possible that is local realistic. In the following two sections, we
show that Bell non-local correlations do not admit a common cause in such a model
and that direct causation can be ruled out as well — even if we allow for superluminal
causation.
5“the ‘path’ comes into existence through our observation.”
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X Y
A B
Λ
Figure 2.2. Alice, on the left, chooses some setting A and obtains the measurement re-
sult X . Bob, on the right, adjusts his measurement apparatus according to the setting B
and measures Y . The boxes abstractly represent the measurements. The dashed lines
represent light cones. Time flows from bottom to top.
2.1.3 No common cause
Around 30 years after the EPR paper was published, Bell [40] tried to answer the ques-
tion raised by the trio (see above)6: Does there exist a complete local-realistic description
of reality? In a series of papers [44], Bell aimed to show that a local-realistic model for
the quantum-mechanical predictions does not exist. These results, however, are subject
to some additional, in parts implicit, assumptions (we elaborate more on those in later
parts of this chapter).
Bell’s argument is the following. Consider two parties, Alice and Bob, who are
space-like separated. Every party freely chooses a measurement setting and observes
the measurement result when some system is measured according to that setting. Their
choice is free in the sense “that the values of such variables have implications only in
their future light cones” [43]. Through the space-like separation of Alice and Bob, we
ensure that both parties cannot communicate. Let us denote by A the random variable
that corresponds to Alice’s choice of the measurement setting, and B likewise for Bob’s
choice. We label the outcomes by the random variables X and Y , where X is Alice’s
and Y Bob’s outcome (see Figure 2.2). By that, the whole setup — without referring
to some underlying systems — is described by some conditional probability distribu-
tion PX ,Y |A,B. The puzzling feature of quantum correlations is unveiled by studying the
probability distributions of this form: Does there exist some underlying local-realistic
model such that the resulting distribution PX ,Y |A,B equals the predictions of quantum
theory?
Towards answering this question, Bell developed a so-called local hidden-variable
6An overview of other attempts to resolve the paradox pointed to by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen is
given by Bell [41] himself.
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model. Such a model, as is shown later, is local realistic. Yet, it is just one local-realistic
model. If by the term “underlying local-realistic mechanism” we understand a local
hidden-variable model, then the question is answered negatively: There does not ex-
ist a model that can give the same predictions as quantum theory.
The underlying system of a local hidden-variable model is a hidden random vari-
able Λ. This random variable is not constrained in its dimension nor distribution. The
only assumption with respect to Λ is that it is a random variable. By this we ensure that
the system is realistic — the state of Λ is predetermined. Furthermore, Λ can be under-
stood as being generated in the common past of Alice and Bob (see Figure 2.2). After
that system Λ has been distributed to Alice and Bob, each party performs a measure-
ment with his or her corresponding setting, and obtains the measurement result. By
the locality assumption, the measurement result of one party is not allowed to depend
on the setting or result of the other. Rather, it is completely specified by the party’s set-
ting and Λ. By putting everything together, a distribution PX ,Y |A,B resulting from a local
hidden-variable model is called Bell local, and can be decomposed as in Definition 2.
Definition 2 (Bell locality). A probability distribution PX ,Y |A,B is called Bell local if and
only if it can be expressed as
PX ,Y |A,B =
∑
λ
PΛ(λ)PX |A,Λ=λPY |B,Λ=λ .
The freeness assumption that we mentioned above is incorporated with the inde-
pendence of Λ from the settings A and B. Finally, the realism feature of such a model,
as already stated, is given by assuming that the underlying state Λ is a random vari-
able. There exists a vast amount of literature on the derivation of Bell locality, even
by Bell [44] himself (see also the article by Brown and Timpson [56] and the blog
entry by [13]).
Bell [40] noticed, that a local hidden-variable model can be constructed that gives
the same predictions as quantum mechanics in the Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen [107]
experiment (see Section 2.1.1), when both space-like separated physical systems are
measured in the same basis: One can simply regard Λ as shared information that de-
termines how these systems “reply” to the same measurements. In that sense, one is
tempted to conclude that the quantum-mechanical description of reality is incomplete,
with the local hidden-variable model being the complete description. However, this is
not the case anymore if we consider different measurements on the space-like separated
systems.
To show that quantum correlations cannot be simulated by local hidden-variable
models, Bell [40] arranged the probabilities from some distribution PX ,Y |A,B in a way to
obtain an inequality that is satisfied by every Bell-local distribution. Such an inequality
is called Bell inequality. Read in the contrapositive: Whenever a distribution PX ,Y |A,B
violates a Bell inequality, then it is Bell non-local, i.e., the distribution cannot be derived
from a local hidden-variable model. An example of a Bell inequality in the two-party
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scenario with binary settings and binary outcomes is (see also Reference [77])
Pr (X ⊕ Y = AB)≤ 3
4
,
where ⊕ is the sum modulo 2, and the settings are assumed to be uniformly distributed.
As it turns out, quantum theory violates this inequality and hence allows for Bell non-
local correlations. This has been verified experimentally (see References [19, 20, 121,
128, 129, 153, 220, 222, 224, 235, 245] for a selection of such experiments).
Magic-square game
The above means that one cannot find a common cause in the local hidden-variable
model that yields the quantum-mechanical predictions. To illustrate how puzzling that
is, we introduce the magic-square game [179, 200]. In the following scenario, two
parties, Alice and Bob, collaboratively play a game — they do not play against each
other but aim at winning the game together. Before the game starts, the parties are
allowed to meet and discuss their strategy. Thereafter, both parties are separated and
not allowed to talk to each other anymore. The game they play is the following. Every
party is given a 3×3 grid. Alice randomly chooses a row i ∈ {1,2, 3} and fills the row i
of her grid with −1s and +1s. Analogously and independently, Bob randomly chooses a
column j ∈ {1, 2,3} and fills the column j of his grid with −1s and +1s. The conditions
for both parties to win are
• Alice’s value on the jth column has to match Bob’s value on the ith row (the
common entries match),
• the product of Alice’s entries is −1, and
• the product of Bob’s entries is +1.
This is repeated an arbitrary number of times. Since neither Alice nor Bob knows what
the other party’s choice is, they must agree on all 9 entries beforehand, i.e., when
they discuss the strategy. However, no 3× 3 grid with predetermined values exist that
satisfies the conditions stated above (see Figure 2.3). So, eventually, the parties lose the
game. In contrast to this, if Alice and Bob were allowed to share quantum states, then
in every round Alice and Bob would be able to fill in a row or a column, respectively,
with entries that would satisfy the conditions posed; i.e., they always win the game. In
other words, when the parties have access to quantum states, it seems as if they would
communicate — but they do not.
On top of that, Bell non-local correlations lead to a series of consequences, e.g.,
it leads to an all-or-nothing feature of randomness: If the experimenters measuring
the quantum states can freely choose the settings, then it follows that the physical sys-
tems must freely “choose” the outcomes as well [82, 83]. In relation to that, Bell non-
local correlations also lead to an all-or-nothing flavor to the Church-Turing hypothesis:
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Figure 2.3. Alice chooses a random row and Bob chooses a random column to fill
in with entries ±1. However, no 3 × 3 grid of predetermined values exist such the
requested conditions are satisfied.
“beyond-Turing computations are either physically impossible, or they can be carried
out by ’devices’ as simple as photons” [251].
2.1.4 No direct causation
In the previous section, we showed that quantum correlations cannot be modeled with
a common cause in a local hidden-variable model. One might ask: Could there be some
hidden influence (as opposed to a common cause) that leads to the quantum-mechanical
predictions? Einstein’s theory of relativity rules out any such hidden influence that
travels at the speed of light or slower.
We discuss the implications of such hidden influences. The discussion is split in two
parts: the quantitative nature of hidden influences — giving promising results for ex-
plaining Bell non-local correlations via hidden influences —, and the qualitative nature
of hidden influences — criticizing hidden influences.
Quantitative nature of hidden influences
Let us take a look on how much hidden communication is required to classically simu-
late any quantum statistics. The scenario is the following: Alice and Bob share some
quantum system (possibly entangled) that is measured by each party separately. This
scenario is now simulated in a model with hidden influences. For that, we can think
of Alice first holding both parts of the quantum system, and measuring her share only.
Thereafter, Alice sends classical information, i.e., a bit string, to Bob. Bob now sim-
ulates the measurement on his part of the quantum system by having access to that
bit string and some shred classical information (see Figure 2.4). This question of the
communication complexity of simulating quantum correlations was raised, among oth-
ers, by Maudlin [176]. He figured out that, in the average, a finite amount of bits sent
from Alice to Bob is enough to simulate a quantum measurement. A finite amount of
classical information seems very surprising, as quantum states and measurements are
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Figure 2.4. Alice, on the left side, measures her share with the setting A. Bob, on
the right, simulates the measurement on his share. The simulation is based on the
classical information obtained from Alice, on some shared random variable Λ, and on
his setting B. The outcome of the simulated measurement is Y .
characterized by real values. Maudlin’s result was strengthened by Brassard, Cleve, and
Tapp [55]: A finite amount of communication is sufficient in the worst case. As shown
by Massar et al. [175], however, in order to bound the amount of communication, an in-
finite amount of shared randomness is required. More results and lower bounds of com-
munication were achieved by others (see, e.g., References [65, 91, 142, 181, 215, 237]).
Qualitative nature of hidden influences
We look at two qualitative aspects: resistance to noise and fundamental implications
of finite speed hidden influences.
Hidden influences are fine tuned
Wood and Spekkens [252] analysed quantum Bell non-local correlations using causal-
discovery algorithms from the field of machine learning. These algorithms take as input
probability distributions (correlations) and infer the causal structures that lead to these
correlations. Causal structures are modelled as follows. Random variables are repre-
sented by nodes on a directed acyclic graph. If one variable is the cause of another,
then the nodes corresponding to these two variables are connected by an directed edge
that leaves the cause. The model parameters are (conditional) probability distribu-
tions, each of which represents the probabilities of an effect given all its causes, i.e., a
node Q without any cause is modeled by a probability distribution PQ, and a node R
with the causes S, T, U , . . . is modeled by the probability distribution PR|S,T,U ,.... Wood
and Spekkens show that all inferred causal graphs that reconstruct quantum Bell non-
local correlations are fine tuned (see Figure 2.5). A causal graph is called fine tuned if
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Figure 2.5. Directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) leading to Bell non-local correlations. The
variables A and B are the measurement settings for Alice and Bob, respectively. The
variables X and Y denote their measurement outcomes. The hidden variable is de-
noted by Λ. Directed edges represent the causal connections; each edge points to the
effect. The hidden influences are represented by dashed edges. The model parameters
for the left-most DAG are PA, PB, PΛ, PX |A,Λ, and PY |A,B,Λ. All three DAGs are fine-tuned,
i.e., disturbing the conditional probability distributions associated to the edges makes
the correlations signaling.
under a slight change of the conditional probability distribution, e.g., if they are sub-
jected to noise, the original correlations are lost. In particular, by introducing noise,
the correlations become signaling at a speed faster than light — and would contradict
Einstein’s theory of relativity.
Hidden influences cannot have a finite speed
Now, we discuss setups where the hidden influences have a finite velocity v <∞ that
is greater than the speed of light. Such a model is called v-causal model.
We follow the argument of Coretti, Hänggi, and Wolf [84]. Consider a three-party
setup with the parties Alice, Bob, and Charlie, where all parties are space-like sep-
arated (note that this is the smallest number of parties where such an argument is
possible [22]). Furthermore, assume that Bob resides somewhere between Alice and
Charlie. If Alice and Bob were to experience Bell non-local correlations, the hidden in-
fluence explanation tells us that a hidden signal is sent, without loss of generality, from
Alice to Bob. Now, if Bob and Charlie experience Bell non-local correlations as well,
then, again without loss of generality, Charlie’s system influences Bob’s in a hidden way.
This gives a configuration in which both, Alice and Charlie, act before (in a preferred
reference frame) Bob (see Figure 2.6). However, there exist two-party distributions for
Alice-Bob and Bob-Charlie, such that every three-party non-signaling distribution be-
tween Alice, Bob, and Charlie consistent with the two-party marginals must necessarily
be Bell non-local for the pair Alice-Charlie. This, however, is inconsistent with the v-
causal model: The influence from Alice to Charlie (or vice versa) would have to travel
at a speed larger than v. By repeating this argument, every finite velocity for hidden
influences can be ruled out. If one, nevertheless, holds on to a v-causal model, then the
assumption that the three-party distribution is non-signaling must be dropped: v-causal
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Alice Charlie
Bob
Figure 2.6. The solid lines represent the light cones of Alice and Charlie. The dashed
lines represent the v-influence cones, with c < v <∞, of Alice and Charlie.
models are signaling.
Unfortunately, the correlations found that lead to this argument are beyond those
achievable by quantum systems. Similar conclusions in more elaborated settings were
established for quantum correlations (see References [22, 24, 221]).
2.1.5 Saving local realism: Relative, retro, and emergent causality
This section deals with other models that can be claimed local realistic, and that — in
stark contrast to the local hidden-variable models — can describe Bell non-local corre-
lations. These models are put in two categories: relative causality and retro causality.
After discussing these, we suggest another way out: emergent causality.
Relative causality
The works of Grete Hermann, a philosopher-scientist, have mostly been overlooked.
Besides that she spotted a mistake in von Neumann’s [243] “proof” that quantum the-
ory cannot be extended to yield deterministic predictions, she gave philosophical argu-
ments against such an extension, and contributed towards a better understanding of
causality. The latter led her to formulate the measurement process in similar way to
the well-known relative-state interpretation [111, 112] of quantum theory. This, and a
series of other work in the same spirit, are what we elaborate on here. They can all be
summarized under the term relative causality for reasons that will become clear later.
In a less-known article, Hermann [152] discusses the apparent “acausality” of quan-
tum theory. At the beginning of the 20th century, many were disturbed by quantum
theory since it does not predict actual measurement outcomes, but probability distribu-
tions of these outcomes only. This has led some to conclude that the causal chain within
quantum-mechanical processes is broken, or that the theory is incomplete. Hermann
addresses these conclusions and argues against both of them. We start with the latter.
Following Bohr [51], Hermann’s [157] intuition for why only probabilistic predic-
tions are possible, is based on the wave-particle dualism. The trajectory of a particle can
be fully described within the “particle-picture,” and the propagation of waves within
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the “wave-picture.” Quantum-mechanical systems can be understood as “particles” or
“waves,” depending on the experimenter’s setup and interest of measurement. How-
ever, the dynamics cannot be described in both pictures simultaneously: The pictures
are exclusive. So, one pictures contains information which is not contained in the other
and vice versa. By that, every picture in itself cannot fully account for the outcomes (this
has been called quantum complementarity [51] — dialectic physics [87]).
Quantum theory merges both pictures (wave, particle) into one. In the standard
interpretation, then again, we jump from the “quantum picture” to the “classical pic-
ture,” whenever a measurement is made. Within the quantum picture, all dynamics
is predicted deterministically by the Schrödinger equation (before any measurement).
The classical picture, then again, is deterministic and describes the evolution of the
apparatus after the measurement. The location of the jump, which is also known as the
Heisenberg cut, is ambiguous: It could be at the first interaction with the measurement
apparatus, within the measurement apparatus, when the experimenter reads out the
result, etc. It is precisely this ambiguity which, according to Hermann [152], forbids
one to extend quantum theory:
“Die Unmöglichkeit, diesen Schnitt eindeutig festzulegen, schließt nun jede
Erwartung aus, durch die Entdeckung vorläufig noch unbekannter Quali-
täten die Unbestimmtheit der Quantenmechanik zu überwinden.”7
Suppose that we fix the location of the Heisenberg cut of some measurement process,
and that we find some additional variables not present in our current theories at this
cut. Since we can shift the cut, these variables would either have to enter the quantum
or the classical picture. Both pictures per se, however, already deterministically describe
the evolution;
“[j]ede Erweiterung würde zu einer Überbestimmung führen und dadurch
mit den bisherigen Ergebnissen der physikalischen Forschung in Konflikt
geraten.”8
Hermann does not only rule out such additional variables, but additionally shows
that in every instance, all causes for the upcoming state can be identified — even when
a measurement happens. Since all causes can be identified, the theory does not pro-
vide any room for additional variables to represent “hidden” causes. So, by Hermann,
quantum theory is complete. In her 1948 article [152], she describes the process of
measuring an electron’s position that is described quantum mechanically. That elec-
tron interacts with a photon (described quantum mechanically as well), and the result
of the interaction, is
7“The impossibility to uniquely determine the cut now eliminates any expectation to overcome the
uncertainty of quantum mechanics by the discovery of currently unknown qualities.”
8“any extension would lead to an overdetermination and by that conflict the hitherto existing results
in physics.”
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“eine neue Wellenfunktion, die eindeutig durch die beiden gegebenen Wel-
lenfunktionen [. . . ] bestimmt ist. Diese Wellenfunktion ist eindeutig be-
stimmt: sie enthält also nicht die Unbestimmtheit, die wir jenem mystisch-
en [. . . ] [P]rozess zuschreiben müßten.”9
At this stage, one would have to measure this new wavefunction to determine the posi-
tion of the electron.
“Ohne solche neuen Beobachtungen führt der quantenmechanische For-
malismus zu einer immer weitergehenden, aber ganz unanschaulichen Ver-
flechtung der Elementarteilchen.”10
According to Hermann, this means that
“[e]rst relativ zu der neuen Messung wird der Zustand des Elektrons nach
seinem Zusammenstoß mit dem Lichtquant durch eine Wellenfunktion mit
scharfer Ortsangabe [. . . ] beschrieben[,]”11
and in that perspective (the key of the argument)
“bildet es also unmittelbar nach dem Zusammenstoß mit dem Lichtquant
durchaus ein für sich bestehendes, durch seine eigene Wellenfunktion cha-
rakterisiertes physikalisches System.”12
In other words, after the interaction, the measured system is in a wavefunction of its
own relative to the measurement outcome. And that measurement outcome, is what
she considers as cause for the electron to be at that position. Such a cause, however,
cannot be brought in to possibly give better predictions, as it is only accessible to the
experimenter after the measurement. In another work [155], she writes:
“Zu einer Voraussage [. . . ] wären jene Gründe trotzdem nicht zu gebrau-
chen; denn auch sie bestimmen [. . . ] das System nur relativ, und zwar re-
lativ zu der Beobachtung, die bei der Messung selber erst gemacht wurde.
Sie konnten also dem Physiker erst nach dieser Beobachtung zur Verfügung
stehen und ihm somit keine Vorausberechnung von deren Ergebnis gestat-
ten.”13
9“a new wavefunction which is uniquely determined by the specified wavefunctions. This resulting
wavefunction is uniquely determined: it therefore does not contain the uncertainty that we would have
to attribute to that mystic process.”
10“Without any such new observations, the quantum-mechanical formalism leads to a progressing
unimaginative braiding of the fundamental particles.”
11“the electron, after interacting with the photon, is described by a wavefunction with a sharp position
only relative to the new measurement,”
12“it therefore constitutes an autonomous physical system characterized by its own wavefunction im-
mediately after the interaction with the photon.”
13“These causes could not have been used for predictions; they determine the system in a relative way,
relative to the observation which was obtained only at the moment of the measurement. These causes,
therefore, could be accessed after this observation only, and therefore do not allow to predict the outcome.”
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By these arguments, Hermann does not only describe a predecessor of Everett’s relative-
state formalism, but also frees the notion of causality from the notion of predictability.
We briefly conclude Hermann’s view. All causes, even if a measurement is per-
formed, can be identified. In the case of a measurement, the state of the measured
system is deterministically determined relative to the measurement apparatus. Thus,
the cause to find the electron at a given position is given relative to the state of the ap-
paratus (the cause is the state of the measurement apparatus). Such a cause cannot be
used to make better predictions; it is only accessible after the measurement itself. This,
however, does not mean that quantum processes are “acausal.” The notion of “cause”
should not be confused with the notion of “predictability.”14
What Hermann describes (see also Reference [156]) is basically Everett’s [111, 112]
relative-state formalism — without making use of any formulas. A measurement en-
tangles the object that is measured to the apparatus, and thereafter relative statements
only are allowed. This, can now be cast into “local realism:” All actions are local and
all quantities real — relatively. Basically, the wavefunction of some measured system
is autonomous relative to the wavefunction of the measurement apparatus. Everett
goes beyond Hermann’s view by explicitly asking for a wavefunction for the whole uni-
verse (a single quantum universe). Everett’s interpretation has often been interpreted
as “parallel worlds:” Whenever a system entangles with the apparatus, all alternative
results manifest themselves in parallel universes — a view advocated by DeWitt [95]
and Deutsch [94]. This, however, is a “left-over of classical conceptions. The coexisting
branches [. . . ] can only be related to ’worlds’ described by classical physics” [168]. To
continue in the words of Lévy-Leblond [168]: “[T]he [. . . ] meaning of Everett’s ideas
is not the coexistence of many worlds, but on the contrary, the existence of a single
quantum one.” If we fall back to classical concepts, then relative statements only, as
commented on above, can be made.
We briefly comment on two extensions of the Hermann-Everett interpretation. One
is parallel lives by Brassard and Raymond-Robichaud [54]: Instead of the universes
splitting, the experimenters split — inside a bubble —, and those experimenters are
allowed to talk to each other where the quantum predictions are retrieved. This model,
just as the Hermann-Everett interpretation, is local as well as realistic.
If one additionally incorporates “time” into the description, then a timeless wave-
function of the whole universe can be constructed. This endeavor has been undertaken
by Page and Wootters [195] (see also Reference [254]). There, the state of some parts
of the universe is determined relative to the reading of another system that is termed
“clock.” By that, all dynamics (the Schrödinger equation) can be cast in static form:
Relative to the clock, the systems undergo the quantum dynamics.
14In some sense, the process that Hermann describes is some kind of self-referential perception [92].
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Retro causality
Another approach for a local-realistic description of Bell non-local correlations is via
retro causation, i.e., causation from the future to the past. One such model is called
“Parisian zigzag” [88, 89] (see also Reference [206]). Assume a Bell non-local exper-
iment as described above, where Alice and Bob, each, get a photon to be measured
according to some measurement setting. In that model, the photons “do not possess
polarizations of their own,” but rather “borrow one later” [89]. That is, when Alice
performs the measurement on her photon, the photon gains a random polarization,
that is sent to the past, to the source where the photons were generated. From there
on, the “borrowed” polarization travels into the future to Bob (that is why this model is
called zigzag). Thus, in that model, “Einstein’s prohibition to ’telegraph into the past’
does not hold at the level” [89] of the photons, but at the level of macroscopic objects
only.
A crucial point of this model is that no photon travels directly from one party to the
other (a path that is “physically empty”). Instead, it travels “along the Feynman-style
zigzag [. . . ] made of two timelike vectors (which is physically occupied).”
Emergent causality
Besides retro causality and relative causality, we speculate on another approach to de-
sign a local-realistic model for Bell non-local correlations. In the Leibnizian [76] view,
space and time are relational, i.e., quantities are related to each other resulting in these
notions. That means, in strong contrast to Newton’s view, if no objects would exist,
then space and time would exist neither. So what, if time, its direction, and causality
are derived from such relations? In the chapter on causality, we formulate such an idea
and use it for the studies in the subsequent chapters.
2.2 Relativity theory: Closed time-like curves
Einstein, Lanczos, Gödel, and others showed that general relativity admits space-time
geometries with closed time-like curves (CTCs). CTCs are world-lines that are space-time
periodic; an object traveling on such a world-line bumps into its younger self.
“[I]f P,Q are any two points on a world line of matter, and P precedes Q
on this line, there exists a time-like line connecting P and Q on which Q
precedes P; i.e., it is theoretically possible in these worlds to travel into the
past, or otherwise influence the past” [131].
By influencing the past, we then again can influence the future, etc., or can we not? In
the affirmative case, a CTC describes a causal loop. No CTCs have yet been observed in
nature and their existence is highly debatable for several reasons. Nevertheless, their
existence, for instance in a remote, to us unaccessible, region in the universe, is not
22 2.2 Relativity theory: Closed time-like curves
ruled out. This motivates the study of causal loops with the aim to better understand
their dynamics — if they would exist.
2.2.1 History
We make an attempt to give a rather lengthy account of the history of CTCs — for
two reasons. The first being that the discovery of CTCs in general relativity is often
overlooked and attributed to Gödel only, and secondly, because these early thoughts on
CTCs come with some peculiarities.
To our knowledge, Lanczos was the first to present a solution to Einstein’s equa-
tions of relativity that exhibits CTCs. This finding, however, as said above, is mostly
attributed to Gödel (e.g., see Rindler [214]). In 1924, Lanczos [165] describes a solu-
tion to Einstein’s equations of relativity where
“die Zeit keine Koordinate [. . . ], die von −∞ bis +∞ variiert, [zu be-
deuten braucht].”15
Instead, in his solution to the equations,
“kann [Zeit] auch eine periodische Koordinate, eine Art Winkelkoordinate
darstellen. Es besteht also die Möglichkeit, daß die Welt nicht nur in räum-
licher, sondern auch in zeitlicher Beziehung periodisch, also nach allen
Richtungen geschlossen ist.”16
Lanczos’ universe has the shape of a cylinder, and is rotationally symmetric; just as the
Gödel universe, which was (re)discovered 25 years later. His results inclined him to
the following speculation.
“Da das Elektron nirgends weder Anfang noch Ende haben kann, müßte
es nach Ablauf einer Zeitperiode wieder in denselben Raumpunkt zurück-
gekehrt sein, von wo es ausgegangen, was höchst unwahrscheinlich wäre.
Es könnte aber auch seine Existenz in einem anderen Raumpunkt fort-
setzen, wobei es scheinbar ein zweites Elektron bilden würde. So kom-
men wir auf den Gedanken, das vielleicht die Weltschläuche sämtlicher
Elektronen nur Ausschnitte aus einem einzigen Urschlauch sind und die
einzelnen Elektronen nur zeitlich verschiedene Entwicklungsstadien eines
einzigen Urgebildes. Die prinzipielle Gleichheit aller Elementarbausteine
der Materie (wenigstens was die negativen Elektronen anbelangt) könnte
15“time does not have to be represented by a coordinate that varies from −∞ to +∞.”
16“time could also be described by a periodic, a kind of an angular coordinate. It is therefore possible
that the world is periodic not only with respect to space, but also with respect to time; and so it would be
closed in all directions.”
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dadurch seine natürliche Erklärung finden und unsere Überzeugung von
der Einheit des Universums um große Ausblicke bereichert werden.”17
Lanczos’ opinion on CTCs is that CTCs “aber nirgends zu einem inneren Widerspruch
führen.”18
Einstein mentioned CTCs 10 years before Lanczos; without having found a solution
to his equations of relativity that would contain them. At that time, Einstein was still
working on the generalization of the theory of special relativity — the final stage of the
general theory was not yet reached. Einstein [99] wrote:
“In der gewöhnlichen Relativitätstheorie ist jede Linie, welche die Bewe-
gung eines materiellen Punktes beschreiben kann, [. . . ] notwendig eine
ungeschlossene [. . . ]. Das Entsprechende kann in der hier entwickelten
Theorie nicht behauptet werden. Es ist daher a priori eine Punktbewegung
denkbar, bei welcher die vierdimensionale Bahnkurve des Punktes eine fast
geschlossene wäre. In diesem Falle könnte ein und derselbe materielle Punkt
in einem beliebig kleinen raum-zeitlichen Gebiet in mehreren voneinan-
der scheinbar unabhängingen Exemplaren vorhanden sein. Dies widerstrebt
meinem physikalischen Gefühl aufs lebhafteste. Ich bin aber nicht im-
stande, den Nachweis zu führen, daß das Auftreten solcher Bahnkurven
nach der entwickelten Theorie ausgeschlossen sei.”19
Later, Einstein asked Carathéodory in two letters to look for a solution of the equations
of general relativity that contain CTCs. In 1916, Einstein [104] wrote:
“Wollen Sie nicht noch etwas über das Problem der geschlossenen Zeitlinien
nachdenken? Hier liegt der Kern des noch ungelösten Teiles des Raum-Zeit-
Problems.”20
17“Since for the electron there is no beginning and end, it would have to return to the same location,
from where it started, after a period of time, which, however, would be highly unlikely. Then again, its
existence could continue in another point in space, and by that apparently form another electron. By that
we arrive at the idea that the paths of many electrons are just sections from a path of a single electron,
and that the apparent electrons are just different stages of development of an ur-electron. The principle
indistinguishability of electrons can therefore be explained in a natural way. This would enrich the credo
of the unity of the universe.”
18“do nowhere lead to an inner contradiction.”
19“In ordinary relativity theory, every line that might represent the motion of a material point is neces-
sarily unclosed. The analogous statement for the here developed theory cannot be claimed. Therefore, a
movement of a point is a priori imaginable, where the four-dimensional curve would almost be closed. In
that case, in an arbitrary small space-time region, one and the same material point could coexist in multiple
apparently independent copies. This contradicts my feeling for physics in the most vivid sense. However, I
am not capable to show that the occurrence of such curves is ruled out in the final theory.”
20As translated in the English translation supplement: “Wouldn’t you like to reflect a bit more on the
problem of closed time lines? Here lies the core of the as yet unresolved portion of the space-time prob-
lem.”
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Einstein’s demand remained unanswered. Later in the same year, Einstein [105] in-
sisted:
“Wenn Sie aber die Frage nach den geschlossenen Zeitlinien lösen, werde
ich mich mit gefalteten Händen vor Sie hinstellen. . . . Hier steckt etwas
dahinter, des Schweisses der besten würdig.”21
Also here, Carathéodory did not get into this at all.
Furthermore, Weyl [246] commented on CTCs in his book Raum Zeit Materie:
“Von jedem Weltpunkt geht der Doppelkegel der aktiven Zukunft und der
passiven Vergangenheit aus. Während in der speziellen Relativitätstheo-
rie diese durch ein Zwischengebiet getrennt sind, ist es hier an sich sehr
wohl möglich, daß der Kegel der aktiven Zukunft über den der passiven
Vergangenheit hinübergreift; es kann also prinzipiell geschehen, daß ich
jetzt Ereignisse miterlebe, die zum Teil erst eine Wirkung meiner künft-
igen Entschlüsse und Handlungen sind. Auch ist es nicht ausgeschlossen,
daß eine Weltline, obschon sie in jedem Punkte zeitartige Richtung be-
sitzt, insbesondere die Weltline meines Leibes, in die Nähe eines Weltpunk-
tes zurückkehrt, den sie schon einmal passierte. Daraus würde dann ein
radikaleres Doppelgängertum resultieren, als es je ein E. T. A. Hoffmann
ausgedacht hat. [. . . ] So Paradoxes da zutage kommt, ein eigentlicher
Widerspruch zu den in unserem Erleben unmittelbar gegebenen Tatsachen
tritt nirgendwo hervor.”22
At this point we would like to point at three peculiarities on which some of Einstein,
Weyl, and Lanczos seem to agree. (1) All three of them mention that such curves could
lead to “Doppelgänger” — multiple copies of the same object — that reside next to each
other in space. (2) From (1) the step to closed lines seems not large: An object could
just take over the place of its “Doppelgänger.” Nevertheless, Einstein and Weyl did not
directly address closed lines. (3) Weyl and Lanczos commented that such world lines
are not contradictory. Einstein did not explicitly mention the issue of contradiction.
21As translated in the English translation supplement: “If you solve the problem of the closed time lines,
though, I shall place myself before you with hands folded in reverence. . . . Behind this is something worthy
of the swat of the best of us.”
22As translated by Brose [247]: “Every world-point is the origin of the double-cone of the active future
and the passive past. Whereas in the special theory of relativity these two portions are separated by an
intervening region, it is certainly possible in the present case for the cone of the active future to overlap
with that of the passive past; so that, in principle, it is possible to experience events now that will in part
be an effect of my future resolves and actions. Moreover, it is not impossible for a world-line (in particular,
that of my body), although it has a time-like direction at every point, to return to the neighbourhood of
a point which it has already once passed through. The result would be a spectral image of the world
more fearful than anything the weird fantasy of E. T. A. Hoffmann has ever conjured up. [. . . ] Although
paradoxes of this kind appear, nowhere do we find any real contradiction to the facts directly presented
to us in experience.”
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Moreover, Einstein did not employ this issue of contradictions to rule out such world
lines from his theory. From (2), however, the thought of the grandfather antinomy (see
Section 1.2) could immediately be reached.
2.2.2 Gödel on closed time-like curves
Gödel’s [135] first article on CTCs appeared 25 years after Lanczos’. His initial de-
scription of CTCs, which appeared in 1949, is a purely philosophical one, where he
understands Einstein’s theory as defending epistemological idealism. The mathemati-
cal version (see Gödel [131]) appeared in the same year as a birthday gift to Einstein
— in a special issue of the journal Reviews of Modern Physics dedicated to Einstein’s
birthday. In the mathematical version, he gives a solution to the equations of relativ-
ity that allow for CTCs. The universe he describes is very similar to Lanczos’ and van
Stockum’s [242]. In the same year, Gödel [134] held a lecture on rotating universes,
which was published posthumously. One follow-up appeared in 1952 [133].
Einstein’s [102] reply to Gödel is rather short and addresses the question on the
reversibility of the dynamics in his theory; there is no a priori notion of future and past.
But if we consider a process that is signaling, then one event necessarily precedes the
other:
“Wesentlich ist hierbei, daß das Senden eines Signals ein nicht umkehrbarer
Prozess ist im Sinne der Thermodynamik, ein Prozess, der mit dem Wach-
sen der Entropie verknüpft ist (während nach unserem gegenwärtigen Wis-
sen alle Elementarprozesse reversibel sind).”23
Contrary to Einstein, Weyl, and Lanczos (see peculiarities above), Gödel added a
note in the German translation of the philosophical article [132] to clarify some points.
He wrote:
“Auch der Entropiesatz dürfte mit den obigen Lösungen durchaus verträg-
lich sein. Denn man kann in ihnen für alle zeitartigen Linien in eindeutiger
und stetiger Weise eine positive Richtung definieren. Ferner ist es un-
endlich unwahrscheinlich, daß irgendein materielles System genau in sich
zurückläuft. Wenn das aber nur angenähert geschieht, so bedeutet es bloß,
daß irgendwo 2 Exemplare desselben Systems (im allgemeinen mit ver-
schiedenen Entropiewerten) gleichzeitig nebeneinander vorhanden sind.”24
23This was translated by Paul Arthur Schlipp [106]: “What is essential in this is the fact that the sending
of a signal is, in the sense of thermodynamics, an irreversible process, a process which is connected with the
growth of entropy (whereas, according to our present knowledge, all elementary processes are reversible).”
24“Also the second law of thermodynamics might thoroughly be in agreement with the above solution.
The reason for this is that one can define an unambiguous and continuous positive direction for every
time-like line. Furthermore, it is infinitely improbable that some material system exactly goes back onto
itself. If, however, this happens only approximatively, then it means that somewhere 2 copies of the same
system (generally with different entropies) simultaneously exist next to each other.”
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Even though in his article of the same year he [131] describes closed time-like curves,
his addendum above says it is infinitely improbable for a system to travel on such a closed
word-line. The last sentence in Gödel’s addendum reads:
“Die Anfangsbedingungen sind allerdings in solchen Welten nicht vollkom-
men frei wählbar.”25
Thus, the issue of contradictory dynamics (the grandfather antinomy) is resolved by —
what is known as Novikov’s self-consistency principle (see Section 5.2) — forbidding a
time-traveler to kill his or her grandfather. That is, if some closed time-like curves exist
in the future of some space-like surface, then the initial conditions set at that surface
are restricted to initial conditions that do not lead to a contradiction. This point has later
been addressed and — in some sense — resolved by Morris et al. [182].
There are also voices against the physical existence of CTCs. For instance, Reichen-
bach [211] suggests that “we must make the assumption that there are no closed causal
chains.” In the same spirit, Hawking [149] conjectures that “[t]he laws of physics do not
allow the appearance of closed timelike curves.” The motivation for these conjectures
is that CTCs seem eligible to the grandfather antinomy (see Section 1.2).
2.3 Quantum gravity: Hardy’s approach
Our two currently most successful theories are quantum theory and general relativity.
Whilst these theories are used widely, the search for a unified theory is ongoing. This
unified theory would be a theory of quantum gravity. Many attempts to merge both
theories have been conducted (see, e.g., Reference [216]). Hardy’s [145–148, 174] ap-
proach to a unified theory is the following. Quantum theory is a probabilistic theory (at
least, apparently probabilistic — see Section 2.1) where a fixed notion of space-time is
assumed. The latter means, that quantum theory — in its current form — is compati-
ble with some background time. General relativity, then again, is a deterministic theory
where space-time is dynamic. Hardy now suggests that a candidate for quantum grav-
ity should be probabilistic with a dynamic space-time; such a formulation of quantum
gravity would uphold the relaxed features from quantum theory and general relativity.
Towards a formulation of quantum gravity, Hardy introduced the causaloid frame-
work — a mathematical framework for that very purpose, in which many theories can
be cast so they become probabilistic and admit an indefinite causal structures. In such
a theory one could imagine events in space-time, and the space-time coordinates them-
selves to be entangled, leading to quantum effects on that footing. This necessitates a
new treatment of causality — a motivation for this thesis.
The process-matrix framework, a framework for quantum correlations that allows
indefinite causal structures, was later developed by Oreshkov, Costa, and Brukner [194].
25“The initial conditions in such worlds, however, are not completely freely selectable.”
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Another framework where indefinite causal structures might be allowed is the quantum
combs framework [68–71, 81]. Our work closely follows the process-matrix framework.
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Chapter 3
On causality
The law of causality, I believe, like
much that passes muster among
philosophers, is a relic of a bygone
age, surviving, like the monarchy,
only because it is erroneously
supposed to do no harm.
Bertrand Russell [219]
The notion of causality has been (and remains to be) highly discussed. The English
word causality has its roots in the Latin word causa, which means reason, cause. Thus,
the notion of causality aims at pinpointing to some reason. Closely related to the word
causality is the conjunction because which means being the cause of. We do not give a
full account of the notion of causality — which is rather impossible (we redirect the
interested reader to The Oxford Handbook of Causation [39]). Instead, we focus on the
cause and effect relation. A discussion of different approaches to causality can be found
in the beforehand mentioned textbook. In physics, causality was understood (up to
the beginning of the 20th century) as being provided by the physical laws in terms of
deterministic laws (see, .e.g., Reference [196]).1 The laws were (and sometimes still
are) used to deterministically predict the configuration of particles, objects, etc. at some
time t. Since quantum theory was formulated, however, this notion gets questioned
frequently. A first doubt on “causality” came when people realized that quantum theory
does not fully predict measurement results — only probabilities can be derived from the
formalism. As Grete Hermann [154] put it:
“Das physikalische Ergebnis der Quantenmechanik, von dem die Erschüt-
terung altgewohnter naturphilosophischer Auffasungen, insbesondere der
1With the development of relativity theory, the notion of “causality” is sometimes used to refer to the
light-cones structure.
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Kausalvorestellungen ausgeht, besagt, daß der Vorausberechnung künftiger
Naturvorgänge eine scharfe, unüberwindbare Schranke gezogen ist.”2
This issue was resolved by freeing the notion of causality from perfect predictability [157]
(see also Section 2.1.5 of this thesis). The quantum community was shocked again by
the works of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen [107] and Bell [40]: Not only that the actual
outcome of a measurement cannot be predicted by quantum theory, but any extension
of the formalism (under some assumptions) does not allow one to predict the results
(see also References [82, 83]).
3.1 Definition of causal relations
In Mente nulla est absoluta, sive
libera voluntas; sed Mens ad hoc, vel
illud volendum determinatur a causa,
quae etiam ab alia determinata est, &
haec iterum ab alia, & sic in
infinitum.3
Baruch de Spinoza [90]
This section aims at giving some definitions around the notion of causality. These
definitions are used in the following chapters. We model physical quantities by random
variables. In this thesis, we understand causality as causal relations between random
variables.
Closely related are space-time relations. Here, we use the theory of special relativity
as a representative theory to discuss them. Suppose we are given a number of random
variables where every random variables is located within space-time. The future of a
random variable A is the space-time region that light could reach from A. This region is
also called the future light cone of A. The past of A, then again, is the space-time region
from which light could have arrived.
Definition 3 (Space-time past, space-time future). A random variable A (B) is in the
space-time past (future) of the random variable B (A), if and only if a signal at the speed
of light or slower could travel from A to B. This relation is expressed by A ST B. If
neither AST B nor B ST A holds, then we write A 6ST 6ST B.
Note that special relativity does not provide a distinction between past and future
light cones; the theory is symmetric in the time direction. Therefore, the above defini-
tion relies on a postulated direction of time.
2As translated in Reference [158]: “The physical consequence of quantum mechanics, which casts
doubt upon traditional views in the philosophy of nature, especially upon the concept of causality, implies
that the predictive calculation of future processes in nature is restricted by a sharp, insurmountable limit.”
3In the mind there is no absolute or free will; but the mind is determined to wish this or that by a cause,
which has also been determined by another cause, and this last by another cause, and so on to infinity.
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The following notion is aimed to reflect the relation between a cause and an effect
as opposed to the notion of space-time past and space-time future.
Definition 4 (Causal past, causal future, case, and effect). A random variable A (B) is
said to be in the causal past (future) of the random variable B (A), if and only if A and B
are correlated and A is free. This relation is expressed by A B. The random variable
A is called a cause and B is called an effect.
In this definition, we distinguish between free and non-free random variables. At
this point we do not aim to give an explanation of what a free variable is, but just
postulate the existence of both types of random variables. One interpretation of free
variables is that their value can be set directly by an experimenter, e.g., a light switch
as opposed to the light bulb that is controlled by the switch.4
If the relation A  B holds, then we can send a signal from A to B. Based on
relativity theory (without closed time-like curves), the relation A B implies AST B.
The converse, however, does not need to hold: The event of deers mating on the other
side of lake Lugano one second after we finished a chess game is within the future light
cone of our action, but unrelated. We can express that setting with random variables:
Place two independent random variables, A and B, in space-time such that AST B.
We adopt the above definition of causal past and causal future to sets of random
variables.
Definition 5 (Causal past and causal future for sets). The set S (T ) is said to be in the
causal past (future) of the set T (S), if and only if there exist random variables A∈ S,
B ∈ T such that A  B and where the relation A′ 6 B′ holds for every A′ ∈ S, B′ ∈ T .
This relation is expressed by S  T .
3.1.1 Freeness from space-time relations and correlations
By Bell [43], freeness of variables means “that the values of such variables have im-
plications only in their future light cones.” This standpoint was taken by Colbeck and
Renner [78] to give a definition of free variables. A random variable A is called free if it
is uncorrelated to all random variables outside of its future light cone (see Figure 3.1).
However, their approach to distinguish between free and non-free variables can only
be applied in a setting where “[t]he space time structure has been taken as given” [42].
This is also reflected by the fact that Colbeck and Renner [78] do not refer to usual
random variables, but call them space-time variables.
3.1.2 Causal relations from freeness and correlations
Instead of defining freeness based on the space-time relations of the variables, we can
define the causal relations based on freeness. Suppose you are given two random vari-
ables, A and X , where you know that A is free and X is not free (e.g., a knob and a
4This follows the interventionists or agent-based approaches to causality [253].
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A
B
C
D
Figure 3.1. The upper cone is the future light cone of the random variable A. The
random variable A is free if it is uncorrelated to C and D.
X A
Figure 3.2. If the random variable A is correlated to X and if A is free, then A is in the
causal past of X .
gauge). Now, if A is correlated to X , then by manipulating A we can manipulate X . So,
a random variable A is called to be in the causal past of another random variable X if A
is free and correlated to X (see Definition 5 and Figure 3.2). Thus, by knowing which
variables are free and which ones are not, and by knowing the correlations among the
variables, we can deduce the causal relations between them. Since this work considers
relaxations of causal relations, we mainly stick to this second approach, and use the
first approach for comparison. By doing so, we place the notion of freeness as more
fundamental when compared to the notion of causal relations (see Table 3.1).
This analysis of causality suggests a third approach, which is too speculative, and
hence not discussed beyond the following sentence. One could, as opposed to the two
approaches above, try to introduce some subjective notion of freeness that depends on
the state of the observer, and derive in that way subjective causal relations from the
correlations.
Postulated Derived from
Colbeck and Renner [80] Causal structure Freeness Correlations
Here Freeness Causal structure Correlations
Table 3.1. Two approaches: One to derive freeness from correlations and a postulated
causal structure, and the other to derive the causal structure from correlations and
postulated freeness.
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3.2 Causal correlations and causal inequalities
The models we study are of operational nature: Parties interact with systems and the
resulting correlations are studied. Before we define causal correlations (correlations
from space-time settings) and causal inequalities (inequalities satisfied by such corre-
lations), we introduce the notion of parties.
Definition 6 (Party and causal relation between parties). A party S j = (A j , X j , L j) is a
triple that consists of a free random variable A j , a non-free random variable X j , and a
local operation L j . The variable A j is called input of S j , and the variable X j is called
output of S j . For two parties S j and Sk, we say that S j (Sk) is in the causal past (future)
of Sk (S j) if and only if A j  Xk. This relation is expressed by S j  Sk.
Note that a setting S j  Sk  S j is not ruled out by that definition. The local
operation L j of a party S j is not discussed further here, but is discussed in the next
chapter. In later parts of this work, we also make use of parties with more than two
random variables. A (free) random variable of a party can also be composed of multiple
(free) random variables, e.g., A j = (A′j , A′′j , A′′′j ).
Causal correlations are correlations among random variables of parties that can be
simulated in a setting where every party is located in a space-time point, and where any
action of a party can have an influence in her future light cone only. For two parties,
this can be formalized easily.
Definition 7 (Two-party causal correlations). Let S1 and S2 be two parties. The prob-
ability distribution PX1,X2|A1,A2 is called causal if and only if it can be written as
PX1,X2|A1,A2 = pPX1|A1 PX2|X1,A1,A2 + (1− p)PX1|X2,A1,A2 PX2|A2 ,
where p is a probability.
This definition (illustrated in Figure 3.3) reads that with probability p, party S1 is
in the past light cone of party S2 (S1 ST S2). In that case, party S2 cannot send any
signal to S1 (the variables X1 and A2 are uncorrelated), and conversely, S1 can signal
to S2 (X2 can depend on A1). Note that sometimes such a decomposition is not unique,
e.g., in the case where all random variables are independent.
For more than two parties, the definition becomes more subtle. The reason for this
is that if we assume that a party S j can influence all events happening in his or her future
light cone, then S j can also have an influence on the locations of the parties in that light
cone (see Figure 3.4). We give a recursive definition, which can be found in a recent
article by Abbott et al. [8]. This subtlety was also discussed in other articles [28, 193].
Definition 8 (Multi-party causal correlations). Let S1, S2, . . . , Sn be parties. The prob-
ability distribution PX1,X2,...,Xn|A1,A2,...,An is called causal if and only if it can be written
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Figure 3.3. The relation S1 ST S2 holds with probability p, and otherwise, the rela-
tion S2 ST S1 holds.
S1
S2S3
S1
S2
S3
S1
S3
S2
Figure 3.4. Party S1 can influence her future light cone, and by that position the parties
within her future to reflect either structure.
as
PX1,X2,...,Xn|A1,A2,...,An =
n∑
j=1
p j PX j |A jQ j ,
where p j are probabilities, and where, for every j, Q j is a causal distribution
PX1,X2,...,X j−1,X j+1,...,Xn|A1,A2,...,A j−1,A j+1,...,An .
By this definition, party S j is in the past light cone of every other party with probabil-
ity p j . In that event, party S j can send signals to and set the locations of all other parties
in his or her future light cone. Without loss of generality, one can assume that party S j
positions the remaining n− 1 parties in such a way that there is another party (Sk) in
the past of the rest n− 2. This party Sk, then again, can signal to and set the locations
of the parties in his or her future light cone, etc.
A causal inequality is an inequality of probability expressions that is satisfied by
causal distributions only. This means that if a distribution leads to a violation of a
causal inequality, then that distribution is not causal, i.e., it cannot be decomposed as
in Definition 8. A causal inequality depends on the setting, i.e., the number of parties
and the dimensions of the input and output per party. Free variables are assumed to be
uniformly distributed.
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For a fixed setting, the set of all causal correlations forms a polytope [193]. Thus,
every face of such a polytope is a causal inequality. For two parties where every party
has a binary input and a binary output, all inequalities have been enumerated [53].
The same has been done recently for the simplest setting with three parties [8]. In this
“simplest” setting, whenever a party has input 0, then he or she outputs a constant 0,
otherwise he or she can output either 0 or 1.
We briefly take a look at an example of a causal inequality. This inequality is con-
structed for two parties S1 = {A1 = A, X1 = X } and S2 = {A2 = (B, B′), X2 = Y }, where
all inputs and outputs are binary. Assume, that the inputs are uniformly distributed.
Every causal distribution in that setting satisfies
pOCB :=
1
2
 
Pr
 
X = B | B′ = 0+ Pr  Y = A | B′ = 1≤ 3
4
. (3.1)
This example is taken from the seminal article by Oreshkov, Costa, and Brukner [194].
The inequality reads that if the random variable B′ takes the value 0, then party S1 has
to guess the free variable B of party S2. For this guess to be correct with a probability
that is strictly larger than 1/2, party S2 has to be in the past of S1 (S2 ST S1). In the
case where the variable B′ takes the value 1, party S2 has to guess the free variable
of party S1, and thus the relation S1 ST S2 should hold. For causal distributions, the
highest value for this expression is 3/4. The reason for this is that one party can, in the
best case, send the value of his or her free variable to the other party. But then, this other
party can at best just make a random guess. Any ordering (S1 ST S2, or S1 ST S2,
or S1 6ST 6ST S2), and thus also any probabilistic mixture of these orderings, does not
lead to a higher success probability (value of pOCB).
3.3 Causal loops
The notions of cause and effect (see Definition 5) can be understood as device indepen-
dent notions. By that we mean that the definition is applied on the level of random
variables, and not on the mechanism bringing about the correlations, or how these ran-
dom variables “interact.”
If one does not presuppose some background direction of causation — or some defi-
nite order — then it is imaginable that a theory could incorporate some causal loops. In
a causal loop, some values are derived (depending on the theory) from others, which
then again are used to calculate the former. This is not to be understood as in a feedback
loop, where the values of some variables change over time. First of all, here we do not
refer to time at all, and secondly, the variables take just one value.
The notion of a causal loop is in that sense symmetric, and thus, it cannot be inferred
directly from Definition 5. To give a definition for what a causal loop is, we hence depart
from the device independent view and consider some underlying mechanism.
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Q
R
Figure 3.5. A causal loop, where some stochastic process transforms Q to R, and back
to Q.
Definition 9 (Causal loop). Let Q and R be two non-free random variables. If in a
theory, some stochastic process computes R from Q, and some (possibly other stochastic
process) computes Q from R, then we call the composition of both processes a causal
loop (see Figure 3.5). In the deterministic case, the random variables are replaced by
variables and the stochastic processes by functions.
In the above definition the (random) variables do not “successively” take different
values; rather, they are fixed by some process or function. So, the variable R from
Figure 3.5 is the output of some process that depends on Q, and Q is the output of
some other process that depends on R — simultaneously. Such loops, however, come
with some logical antinomies.
3.3.1 Antinomies
We discuss two logical problems — antinomies — of causal loops. Both antinomies are
illustrated by time travel. By going to the past, and interacting in the past, one creates
a causal loop: The past state depends on the current, and the current then again on the
past one.
One antinomy is called grandfather antinomy. Suppose someone travels to the past,
where his or her grandfather is alive yet where the grandfather has not yet met his
beloved one (the grandmother). Once this person has found the grandfather, he or she
kills the grandfather. By doing so, the grandfather would not have been involved in a
series of acts that would have led to the birth of this time-traveling person. So, this
person would have never been born. But then, he or she could also not travel to the
past to kill the grandfather. But if the grandfather was not killed, then this person is
alive, but . . . — a logical contradiction.
In terms of the definition of causal loops above, the grandfather antinomy arises
when no consistent assignment of values to the variables exists. As an example (see
Figure 3.6a), consider two binary variables R and Q, where R is the output of the identity
function applied to q, and q is the output of the bit-flip function applied to r.
The other antinomy is called information antinomy. This antinomy is slightly more
subtle, but as we are going to see, its consequences would undermine all scientific
thoughts. Suppose someone wakes up one morning to find a book on his or her desk.
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Figure 3.6. (a) Schematic description of the grandfather antinomy. (b) Schematic de-
scription of the information antinomy.
After going through the stages of happiness and boredom, he or she publishes the book,
wins some prices, invents a time machine, travels back in time and places that very same
copy of the book on his or her desk, just the night before he or she has found it. Now,
the question is, who or what wrote the book, and more concretely, why is the content of
the book not different? The strings of text and numbers seem to arise ex nihilo, where
no reason exists for its structure to be like it is. As Deutsch [93] puts it:
“It is a fundamental principle of the philosophy of science that the solu-
tions of problems do not spring fully formed into the [u]niverse, i.e., as
initial data, but emerge only through evolutionary or rational processes. In
adopting this evolutionary principle we reject such antirational doctrines
as creationism.”
Thus, the solution to problems, or complex information (randomness taken aside),
could not simply “pop up,” but must be the result of some process. Otherwise, as
Deutsch remarks it, science would follow the doctrine of creationism.
By reconsidering the definition of causal loops above, the information antinomy
arises when the processes do not specify the values of the variables. Then, we do not
know what values they should take. As an example, consider both operations that
connects R with Q, and Q with R to be the identity functions (see Figure 3.6b).
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Chapter 4
Correlations without causal order
[. . . ] on s’imagine des Places, des
Traces, des Espaces, quoyque ces
choses ne consistent que dans la
verité des Rapports, & nullement
dans quelque realité absolue.1
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz [75]
Logical consistency does not imply causal correlations. This, and related results,
are shown in the current chapter.
In Chapter 2, we elaborated on an emergent notion of causal order, and on causal
loops. Here, we pose the question of whether local assumptions and logical consistency
only imply causal correlations. Causal correlations are defined in Chapter 3.
The study of correlations without causal order was initiated by Oreshkov, Costa,
and Brukner [194]. They showed that non-causal correlations (see Definition 8) are
achievable in a model where quantum theory holds locally, but no assumption on the
causal order of the parties is made. In the same work (see also Reference [85]), it was
shown that in the classical limit, i.e., when all operations are restricted to operations in
a fixed basis, the resulting correlations for two parties are necessarily causal. This leads
to the impression that a causal order might emerge from a quantum-to-classical transi-
tion. An extension of that result was shown by Baumann and Brukner [27] (see also
Reference [26]): If both parties measure their respective quantum systems in a fixed
basis, then the resulting correlations can always be simulated causally (their output sys-
tems do not have to be classical). However, for three or more parties, this appearance of
a causal order from the quantum-to-classical transition vanishes. This is shown in the
current chapter. After we state the assumptions, we derive the mathematical frame-
work: the framework for correlations without causal order. We continue by briefly
interpreting the framework, and then by characterizing the processes appearing in the
1As translated by Clarke [74] himself: “[. . . ] Men fancy Places, Traces, and Spaces; though those things
consiste only in the Truth of Relations, and not at all in any absolute Reality.”
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framework in two ways: by polytopes and by fixed-point theorems. Having done that,
we explicitly state some non-causal correlations, and show that they remain achievable
even if one presumes that all dynamics must be reversible. Furthermore, such reversible
dynamics leading to non-causal correlations can be cast in the quantum framework (the
process-matrix framework), where the process matrix represents a unitary transforma-
tion — reversible quantum dynamics. Finally, we show that the developed framework
is equivalent to the quantum framework in the classical limit.
4.1 Assumptions
The assumptions for the model of classical correlations without causal order are listed
here. Usually, theories, e.g., quantum theory, are formulated with the assumption of
a global causal order. This assumption fixes the relative positions of the parties. We
depart from this view by dropping that often made (sometimes implicit) assumption.
This means that for some parties S1, S2, . . . we do not assume some causal order S1  S2
or S1  S2 etc. among the parties. Instead, we base the framework on the following
list of local assumptions only. What is outside of the parties will be called environment.
The environment will then allow the parties to interact in the most general way. At
this point, the environment is held purely mathematical; possible interpretations of the
environment are given in the subsequent Section 4.3.
(C) The underlying systems the parties interact with are classical, i.e., random vari-
ables. Thus, in the most general setting, the parties can interact with the random
variables in an arbitrary way, as long as the interaction maps random variables
to random variables. The latter implies that any such interaction is governed by
probability theory, and that a party has an input as well as an output. So, every
party has a direction of time within her laboratory.
(Isol) Every party is isolated from all other parties. This means that no joint operations
on random variables can be performed; every party can perform operations on
her own random variables only. The reasons for why parties must be isolated are
that local interactions only are possible, and that otherwise the model would be
trivial: All correlations become possible.
(1-Int) Parties interact with the environment only once. The interaction is held as general
as possible. This means, a party obtains a random variable from the environment,
manipulates it, and outputs a random variable to the environment.
(LC) The assumption of logical consistency states that the distribution over all non-free
random variables conditioned on all free random variables is a map f which is
multi-linear in the choice of the local operations. This means that, for any choice
of local operations, the map f gives a probability distribution (the probabilities
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I j
Figure 4.1. A party S j has a free variable A j and a channel L j that transforms A j and I j
(the input from the environment) to X j and Oj (the output to the environment).
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· · ·
Figure 4.2. Parties are isolated and therefore, interact independently with the environ-
ment.
sum up to unity and are non-negative) over all non-free random variables con-
ditioned on all free random variables. The requirement for the map to be multi-
linear is of operational nature. Assume one could choose an operation out of two
to perform, and that for every operation, one receives a different output. If a
coin-flip chooses the operation, the output should then be distributed according
to the distribution of that coin.
4.2 Mathematical framework
The underlying states with which the parties interact are random variables (see As-
sumption (C)). In the most general setting respecting Assumption (C) and Assump-
tion (1-Int), a party S j first receives a system I j from the environment and thereafter
outputs a system Oj to the environment. Thus, we can make the following definition.
Definition 10 (Local operation). The local operation L j of a party S j is PX j ,Oj |A j ,I j . The
set of all local operations of S j is L j .
A local operation is a stochastic map, i.e., a conditional probability distribution
that has the form PX j ,Oj |A j ,I j (see Figure 4.1). Due to the assumption that the parties
are isolated (see Assumption (Isol)), multiple parties are represented by a set of par-
ties {S1, S2, . . . } (see Figure 4.2). We drop the indices to refer to a collection of objects,
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e.g., X stands for (X1, X2, . . . ). Assumption (LC) asks for a multi-linear map f from the
local operations L1, L2, . . . to the probability distribution PX ,O,I |A.
Definition 11 (Map). The map
f : L→G ,
(L1, L2, . . . ) 7→ PX ,O,I |A ,
where f is linear in L ∈ L, generates the probability distribution of all non-free variables
conditioned on the free variables.
Theorem 1 (Probability expression). The map f is
f : (L1, L2, . . . ) 7→ PI |O L1 L2 . . . .
Before we state the proof, we consider a simpler scenario: We ignore the free vari-
ables (they can be embedded into the local operations) and we marginalize over the
non-free random variables X1, X2, . . . . Thus, we consider the restricted local opera-
tions L′j = POj |I j only, and ask for the most general multi-linear map f ′:
f ′ : L′1 ×L′2 × . . .→ G′ ,
(L′1, L′2, . . . ) 7→ PI ,O ,
where L′j is the set of all local operations for party S j of the form POj |I j , and where G′
is the set of the probability distributions PI ,O.
Proof of Theorem 1. If a party S j applies the local operation L j(o, i) = δo,0, i.e., if S j
deterministically outputs 0, then the probability PI ,O(i, k) for k 6= 0 should be 0. Oth-
erwise, the joint probability PI ,O would not reflect the probabilities observed by the
parties. Therefore, we can rewrite the function f ′ as
f ′ : (R,R, . . . )→ R ,
(PO1|I1(o1, i1), PO2|I2(o2, i2), . . . ) 7→ PI ,O(i, o) .
That f ′ is multi-linear means that f ′(L′1(o1, i1), L′2(o2, i2), . . . ) equals
c(o, i) + e1(o, i)L
′
1(o1, i1) + e2(o, I)L
′
2(o2, i2) + . . .
+ e1,2(o, i)L
′
1(o1, i1)L
′
2(o2, i2) + . . .
+ e1,2,...(o, i)L
′
1(o1, i1)L
′
2(o2, i2) . . . ,
where c(o, i) is some constant and where ep,q,r,...(o, i) is the coefficient for the product
of probabilities of the parties Sp, Sq, Sr , . . . . As above, we fix the local operations of all
parties to be
L′j
 
o j , i j

=
¨
1 o j = 0 ,
0 otherwise,
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Figure 4.3. The environment E is a channel that takes the outputs of the parties and
produces the inputs to the parties.
i.e., every party deterministically sets the random variable Oj to the value 0. As dis-
cussed at the beginning of the proof, PI ,O(i, o) for o 6= (0,0, . . . ) should be 0, which
implies that c(o, i) must be 0. Then again, if at least one party uses the local operation
from above, then PI ,O(i, o) for o 6= (0, 0, . . . ) should remain 0. This implies that all
coefficients of strict subsets of parties must be zero. Thus, we are left with
PI ,O(i, o) = e1,2,...(o, i)L
′
1(o1, i1)L
′
2(o2, i2) . . . ) .
If we fix the parties to deterministically output o′, then the condition that probabilities
sum up to unity implies∑
i,o
e1,2,...(o, i)δo1,o′1δo2,o′2 · · ·=
∑
i
e1,2,...(o
′, i) = 1 .
By repeating this argument for all o′, we get∑
i
e1,2,...(o, i) = 1 .
The coefficient e1,2,...(o, i) can thus be interpreted as a conditional probability distribu-
tion PI |O(i, o).
The conditional probability distribution PI |O can be interpreted as channel E (see
Figure 4.3). We call this channel environment or classical process.
Definition 12 (Environment, classical process). The environment, also called classical
process E is a channel PI |O that takes the random variables O1, O2, . . . as input from the
respective parties, and produces the random variables I1, I2, . . . as outputs, which serve
as inputs to the respective parties.
4.2.1 Examples of classical processes
We briefly discuss three examples with three parties S1, S2, S3, where all random vari-
ables are assumed to be binary.
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Figure 4.4. (a) The environment E as a state. (b) The environment E as a channel
from S1 to S2, S3. (c) The environment E produces a loop from the output of S1 to the
input of the same party.
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Example 1. An example of an environment is a state PI1,I2,I3 , i.e., a channel that ignores
the inputs O1, O2, O3:
PI1,I2,I3|O1,O2,O3 = PI1,I2,I3 .
This can be visualized as in Figure 4.4a.
Example 2. Another example is an environment that gives a state to party S1 and that
sends the output of S1 to all other parties:
PI1,I2,I3|O1,O2,O3 = PI1 PI2,I3|O1 ,
with
PI2,I3|O1(i2, i3, o1) = δi2,o1δi3,o1 .
Such an environment generates the causal relations S1  S2 and S1  S3. This is shown
in Figure 4.4b.
Example 3. A final example (see Figure 4.4c) is an environment that deterministically
forwards the output of party S1 to the input of S1, and where all other parties receive
a state:
PI1,I2,I3|O1,O2,O3 = PI1|O1 PI2,I3 ,
with
PI1|O1(i1, o1) = δi1,o1 .
Note that this example has a logical problem. If party S1 chooses to perform the local
operation
L1(x1, o1, a1, i1) = PX1,O1|A1,I1(x1, o1, a1, i1) = δx1,0δo1,i1⊕1 ,
i.e., she flips the input I1 to produce the output O1, then no consistent assignment of
values to the variables is possible: If S1 receives the value a from the environment, flips
it, i.e., she outputs the value a ⊕ 1, which then again is forwarded to her input, then
we get the inconsistency that a has to be equal a⊕ 1, which is not possible. This is an
instantiation of the grandfather antinomy (see Section 3.3.1).
4.2.2 Logical consistency
Because of logical problems as in Example 3, we need to restrict the environment E in
such a way that for any choice of local operations no logical problem arises. This follows
from Assumption (LC) combined with Assumption (C), which states that the parties
can perform arbitrary operations.
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Definition 13 (Logical consistency). An environment E = PI |O is called logically consis-
tent if and only if for any choice of local operations of the parties, the expression
PI |OPX1,O1|A1,I1 PX2,O2|A2,I2 · · ·
yields a probability distribution PX ,O,I |A.
Since we anyhow consider all choices of local operations, we can, for the sake of
simplicity (as also done above), ignore the random variables A1, A2, . . . and the random
variables X1, X2, . . . . Thus, the definition of an environment E to be logical consistency
simplifies to:
∀  PO1|I1 , PO2|I2 , . . .  ∈ L′1 ×L′2 × · · · : PI ,O = PI |OPO1|I1 PO2|I2 · · · ,
where the operations POj |I j are the reduced local operations of the parties — the in-
puts A j and outputs X j are ignored. This is the same as saying that for any choice of
reduced local operations of the parties, the following two conditions are satisfied:∑
o∈O,i∈I
PI ,O(i, o) = 1 ,
∀o ∈O, i ∈ I :PI ,O(i, o)≥ 0 .
The first condition requires that the probabilities sum to unity, and the second condi-
tions asks for non-negative probabilities.
The environment of Example 3, as opposed to the other two examples, is logically
inconsistent. To see this inconsistency take the local operation L′1(o1, i1) for party S1 to
be δo1,i1⊕1. By this, we get∑
o∈O,i∈I
δi1,o1 PI2,I3(i2, i3)δo1,i1⊕1PO2|I2(o2, i2)PO3|I3(o3, i3) = 0 ,
which, however, should be 1.
4.3 Interpretation of the environment
There are several ways to interpret the environment E. Throughout this work we dis-
cuss some of them in detail.
One way to interpret the environment is that the causal relations among the parties
are not defined a priori. Rather, they are defined via the correlations that the environ-
ment and the choice of local operations establish. This advocates the view that physics
is not “played” on a space-time stage; the stage emerges from the correlations. This
could be a called Leibnizian interpretation; space-time is relational.
This contrasts the view that the parties have fixed locations within space-time. In
that case, the environment can be thought of as a back-in-time channel in the sense of
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a closed time-like curve. We call this interpretation Einsteinian. We elaborate more on
this in Chapter 5.
Finally, we could interpret the environment logically. Then, it is not an actual process
that happens. Rather, the environment serves as a tool that helps to describe the most
general correlations if one follows the assumptions from Sections 4.1. We follow this
logical interpretation in Chapter 6, where we discuss it from a point of view of computer
science.
4.4 Characterization with polytopes
Polytopes and their properties are described in the preliminaries (see Appendix). The
objects used in Section 4.2 can be represented by probability vectors and stochastic
matrices (see Appendix as well).
The environment E can be modeled by a stochastic matrix Eˆ = PˆI |O of dimen-
sion |I| × |O|. The local operation L j of a party S j , then again, can be modeled by
a stochastic matrix PˆX j ,Oj |A j ,I j . As above, we restrict ourselves in the following to the
reduced local operations: PˆOj |I j =: Lˆ′j . The dimensions of the matrix Lˆ′j depends on the
cardinality of the sets O j and I j: Lˆ′j is a |O j| by |I j| matrix. In the following, the set L′j
refers to the set of all stochastic matrices of that form. As above, the set L′ (where
we drop the index j) is the set of the Kronecker products of all stochastic matrices
for all parties involved, i.e., L′ = L′1 × L′2 × . . . . Thus, an element Lˆ′ ∈ L′ has the
form Lˆ′1 ⊗ Lˆ′2 ⊗ . . . where Lˆ′j ∈ L′j . We adopt the definition of logical consistency (see
Definition 13) to the current representation, where the probabilities are expressed by
PI |O(i, o) =
 
~i1 ⊗ ~i2 ⊗ · · ·
T
Eˆ (~o1 ⊗ ~o2 ⊗ · · · ) , (4.1)
POj |I j (o j , i j) = ~o
T
j Lˆ
′
j
~i j . (4.2)
The condition for an environment E to be logically consistent is stated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 2 (Logical consistency). An environment E is logically consistent if and only if
∀ Lˆ′ ∈ D : Tr  Eˆ Lˆ′= 1 , (4.3)
∀(m, n) ∈ I ×O :Eˆm,n ≥ 0 . (4.4)
The set D ⊂ L′ is the set of all deterministic local operations from the set L′.
The first condition states that for any choice of deterministic operations of the par-
ties, the probabilities sum up to unity. The second condition states that the probabilities
are non-negative.
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Proof of Theorem 2. By plugging in Equations (4.1) and (4.2), the total-probability con-
dition is
∀ Lˆ′ ∈ L′ :∑
i,o
 
~iT Eˆ~o
 ·  ~oT1 Lˆ′1~i1 ·  ~oT2 Lˆ′2~i2= 1 .
This can now be rewritten as
∀ Lˆ′ ∈ L′ :∑
i,o
~iT Eˆ~o~oT Lˆ′~i = 1 ,
from which we obtain
∀ Lˆ′ ∈ L′ : Tr  Eˆ Lˆ′= 1 .
Because any local operation can be written as a convex combination of deterministic
ones, and because the above expression is linear in the choice of local operations, it is
sufficient to consider the deterministic ones only. By this we arrive at the condition (4.3).
The non-negativity condition (4.4) is easy to show. Probabilities must be non-
negative. The local operations contain non-negative entries only. Thus, every entry
of Eˆ must be non-negative as well.
Theorem 2 can also be stated by considering a smaller set of local operations:
Theorem 3 (Necessary and sufficient set for the total-probability condition). The con-
dition 4.3 can also be stated by restricting every party S j to the operations
Dˆj,m,n =

1 1 1 · · · 1 0 1 · · · 1
0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0
0 0 0 · · · 0 1 0 · · · 0
0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0 · · · 0

,
which is the zero matrix with 1 entries in the first row, except for the column m: There the
entry 1 is at position n. Such an operation outputs the all-zero state for any input except
for input m, where the output is n. This matrix has dimension |O j| × |I j|. Formally, this
means
∀(m, n) ∈O× I : Tr  Eˆ  Dˆ1,m1,n1 ⊗ Dˆ2,m2,n2 ⊗ . . . = 1
⇐⇒
∀ Lˆ′ ∈ D : Tr  Eˆ Lˆ′= 1 .
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Proof. We restrict ourselves to the single-party scenario — the multi-party case follows
from linearity. The direction ⇐= is trivial since:
∀(m, n) ∈O1 × I1 : D1,m,n ∈ D .
For the other direction, we show that any Lˆ′ ∈ D can be written as a linear com-
bination of Dˆ1,m,n with (m, n) ∈ O × I. The proofs then follows from the fact that the
probability expression is linear in the choice of operation. So, any Lˆ′ ∈ D, where k is
mapped to ak can be written as
Lˆ′ =
∑
k
~wak ~v
T
k ,
where ~vk is the |I|-dimensional vector with a 1 entry at position k and 0s everywhere
else, and where the vector ~wak , then again, is the |O|-dimensional zero vector with a 1
at position ak. Now, Lˆ
′ can be written as
Lˆ′ =
∑
k∈I
Dˆ1,k,ak − (|I| − 1) Dˆ1,0,0 .
The family {Dˆj,m,n|(m, n) ∈O j × I j} of deterministic operations has size
|I j|
 |O j| − 1+ 1 .
In contrast, the set D j has cardinality |O j||I j |.
4.4.1 Polytope of logically consistent environments
The above characterization for logically consistent environments defines a polytope.
Let us assume a setup with n parties S1, S2, . . . , Sn. Now, the set of logically consistent
environments E forms a polytope:
Theorem 4 (Polytope). The H-representation of the polytope of logically consistent envi-
ronments without causal order is
∀(m, n) ∈O× I : Tr  Eˆ  Dˆ1,m1,n1 ⊗ Dˆ2,m2,n2 ⊗ . . . = 1 ,
∀i, j : Eˆi, j ≥ 0 .
If all input and output spaces are isomorphic and have dimension d, then the poly-
tope has d2n facets and dimension
d2n − (d(d − 1) + 1)n ,
which is exponential in the number of parties.
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causal deterministic extremal point
proper-mixture extremal point (fine-tuned)
non-causal deterministic extremal point
Figure 4.5. Schematic polytopes. The triangle inside represents the set of all causal
environments. The dash-dotted polytope is the polytope of all environments (non-
causal as well), and the polytope in-between is the non-causal polytope restricted to
deterministic extremal points.
4.4.2 Deterministic-extrema polytope
As is shown later, for some configurations, the polytope of logically consistent environ-
ments consists of extremal points that are probabilistic. Such extremal points thus are
intrinsically probabilistic; they cannot be expressed as a convex combination of deter-
ministic extremal points. Rather, they are consistent mixtures of inconsistent points. We
call them proper mixtures. This motivates to study the following, restricted polytope:
Definition 14 (Deterministic-extrema polytope). The deterministic-extrema polytope is
defined as the polytope of logically consistent environments where all extremal points
are deterministic (see polytope with the solid lines in Figure 4.5).
This polytope is solved by first solving the regular polytope and then by selecting
only the deterministic extremal points. Let us define two sets: D is the set of all en-
vironments from the deterministic-extrema polytope, and the set Dext is the set of all
extremal points of that polytope. In the following two chapters, we state a result where
these definitions come handy.
4.4.3 Polytopes with binary systems for one to three parties
We discuss four examples where all input and output spaces are binary: the single-
party scenario, the two-party scenario, the three-party scenario, and the deterministic-
extrema polytope of the three-party scenario. For all examples we use I j =O j = {0, 1}
for j ∈ {1, 2,3}. Thus, the set Ldet of deterministic local operations is
Ldet =

Dˆ0 =

1 1
0 0

, Dˆ1 =

0 0
1 1

, Dˆid =

1 0
0 1

, Dˆnot =

0 1
1 0

,
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S1
X1
A1
O1
E
I1
Figure 4.6. In the single-party scenario, the environment is equivalent to a state.
where Dˆ0 and Dˆ1 produce the output 0 and 1, respectively, and where Dˆid and Dˆnot
are the identity and bit-flip operations. Because of Theorem 3, we do not have to
consider Dˆnot.
Example 4 (Single-party scenario). The environment Eˆ is a two-by-two matrix:
Eˆ =

w0 w1
w2 w3

.
With the identities
Tr
 
Eˆ Dˆ0

= 1 , Tr
 
Eˆ Dˆ1

= 1 , Tr
 
Eˆ Dˆid

= 1 ,
we can eliminate three variables from Eˆ and get
Eˆ =

w0 w0
1−w0 1−w0

.
From the non-negativity constraint we get
w0 ≥ 0 ,
1−w0 ≥ 0 .
This gives a one-dimensional polytope with the extremal points w0 = 0 and w0 = 1.
The respective environments are
Eˆ0 =

1 1
0 0

, Eˆ1 =

0 0
1 1

.
Every convex combination of these two environments is such that it ignores the output
of the single party. Thus, in the single-party scenario, an environment is equivalent to
a state, as shown in Figure 4.6.
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Example 5 (Two-parties scenario). In the two-parties scenario with binary inputs and
outputs, the environment as a stochastic matrix Eˆ is a 4-by-4 matrix where the condi-
tions
∀i, j ∈ {0, 1, id} : Tr  Eˆ  Dˆi ⊗ Dˆj= 1 ,
∀m, n ∈ {1,2, 3,4} : Eˆm,n ≥ 0
are fulfilled. We can eliminate 9 out of the 16 variables. Thus, the polytope is 7-
dimensional. There are 12 extremal points:
Eˆ0 =

1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 , Eˆ1 =

0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 ,
Eˆ2 =

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0
 , Eˆ3 =

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1
 ,
Eˆ4 =

1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 , Eˆ5 =

0 0 1 1
1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
 ,
Eˆ6 =

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1
 , Eˆ7 =

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1
1 1 0 0
 ,
Eˆ8 =

1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0
 , Eˆ9 =

0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
 ,
Eˆ10 =

0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1
 , Eˆ11 =

0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0
 .
The four first environments represent states (the input state is independent of the out-
put state of the parties). The following four environments represent channels from S1
to S2 (S1  S2), and the last four environments are channels from S2 to S1 (S2  S1).
These environments are shown in Figure 4.7.
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S1 S2
c1 c2
(a)
S1
S2
c1
⊕c
(b)
S2
S1
c2
⊕c
(c)
Figure 4.7. The two-parties polytope consists of environments that represent either
(a) a state, (b) a (bit-flip) channel from S1 to S2, or (c) a (bit-flip) channel in the reverse
direction.
Example 6 (Three-parties scenario). Here, the environment Eˆ is an 8-by-8 matrix. This
polytope is given by
∀i, j, k ∈ {0, 1, id} : Tr  Eˆ  Dˆi ⊗ Dˆj ⊗ Dˆk= 1 ,
∀m, n ∈ {1,2, . . . , 8} : Eˆm,n ≥ 0 ,
and is 64 − 27 = 37-dimensional. We used cdd+ [124] to enumerate the extremal
points. For this setting, the polytope consists of 710′760 extremal points. Here, as op-
posed to the two examples looked at before, some extremal points are fine-tuned. This
means, that such an extremal point cannot be expressed as a convex combination of
deterministic ones from the polytope. Rather, these extremal points are a convex com-
bination of deterministic matrices where some of them are necessarily inconsistent. A
tiny variation to the mixture of such fine-tuned processes might render them inconsis-
tent. One fine-tuned extremal point of this polytope is
Eˆex1 =
1
2

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1

. (4.5)
This environment is a uniform mixture of two circular channels. One channel takes
the output of S1 and forwards it to S2, takes the output of S2 and forwards it to S3,
and takes the output of S3 and forwards it to S1. The other channel is as the one
just described with additional bit-flips (see Figure 4.8). The environment Eˆex1, as a
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S1
S2S3
S1
S2S3
⊕1
⊕1
⊕1
+12
1
2
Figure 4.8. The extremal point Eˆex1 corresponds to an environment which is the uni-
form mixture of two circular channels: the identity and the bit-flip channel.
E
Dˆi Dˆj Dˆk
Dˆi Dˆj Dˆk
O1 O2 O3
I1 I2 I3
E′
Figure 4.9. From a logically consistent environment E one can always obtain another
logically consistent environment E′ where (0,0, 0) is mapped to (0,0, 0). This is done
by squeezing E into a set of identity or bit-flip operations.
conditional probability distribution, is
PI |O(i, o) =

1
2 for (i1, i2, i3) = (o3, o1, o2) ,
1
2 for (i1, i2, i3) = (o3 ⊕ 1, o1 ⊕ 1, o2 ⊕ 1) ,
0 otherwise.
(4.6)
Example 7 (Three-parties deterministic-extrema scenario). If we restrict ourselves to
the deterministic extremal points of the polytope discussed above, we find a total of 744
extremal points. We can exploit some symmetry to reduce the number by a factor
of 8: We look only at those extremal points where on input (0, 0,0) the environment
outputs (0, 0,0) again. This is obtained by some relabeling of the bits (see Figure 4.9).
Thus, we remain with a total of 93 extremal points. They can be categorized within
seven classes (see also Figure 4.10):
1. all parties receive a state (no channels);
2. two-parties to one-party channels;
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C
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A
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A
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A
B
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A
C
B
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A
C
(g)
Figure 4.10. All classes of environments in of the deterministic-extrema polytope for
three parties and binary inputs and outputs.
3. one-party to two-parties channels;
4. one-party to one-party to one-party channels;
5. one-party to two-parties and one-party to one-party channels;
6. one-party to two-parties and two-way channels between these two parties;
7. every input depends on the other two outputs.
The environments of class 1 are simply states. Up to the symmetry discussed above,
only one extremal point belongs to this class. The number of extremal points per class
are shown in Table 4.1. The last two classes are of special interest since the respec-
tive environments lead to non-causal correlations. One extremal point of the last class
(which is also an extremal point of the three-parties polytope discussed above) is
Eˆex2 =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

. (4.7)
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Class Number of extremal points
1 1
2 3 · 7 = 21
3 3
4 6
5 6 · 5 = 30
6 3 · 8 = 24
7 8
Total 93
Table 4.1. Number of deterministic extremal points per class.
S1
S2S3
S1
S2S3
⊕1
⊕1
⊕1
maj(o1, o2, o3) = 0 maj(o1, o2, o3) = 1
Figure 4.11. The extremal point shown in Equation 4.8 is a conditional circular chan-
nel.
This is a deterministic circular channel which depends on the majority of the inputs.
It was initially found by Araújo and Feix [14]. If the majority of the inputs is 0, then
the environment implements a clock-wise circular channel. Otherwise, it implements
a counter clock-wise circular channel with bit-flips (see Figure 4.11):
PI |O(i, o) = δi1,¬o2∧o3δi2,¬o3∧o1δi3,¬o1∧o2 . (4.8)
In Figure 4.12, we project this and the preceding polytope onto a plane, together
with the discussed examples.
4.5 Characterization with fixed points
The property that an environment is logically consistent can be expressed by statements
about its fixed points. Basically, an environment is logically consistent if and only if it
has a unique fixed point. We show this in the deterministic case first, and head on to
the probabilistic later.
A conditional probability distribution PR|Q with only 0−1 entries can be written as
a function and vice versa.
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CC¯ Eˆex1
Eˆex2
Figure 4.12. The three-parties polytope for binary systems is projected onto a plane.
The solid lines show the smaller deterministic-extrema polytope. The points C and C¯
represent the circular channels (clock-wise and anti clock-wise).
Definition 15 (Conditional probability distributions and functions). Let PR|Q be a con-
ditional probability distribution. We define the function fPR|Q as
fPR|Q :Q→R
q 7→ r such that PR|Q(r, q) = 1 .
For a function g : S → T we define the corresponding conditional probability distribu-
tion P gT |S as
P gT |S(t, s) =
¨
1 if g(s) = t ,
0 otherwise,
where T and S are random variables with sample spaces T and S respectively.
By using this definition, we can switch from functions to conditional probability
distributions and back.
Theorem 5 (Unique fixed points for deterministic environments). A deterministic en-
vironment E is logically consistent if and only if, for any choice of local operations of the
parties, the concatenated function has a unique fixed point, i.e.,
∀L′ ∈ L′,∃!i ∈ I : i = fE

fL′1(i1), fL′2(i2), . . .

,
where ∃! is the uniqueness quantifier.
Proof. By Theorem 2 we have
∀ Lˆ ∈ Ldet : Tr
 
Eˆ Lˆ

= 1 .
Since Lˆ and Dˆ have 0− 1 entries only, so does Mˆ := Eˆ Lˆ. That the trace of Mˆ equals
one means that the diagonal ~q of M has a single 1 entry, and that
Mˆ~q = ~q .
The position of the 1 entry in ~q corresponds to the fixed point.
58 4.5 Characterization with fixed points
This theorem can be understood in the following way. If there would be no fixed
point, then we would have a logical inconsistency in the spirit of the grandfather anti-
nomy (see Section 3.3.1). If there would be more than one fixed points, then we run
into the information antinomy (see Section 3.3.1): What is the actual state observed
by the parties? If one would apply some function to reduce the number of fixed points
back to one (as is done in Deutsch [93]), then one introduced a non-linearity into the
dynamics, which leads to other problems.
A similar theorem can be stated for probabilistic environments:
Theorem 6 (Average number of fixed points is one). Let E be a convex combination of
deterministic stochastic matrices:
Eˆ =
∑
k
pk Dˆk .
Then, for any choice of local operations, we have
∀ Lˆ′ ∈ Ldet :
∑
k
pk
¦i | i = fDk  fL′1(i1), fL′2(i2), . . .©= 1 .
Proof. By plugging in some decomposition
Eˆ =
∑
k
pk Dˆk
of Eˆ, the total-probability condition becomes
∀ Lˆ′ ∈ Ldet : Tr
 
Eˆ Lˆ′

= Tr
∑
k
pk Dˆk Lˆ
′

=
∑
k
pk Tr
 
Dˆk Lˆ
′= 1 .
We conclude the proof by noting that, as in the proof above, the expression Tr
 
Dˆk Lˆ
′
is the number of fixed points of Dˆk Lˆ
′.
This theorem states that the average number of fixed points is 1. Note that the tran-
sition matrices Dˆk of some decomposition of Eˆ do not necessarily have to be logically
consistent.
4.5.1 Illustrations of the fixed-point theorems
We discuss the two examples (Equations (4.5) and (4.7)), starting with the latter.
Example 8. The environment Eˆex2 (see Equation (4.7) and Figure 4.11) is deterministic.
The function f Eˆex2 as a function is shown in Table 4.2. If all three parties S1, S2, S3 apply
the identity operation (o j = i j), then the fixed point is (0, 0,0). Now, suppose that
party S3 applies the bit-flip operation instead. This is shown in Table 4.3 where we
added a third column that contains the outputs of the parties after the local operations
have been applied. In this case, the fixed point is (1,0, 1).
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o1 o2 o3 i1 i2 i3
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 0 0
Table 4.2. The function table of f Eˆex2 .
o1 o2 o3 i1 i2 i3 o1 o2 o3
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
Table 4.3. The function table of f Eˆex2 and subsequent application of the local opera-
tions.
Example 9. The other example (see Equation 4.5 and Figure 4.8) consists of a uniform
mixture of two cyclic channels: of
c : (o1, o2, o3) 7→ (o3, o1, o2)
and of
c¯ : (o1, o2, o3) 7→ (o3 ⊕ 1, o1 ⊕ 1, o2 ⊕ 1) .
Suppose all three parties apply the identity operation (o j = i j). In that case, the left
channel of Figure 4.8 (channel c) has two fixed points:
(0,0, 0) = c(0, 0,0) ,
(1,1, 1) = c(1, 1,1) .
Then again, the right channel (channel c¯) has no fixed point:
∀(i1, i2, i3) ∈ I : (i1, i2, i3) 6= c¯(i1, i2, i3) .
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Thus, in average, the number of fixed points is 1/2 · 2 + 1/2 · 0 = 1. If, to look at a
second case, party S3 applies the bit-flip operation instead, then
∀(i1, i2, i3) ∈ I : (i1, i2, i3) 6= c(i1, i2, i3 ⊕ 1) ,
yet
(0,1, 1) = c¯(0, 1,1⊕ 1) ,
(1,0, 0) = c¯(1, 0,0⊕ 1) .
So, again, the number of fixed points on average is 1.
4.6 Non-causal correlations
By now, we have all tools needed to discuss non-causal correlations (see Definition 8).
In the settings with one or two parties (see Examples 4 and 5), all correlations achiev-
able are causal. The reason for this is that the environments in these cases represent
either a state or a channel in one direction. This has been proven for arbitrary dimen-
sions in the work by Oreshkov et al. [194] and in the work by Costa [85]. One of the
main contributions of this thesis is that for three or more parties, there exist logically
consistent environments that lead to non-causal correlations.
Assume a three-parties setup with the parties S1, S2, S3. One way to prove that
an environment produces non-causal correlations is by showing a violation of a causal
inequality. These inequalities have been introduced in Section 3.2.
4.6.1 Probabilistic non-causal correlations
The non-causal correlations that are established here are probabilistic. Consider the
following game:
Game 1. The three parties
S1 = (A1 ≡ (A, M), X1 ≡ X , L1) ,
S2 = (A2 ≡ (B, M), X2 ≡ Y, L2) ,
S3 = (A3 ≡ (C , M), X3 ≡ Z , L3) ,
have binary random variables A, B, C , X , Y, Z and M is a shared trit with M= {1,2, 3}.
Assume that all free random variables are uniformly distributed. The goal of the game
these three parties play is to maximize
psucc :=
1
3
(Pr (X = B ⊕ C | M = 1)
+Pr (Y = A⊕ C | M = 2)
+Pr (Z = A⊕ B | M = 3)) ,
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which states that, depending on the value of M , one party should receives the parity of
the inputs of the other two parties.
The maximal value this probability expression can take in a causal scenario is
pprobsucc ≤ 56 ,
which is a causal inequality (see Section 3.2). The reasoning here is that in a causal
scenario, at least one party is in the causal past of all others. Without loss of generality,
assume that S1 ST S2 and that S1 ST S3. If M = 1, then the guess X of S1 is correct
with half probability:
pprobsucc ≤ 13

1
2
+ 1+ 1

=
5
6
.
The same holds where any other party is in the causal past of the remaining two.
The environment Eˆex1 (shown in Figure 4.8 and in Equations (4.5) and (4.6)) with
appropriate local operations violates this inequality up to the algebraic maximum. This
violation is achieved with the following choice of local operations:
L1 = PX ,O1|A,I1,M (x , o1, a, i1, m) =

δx ,i1δo1,0 if m = 1 ,
δx ,0δo1,i1⊕a if m = 2 ,
δx ,0δo1,a if m = 3 ,
L2 = PY,O2|B,I2,M (y, o2, b, i2, m) =

δy,i2δo2,0 if m = 2 ,
δy,0δo2,i2⊕a if m = 3 ,
δy,0δo2,b if m = 1 ,
L3 = PZ ,O3|C ,I3,M (z, o3, c, i3, m) =

δz,i3δo3,0 if m = 3 ,
δz,0δo3,i3⊕a if m = 1 ,
δz,0δo3,c if m = 2 .
That is, party SM uses the input IM from the environment as her guess to win the game.
The other parties, i.e., S j with j 6= M , set, without loss of generality, there non-free
random variable to 0. Party S(M+1 mod 3)+1 adds her free variable to the input from the
environment and uses that as the output to the environment. Finally, party S(M mod 3)+1
simply uses the free variable as output to the environment. By this, the success proba-
bility for Game 1 is 1. The case where M = 1 is shown in Figure 4.13. If M = 1, then
the correlations that the parties establish are such that S2  S1 and S3  S1. For M = 2,
we get S1  S2 and S3  S2. Finally, for M = 3, we get S1  S3 and S2  S3. Thus,
the causal relations among the parties depend on the choice of the local operations they
apply.
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Figure 4.13. For M = 1, party S1 outputs 0 to the environment, party S2 outputs b to
the environment, and party S3 adds c to the input from the environment to produce
the output. Via both circular channels, party S1 receives the correct input b ⊕ c from
the environment (the two bit flips of the right channel cancel).
4.6.2 Deterministic non-causal correlations
Deterministic environments that are logically consistent and can be used to establish
non-causal correlations exist as well. We already found such an example as an extremal
point of the deterministic-extrema polytope (see Section 4.4.2). Here, we show that
the environment depicted in Figure 4.11 and Equations (4.7) and (4.8) indeed leads to
non-causal correlations. For this we introduce the following game:
Game 2. Consider the three parties
S1 = (A1 ≡ A, X1 ≡ X , L1) ,
S2 = (A2 ≡ B, X2 ≡ Y, L2) ,
S3 = (A3 ≡ C , X3 ≡ Z , L3) ,
where all random variables are binary and the free random variables are uniformly dis-
tributed. The game is that the three parties wish to maximize the probability expression
pdetsucc :=
1
2
(Pr (X = C ∧ Y = A ∧ Z = B |maj(A, B, C) = 0)
+ Pr (X = B ⊕ 1 ∧ Y = C ⊕ 1 ∧ Z = A⊕ 1 |maj(A, B, C) = 1)) ,
(4.9)
where the function maj(A, B, C) takes three bits and outputs the majority 0 or 1 of the
bits. Thus, if the majority of the free variables is 0, then the parties aim to establish
a clock-wise identity channel. Otherwise, they aim to establish a counter-clockwise
bit-flip channel.
In a causal scenario, the highest value for the success probability is 3/4. The reason
for this is that a causal scenario forces at least one party to be in the causal past of the
other two parties, e.g., S1 ST S2 and S1 ST S3. In that case, S1 has to guess ¬B ∧ C ,
which, for uniformly distributed B, C , is 0 with probability 3/4. Thus, party S1 has to
bet on 0 to maximize the probability expression; a bet she loses with probability 1/4.
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Figure 4.14. The local operation of party S j with j ∈ {1, 2,3} is to simply forward the
free variable as the input to the environment, and to use the state obtained from the
environment as the guess.
From this follows that the overall probability for all parties to guess correctly is upper
bounded by 3/4.
The environment from Figure 4.11, however, can be used to win the game perfectly
— this environment implements precisely the relations the parties wish to achieve. For
that purpose, we simply choose the trivial operations as the local operations of the
parties (see Figure 4.14):
L1 = PX ,O1|A,I1(x , o1, a, i1) = δx ,i1δo1,a ,
L2 = PY,O2|B,I2(y, o2, b, i2) = δy,i2δo2,b ,
L3 = PZ ,O3|C ,I3(z, o3, c, i3) = δz,i3δo3,c .
The condition (4.9) corresponds to the following set of equations:
X = ¬B ∧ C ,
Y = ¬C ∧ A ,
Z = ¬A∧ B .
The causal relations among the parties clearly depends on the free variables of the
parties, i.e., if party S3 uses C = 0, then S1  S2, otherwise, S2  S1. From this we see
that a party can select the signaling direction between the remaining two parties.
4.7 Reversible environments
The above environments are processes, or channels, that produce the inputs to the
parties from their outputs. Here, we pose the question whether such processes can
be made reversible. A reversible process is necessarily a function; and a function e is
reversible if and only if its inverse e−1 exists as well (e−1(e(x)) = x). In general, any
function can be embedded into a reversible one — this is usually done by embedding
it into a function with a higher-dimensional domain and range. However, it is not
immediately clear whether this can be done for processes. The caveat here is that the
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Figure 4.15. (a) Reversible embedding of a function f . (b) Reversible embedding of a
probabilistic operation (channel) PY |X (·, x) =∑k pk fk(x).
larger process (in which some logically consistent process is embedded) needs to be
logically consistent as well.
A function
f : X → Y ,
x 7→ y ,
with finite sets X = {0, 1, . . . , nx},Y = {0,1, . . . , ny}, can be embedded into a reversible
function f ′ in the following way (see Figure 4.15a):
f ′ : X ×Y → X ×Y ,
(x , a) 7→ (x , a⊕ f (x)) ,
where ⊕ is the addition modulo |Y|. Then, f is retrieved from f ′ whenever the second
input to f ′ is 0: f ′(x , 0) = (x , f (x)). The same holds for probabilistic operations by the
technique of derandomization. There, a channel PY |X has first to be decomposed into
a convex mixture of deterministic channels (functions)
PY |X (·, x) =
∑
k
pk fk(x) ,
where pk are probabilities and fk are functions from X to Y. The reversible function fP ′
is defined as
fP ′ : X ×K×Y → X ×K×Y ,
(x , k, a) 7→ (x , k, a⊕ fk(x)) ,
where K is the set that enumerates the functions used in the decomposition. For the
probabilistic input PK(k) = pk, this construction recovers the distribution PY |X (·, x).
Then, a reversible channel can be implemented as shown in Figure 4.15b.
Some, but not all, environments studied here can be embedded into a reversible
process as well. In that context, we present three results. First, all environments from
the deterministic-extrema polytope (from set D) can be embedded into a reversible pro-
cess. Second, no environment from outside of that polytope can be made reversible.
And finally, to make an environment reversible (if possible), one needs additional par-
ties; a so-called source and a so-called sink.
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Figure 4.16. (a) The source Ssrc is a party that does not receive any system from the
environment. (b) The sink Ssink is a party that does not provide any system to the
environment.
4.7.1 Reversible environments from the deterministic-extrema polytope
We constructively show how to embed processes from the set D, and prove that every
other process cannot be made reversible. In the spirit of Figures 4.15a and 4.15b, we
add two parties: a source, labelled by Ssrc, and a sink, labelled by Ssink. The source has
a trivial input and produces an output to the environment (see Figure 4.16a). Her oper-
ation is described by the conditional probability distribution PXsrc,Osrc|Asrc . Symmetrically,
the sink has a trivial output and obtains a random variable from the environment (see
Figure 4.16b). Here, the local operation is PXsink|Asink,Isink .
Theorem 7 (Reversible extremal ponits from the deterministic-extrema polytope). Ev-
ery environment that corresponds to an extremal point of the deterministic-extrema poly-
tope (from the set Dext) can be embedded into a logically consistent environment that is
reversible.
Proof. Let Eˆ ∈ Dext be an extremal point of the deterministic-extrema polytope. There-
fore, fE represents a function
fE :O→ I ,
o 7→ i .
The reversible and logically consistent environment into which Eˆ is embedded is defined
as
e′ :O× Isrc→ I ×Osink ,
(o, r) 7→ (r ⊕ fE(o), o) ,
where the source and the sink are incorporated. Here, the operation ⊕ is an addition
modulo |I j| that is applied locally to every party S j . The output space of the source
is Osrc = I, and the input space of the sink is Isink = O. This setup is visualized in
Figure 4.17. As in the considerations above, we simply ignore the input and output
spaces Asrc,Asink,Xsrc,Xsink of the source and sink. We have to show two properties
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Figure 4.17. A reversible embedding of an environment Eˆ from the deterministic-
extrema polytope (set Dext).
of e′. The first is that it indeed embeds fE , and the second one is that it is logically
consistent. For the latter property, we also need to look at all operations the source and
the sink can apply.
Formally, the first property is
∃r ∈Osrc,∀o ∈O : e′(o, r)O = fE(o) .
By the subscript O we mean that we look only at the space O after e′ has been applied.
Indeed, by construction, this property is fulfilled for r = 0.
The second property is
∀r ∈Osrc,∀L ∈ L,∃!(i, s) ∈ I × Isink : (i, s) = e′( fL(i), r) .
Note that here we applied the same notation as above again: If an index is dropped,
then we refer to the collection. We rewrite the above equation with e′ ≡ (e′1, e′2):
∀r ∈Osrc,∀L ∈ L,∃!(i, s) ∈ I × Isink : i = e′1( fL(i), r)∧ s = e′2( fL(i), r) .
The latter part is trivially satisfied: e′2 is a function and thus always outputs one value.
The former part follows from the assumption that fE is logically consistent. First, let us
rewrite e′1:
i = e′1( fL(i), r) = r ⊕ fE( fL(i)) .
The addition modulo |I j| can now be carried into the local operation of party S j .
Since fE has a unique fixed point for every choice of local operation, it also has a
unique fixed point for this modified local operation. By this, e′ is logically consistent as
well.
The above theorem is designed for the extremal points of the deterministic-extrema
polytope. However, it is easy to see that the same technique can be applied to show
that every point inside that polytope, i.e., every environment from the set D, can be
embedded into a reversible process.
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Corollary 1 (Reversibility of environments from within the deterministic-extrema poly-
tope). Every environment that corresponds to a point inside the deterministic-extrema
polytope can be embedded into a logically consistent environment that is reversible.
This is obtained by first decomposing some environment Eˆ ∈ D into a convex com-
bination of the extremal points of the set Dext. Thereafter, every extremal point is
made reversible by the theorem above. And finally, one applies the derandomization
technique (see Figure 4.15b). Here, however, the source has to produce an additional
system to the environment which selects the extremal point to be implemented. The
sink, then again, needs an additional input from the environment where she receives
this selection.
4.7.2 Environments from outside of the deterministic-extrema polytope can-
not be made reversible
Every logically consistent process that lies outside of the polytope in consideration, i.e.,
an environment that is not in the set D, cannot be embedded into a logically consistent
environment that is reversible.
Theorem 8 (Impossiblity of reversible pure mixtures). Any logically consistent environ-
ment that is not in the set D cannot be made reversible.
Proof. Take any environment Eˆ 6∈ D. Such an environment can be decomposed as
Eˆ =
∑
i
pi Eˆi ,
where pi are probabilities and Eˆi are deterministic environments, where some are logi-
cally inconsistent. Note that such a decomposition might not be unique. However, this
proof works for any decomposition into deterministic environments. Since Eˆ 6∈ D, some
of the Eˆi are logically inconsistent. In the most general setting, Eˆ is embedded into a
larger process with a source and a sink. Because Eˆ is probabilistic and the embedding
should be deterministic (reversible), the source has an additional output that is fed to
the larger environment which selects the deterministic process. Thus, the source could
simply select the process from the decomposition that is logically inconsistent, and by
this create a contradiction.
4.7.3 Necessity of some source and some sink
Finally, we show that if an environment can be made reversible, then only with addi-
tional parties.
Theorem 9 (Necessity of a sournce and a sink to make environments reversible). If ev-
ery party obtains an input and provides an output to the environment, then every reversible
function f :O→ I is logically inconsistent.
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Figure 4.18. The function f is assumed to be reversible and, towards a contradiction,
logically consistent. Every party S j applies some pre- (e j) and post processing (g j) as
part of their local operation.
Proof. Suppose f : O → I is reversible, and, (towards a contradiction) logically con-
sistent. Since f is reversible, we have O ≡ I. Furthermore, suppose without loss of
generality that O is isomorphic to {0,1}n for some n. Thus, there exists an encoding
from O to {0,1}n and back. If the cardinality of O is not a power of 2, then one could
just take the larger power of 2 and conduct the following proof for the subspace iso-
morphic to O. Because f is logically consistent, there exists a unique fixed point for
every choice of local operations L ∈ L (see Theorem 5). Now, suppose that every party
applies some pre- and post-processing e j and g j that consist of bit-wise identity or bit-
flip operations (see Figure 4.18), such that the fixed point of f ′ = e ◦ f ◦ g is 0n. The
function f ′ is reversible (because f , g, and e are reversible) and logically consistent.
The latter follows because e and g are just local operations, and f is supposed to be
consistent for every choice of local operations. Let ` = (`1,`2, . . . ) be the local opera-
tions of the parties after the preprocessing and before the postprocessing. There exist 2n
different ` that consist of the identity or the bit-flip operations only. For different `, the
fixed point of f ′ ◦` is different as well: If ` 6= ˜`, then ˜` = `◦`∆, and therefore, the fixed
point y of f ′ ◦ ` is not a fixed point of f ′ ◦ ˜`:
f ′ ◦ ˜`(y) = f ′ ◦ ` ◦ `∆(y) , but
`∆(y) 6= y .
This means that for every y ∈ {0,1, }n, there exists an ` such that y is the fixed point. In
particular, there exists an `′ where the fixed point is 1n. This local operation `′, however,
is different from the identity operation (there, the fixed point is 0n). Furthermore, it is
also different from the bit-wise bit-flip on every position. In that case, `′(1n) = 0n would
hold, however, f ′(0n) = 0n holds as well. This means, `′ consists of a strictly positive
number of identity, and strictly positive number of bit-flip operations. Now, define the
following local operation m. The operation m is equal to `′ up to every position where `′
implements a bit-flip. On these positions, m implements the constant 0 as opposed to a
bit-flip. Now, we have m(1n) = `′(1n), which means that 1n is the fixed point of f ′ ◦m.
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However, and this is where the contradictions comes in, 0n is a fixed point of f ′ ◦m as
well:
f ′ ◦m(0n) = f ′(0n) = 0n .
Thus, f ′◦m has at least two fixed points, and by this contradicts our initial assumption.
4.7.4 Example of a reversible non-causal environment
Let us apply Theorem 7 to the environment of Equation (4.8). By this, we obtain a
reversible environment with which Game 2 can be won. The environment (4.8) is
designed for three parties and binary random variables. Since (4.8) is a determinis-
tic environment, we can write it as a function (see also Example 8). Now, the par-
ties S1, S2, S3 input states i1, i2, i3 are the result of some function e applied to their
output states o1, o2, o3. The function e, which is equivalent to the environment (4.8) is
e :O1 ×O2 ×O3→ I1 × I2 × I3 ,
(o1, o2, o3) 7→ (¬o2 ∧ o3,¬o3 ∧ o1,¬o1 ∧ o2) .
To make e reversible, we need to add two parties: a source Ssrc and a sink Ssink. The
output state space of the source is Osrc ≡ I1 × I2 × I3, and the input state space of the
sink is Isink ≡O1 ×O2 ×O3. The reversible function is
erev :O1 ×O2 ×O3 ×Osrc→ I1 × I2 × I3 × Isink , (4.10)
(o1, o2, o3, r1, r2, r3) 7→ (¬o2 ∧ o3 ⊕ r1,¬o3 ∧ o1 ⊕ r2,¬o1 ∧ o2 ⊕ r3, o1, o2, o3) .
In the same spirit, every other process from the setD can be embedded into a reversible
one. The sink, in such an embedding, receives the output states of the parties, and the
source provides some states that are added after the original function has been applied.
4.8 Quantum correlations without causal order
The framework developed in this chapter is a special case (the classical limit) of its
quantum variant: the process-matrix framework [194]. The process-matrix framework
— which was developed prior to this framework — uses the same assumptions as listed
in the Section 4.1, with the sole difference that the underlying states are quantum
states as opposed to classical states. The quantum version allows for correlations not
obtainable in the classical limit. Most strikingly, and in stark contrast to the classical
special case, the process-matrix framework can establish non-causal correlations in a
two-party setup [85, 194] (see also Reference [159]). An example of a two-party causal
inequality is Inequality (3.1). That inequality cannot be violated in the framework
developed here. In the quantum framework, then again, a violation is possible, and
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the maximal violation of that inequality (under some restrictions) is (2+
p
2)/4 [57].
This violation coïncides numerically with Tsirelson’s bound [73]: the maximal quantum
violation of a specific Bell inequality. It is interesting to see that here the same algebraic
number pops up in to different contexts: non-local and non-causal correlations.
In the process-matrix framework, the process matrix is the analogous mathemati-
cal object to what we called “environment,” or “classical process.” Interestingly, some
process-matrices exist that do not violate any causal inequality, but which are never-
theless non separable [115]. A process matrix is non separable if it cannot be written
as a convex combination of process matrices with fixed causal structures. To detect this
non separability, so-called causal witnesses [16, 52, 114, 115, 173] have been developed
— analogous to the entanglement wittinesses. The process-matrix framework has also
been extended to continuous variables [125].
Even though the quantum formalism can be seen as a generalization of our formal-
ism, it was unclear whether unitary quantum processes that violate causal inequalities
exist. The reason for why this was unclear initially is that in the quantum setup, an in-
finite number of operations are possible, also for a finite-dimensional state space. This
means, for a quantum process to be logically consistent, the derived probabilities must
be well-defined for every operation (an infinity) of all parties. Just as in the classical
formalism, the physical realizability of non-causal correlations is highly debatable. This
led Araújo et al. [17] to formulate a purification postulate: “processes are physical only
if they are purifiable.” Purifiable means that a process can be embedded into a larger
process that is pure — a term often used for unitary (and hence, reversible) quantum
channels. Since no violation of any causal inequality has been observed, it is tempt-
ing to conjecture that all process matrices that lead to violations of causal inequalities
cannot be purified. However, as is shown here, this is not true; we can transform the
reversible classical process from Section 4.7.4 to a pure quantum process. As a side re-
mark, note the close connection of this discussion to the reversibility principle in the
following study of closed time-like curves.
We recap the process-matrix framework. After that, we present the unitary analogue
of the reversible classical process from Section 4.7.4.
4.8.1 Framework
Since the underlying states are quantum (as opposed to classical ones), a party is de-
fined by a quantum channel from her inputs to her outputs. In accordance with Defi-
nition 6, a party S j has a free random variable A j and a non-free random variable X j .
These variables are classical: A j represents the measurement setting, and X j represents
the measurement outcome of party S j .
2 The systems that a party S j receives from and
returns to the environment are, in contrast to the classical setting and result, quantum
2More precisely, these classical variables are related to the setting and outcome, as some processing
could happen in between, e.g., the measurement operator applied could be independent of A j .
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states. We label the input system of party S j by I j , and the output system is Oj . The
state space of the input to party S j is S(HI j ). For the sake of a simpler presentation, we
denote this state space by I j . The same is done for the output state space of a party:
The set S(HOj ) is denoted by O j . Thus, the local operation L j is a quantum channel
from I j to O j . In the most general setting, such a channel is a completely-positive and
trace-preserving (CPTP) map. Such a CPTP map can be split up into a collection of
completely-positive (CP) maps. A CP map can be understood as a measurement, where
the probability that a particular map is applied equals to the trace of the resulting state.
We represent the local operation L j of a party S j by its Choi map M
x j ,a j
j (see Ap-
pendix), which depends on the measurement setting a j and on the measurement re-
sult x j . If we sum over all measurement results x j , then we obtain∑
x j
M
x j ,a j
j = M
a j
j ,
which is a CPTP map. There is a slight difference in notation of the presentation of
the process-matrix framework here when compared to the initial article by Oreshkov,
Costa, and Brukner [194]: In the Oreshkov et al. [194] notation, the Choi maps are
additionally transposed.
If all local operations of the parties are given, then the most general expression sat-
isfying all assumptions (see Section 4.1) that gives the probability distribution PX |A is:
PX1,X2,···|A1,A2,...(x1, x2, . . . , a1, a2, . . . ) = Tr
  
M x1,a11 ⊗M x2,a22 ⊗ . . .

W

.
The mathematical object W is a matrix in L(HI1⊗HO1⊗HI2⊗HO2⊗ . . . ). The condition
that all probabilities are non-negative and sum to unity produces a set of restrictions
for W . The non-negativity condition is
W ≥ 0 , (4.11)
and the unit-probability condition is
∀M1, M2, · · · : Tr ((M1 ⊗M2 ⊗ . . . )W ) = 1 , (4.12)
where M j are CPTP maps represented as as Choi maps. Theses conditions imply
TrI1,I2,... W = 1 .
Thus, W can be interpreted as a CPTP map from O1,O2, . . . to the spaces I1,I2, . . .
in the Choi-Jamiołkowski (CJ) representation (see Figure 4.19). Such a W is called
process matrix and corresponds to the quantum analog of what we called environment
or classical process (see Definition 12). The conditions on the process matrix imply
that if a process matrix is decomposed into a weighted sum of Pauli matrices, then for
every summand appearing in the decomposition, the following must hold (see Refer-
ences [193, 194]): There exists at least one party with the identity operator in her
output space and an operator different from identity on her input space. The interpre-
tation of this is that at least one party receives some state without sending a state. A
process matrix that satisfies these conditions is called valid.
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Figure 4.19. A process matrix W for two parties S1 and S2.
4.8.2 Reversible non-causal process matrix
As said before, a natural conjecture could be that process matrices leading to a violation
of causal inequalities cannot be embedded into a larger unitary process that leads to
well-defined probabilities as well. The motivation for posing such a conjecture is that
violations of causal inequalities seem unphysical — or, in other words, their physical
existence is doubted. Here, we show that this conjecture is false, and give an explicit
process matrix which represents a unitary process and leads to well-defined non-causal
probabilities. The process matrix W U is constructed from the reversible classical process
from Section 4.7.4 and is a rank 1 Choi map, i.e., it represents a unitary transformation.
Assume three parties S1, S2, S3, a source Ssrc, and a sink Ssink. Let us define a unitary
transformation U from the spaces O×Osrc to the spaces I × Isink, that implements the
function (4.10) in some fixed basis:
U =
∑
o1,o2,o3
r1,r2,r3
|¬o2 ∧ o3 ⊕ r1,¬o3 ∧ o1 ⊕ r2,¬o1 ∧ o2 ⊕ r3, o1, o2, o3〉〈o1, o2, o3, r1, r2, r3| .
In the CJ representation, this unitary is the following process matrix
W U = |U〉〉〈〈U | , with (4.13)
|U〉〉= ∑
o1,o2,o3
r1,r2,r3
|¬o2 ∧ o3 ⊕ r1,¬o3 ∧ o1 ⊕ r2,¬o1 ∧ o2 ⊕ r3, o1, o2, o3〉×
|o1, o2, o3, r1, r2, r3〉 .
Clearly, the process matrix W U implements the function erev in the computational basis.
This means, it leads to violations of a causal inequality. Furthermore, it can easily
be checked that U is a unitary and that W U is the corresponding operator in the CJ
representation. Thus, it remains to show that W U is valid.
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A process matrix W U is valid if and only if the following conditions hold. The
matrix W U must be a CPTP map from O,Osrc to I,Isink in the CJ from
W U ≥ 0 ,
TrI ,IsinkW = 1 ,
and, in the Pauli decomposition of W U , every summand must contain at least one party
who has the identity operator on the output and some different operator on the input.
Since party Ssink has no output space, Ssink always receives a state — except in those
terms of the Pauli decomposition where Isink is the identity operator. In this latter case,
the sink does not receive any state. Thus, all terms in the Pauli decomposition that are
different from identity on the input space of Ssink do not hinder the process matrix to be
valid. By this, we can simplify our analysis to the reduced matrix W ′U = TrIsinkW U . In
this reduced matrix, all summands of a Pauli decomposition where Isink is the identity
operator vanish into a multiplicative number. We define the operator QX as in Ref. [16],
to cover the remaining cases:
QX =
1Q
dQ
⊗ TrQX ,
where dQ is the dimension of the system Q and idQ is the dQ-dimensional identity op-
erator.
If two parties of S1, S2, S3 are not involved in a summand of a Pauli decomposition
(their spaces contain the identity operator), then the third party must have identity on
her output. This is expressed by the following set of equations:
I1,O1,I2,O2W
′U = I1,O1,I2,O2,O3W
′U ,
I1,O1,I3,O3W
′U = I1,O1,I3,O3,O2W
′U ,
I2,O2,I3,O3W
′U = I2,O2,I3,O3,O1W
′U .
If one party of S1, S2, S3 is not involved in a summand of a Pauli decomposition, then
one of the remaining tow parties must have the identity operator on the output:
I1,O1W
′U = I1,O1,O2W
′U + I1,O1,O3W
′U − I1,O1,O2,O3W ′U ,
I2,O2W
′U = I2,O2,O1W
′U + I2,O2,O3W
′U − I2,O2,O1,O3W ′U ,
I3,O3W
′U = I3,O3,O1W
′U + I3,O3,O2W
′U − I3,O3,O1,O2W ′U .
In the last case, at least one party of S1, S2, S3 has identity on the output:
W ′U = O1W
′U + O2W
′U + O3W
′U − O1,O2W ′U − O1,O3W ′U − O2,O3W ′U + O1,O2,O3W ′U .
All these conditions are satisfied by the reversible and logically consistent process ma-
trix W U (see Equation (4.13)). Furthermore, W U leads to violations of causal inequal-
ities.
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4.8.3 The classical framework arises as limit of the quantum framework
We quickly show that the classical framework for correlations without causal order is
indeed recovered if one takes the classical limit of the process-matrix framework. The
mathematical objects in the process-matrix framework are local operations and the
process matrix, which all can be interpreted as Choi maps. In the classical limit, these
Choi maps become diagonal in the computational basis.
Theorem 10 (The classical limit of the process-matrix framework is the classical frame-
work for correlations without causal order). In the classical limit, the conditions ex-
pressed in Equation (4.11) and Equation (4.12) equal to conditions of Equation (4.4)
and Equation (4.3).
Proof. We first show a bijection of the quantum object in the classical limit (diagonal
Choi maps) to the stochastic operations used in the classical framework. Suppose Eˆ
is a stochastic matrix that describes the environment. Then, the process matrix WE is
defined as
WE =
∑
k
|k〉〈k|O ⊗ d

Eˆ|k〉∑
`
〈`|I

,
where |k〉 and |`〉 have the same dimension as Eˆ. The function d is the function that
takes a matrix and cancels all off-diagonal terms, i.e.,
d(ρ) =
∑
m
|m〉〈m|ρ|m〉〈m| .
By this, WE is rewritten as
WE =
∑
k
|k〉〈k|O ⊗
∑
m
|m〉〈m|Eˆ|k〉〈m|I .
This Choi map WE acts in the same way as Eˆ: Some state |k〉 is mapped to Eˆ|k〉. A local
operation Lˆ′j is transformed to a Choi map in a similar way:
M ′j =
∑
k′,m′
|m′〉〈m′| Lˆ′j|k′〉〈m′|Oj ⊗ |k′〉〈k′|I j .
The reverse direction of the bijection is given by these definitions.
We explicitly show (in the restricted case of one party only) that the conditions coïn-
cide. That condition (4.11) coïncides with (4.4) is easy to see. That condition (4.12)
equals (4.3) is shown in the following calculation, where we assume that the process
matrix W and the local operation M are diagonal in the computational basis.
Tr(W M1) =
∑
i, j
〈i, j|W M1|i, j〉=
∑
i, j
〈i, j|W |i, j〉〈i, j|M1|i, j〉 .
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By substituting W with WE and M1 with M
′
1 we get∑
i, j,m,k,m′,k′
〈i|k〉〈k|i〉〈 j|m〉〈m|Eˆ|k〉〈m| j〉〈i|m′〉〈m′| Lˆ′1|k′〉〈m′|i〉〈 j|k′〉〈k′| j〉
=
∑
i, j
〈 j|Eˆ|i〉〈i| Lˆ′1| j〉
= Tr
 
Eˆ Lˆ′1

,
which concludes the proof. The case of more than one party works analogously.
4.9 Discussion
Classical correlations without causal order are obtained by manipulating random vari-
ables in a way where only local assumptions are enforced. Among those local assump-
tions, we employed the assumption of logical consistency, which ensures that we do
not run into a logical contradiction. By studying these correlations, a world between
the logically possible and the causal opens: The framework developed allows for cor-
relations that cannot be simulated if we assume some background time. This can be
interpreted in the following way: From the correlations we can deduce the causal rela-
tions between the parties. In that sense, the causal relations emerge from — and as we
show, depend on — the local operations. Thus, in the spirit of Leibniz (see Section 2),
causal relations cannot be put on an absolute ground.
We developed the framework and characterized the mathematical objects in differ-
ent ways. An interesting characterization is the one in terms of fixed points: It gives
an intuitive understanding of the condition of logical consistency. In its deterministic
form, the fixed-point theorem says that some process is logically consistent if and only
if the process combined with the local operations has a unique fixed point — and that
for any choice of local operations. Hence, a consistent assignment of values to the vari-
ables must exist for the “circular map” (no grandfather antinomy), yet not more than
one (no information antinomy) is allowed.
We presented some causal and some non-causal correlations explicitly. It was con-
jectured that all correlations obtainable with reversible dynamics are causal. The reason
to place such a conjecture is that we do not know how causal inequalities are violated,
and enforcing reversibility seems natural. However, by showing that a large class of
non-causal correlations can be obtained in a reversible way, and that these correlations
are also consistent with the quantum framework, we refuted this conjecture.
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Chapter 5
Closed time-like curves
It is common belief that the
’identifications’ [. . . ] along the time
axis are forbidden b[y] the laws of
physics and must be excluded. This is
usually justified by causality
considerations. [. . . ] Here we note
only that, in general, the closure of
time-like curves is not linked with the
causality principle in such a trivial
manner. The clos[ure] of time curves
does not necessarily imply a violation
of causality, since the events along
such a closed line may be all
’self-adjusted’ — they all affect one
another through the closed cycle and
follow one another in a
self-consistent way.
Igor Dmitriyevich Novikov [190]
In the previous chapter, we discussed non-causal correlations. These correlations
were obtained by dropping the often made assumption of a global causal order; we did
not assume any a priori causal relations among the parties. Here, we look at these results
from the point of view of relativity theory. In relativity theory, space-time is dynamic
— the space-time relations depend on the velocity, acceleration, etc. —, yet object are
embedded within that space-time structure. The latter becomes clear if one describes a
universe in general relativity without any objects: space-time persists. These thoughts,
at a first glance, suggest that non-causal correlations cannot be described, or do not
arise, within relativity theory. Also Einstein [99] commented on his potential discovery
that (at that time not yet finished) general relativity allows for CTC by: “Dies wider-
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strebt meinem physikalischen Gefühl aufs lebhafteste.”1 Furthermore, the limitation
on the speed of light, and therefore of any signal, seems to prohibit causal loops from
arising in relativity theory. As Einstein [98] put it, the possibility of superluminal sig-
naling means “dass wir einen Übertragungsmechanismus für möglich halten müssten,
bei dessen Benutzung die erziehlte Wirkung der Ursache vorangeht.”2 As a side re-
mark, Einstein continues by writing that “dieses Resultat [. . . ], meiner Ansicht nach,
rein logisch genommen, keinen Widerspruch enthält.”3 In similar words, Tolman [236]
writes: “Such a condition of affairs might not be a logical impossibility; nevertheless
its extraordinary nature might incline us to believe that no causal impulse can travel
with a velocity greater than that of light.” However, if an agent observes an effect that
precedes its cause, and if that agent has the ability of superluminal signaling, then we
should worry about logical inconsistencies (see Section 1.2 and Section 3.3.1).
Then again, “[b]ecause general relativity is a local theory with no a priori restric-
tions on the global topology, causality violation can be introduced” [234]. Such a global
topology could be one where the time coordinate is periodic, as long as it is consistent
with Einstein’s equations of general relativity. Indeed, solutions with this kind of topol-
ogy were found (see, e.g., References [131, 165]), and these “causality violations” show
up in terms of closed time-like curves (CTCs). Such CTCs allow us to apply the results
from the previous chapter to general relativity. Clearly, the existence of CTCs in nature
is doubted, however, it cannot be ruled out. This analysis and the next chapter of this
thesis show that CTCs are unproblematic under various considerations.
5.1 Closed time-like curves in general relativity
Some forms and an historic account of CTCs is presented in the introduction (see Chap-
ter 2.2). Other forms of CTCs within general relativity that are not based on the uni-
verses by Lanczos or Gödel, as discussed in the introduction, were discovered, for in-
stance, by Morris, Thorne, and Yurtsever [182] and Gott [138]. The possibly easiest
way to understand a setup in general relativity where CTCs arise is the approach by the
former (see also [233]). Their approach relies on wormholes: “[I]f the laws of physics
permit an advanced civilization to create and maintain a wormhole in space for inter-
stellar travel, then that wormhole can be converted into a time machine with which
causality might be violatable” [182]. Wormholes consist of two mouths: By entering
one mouth one exits the other (see Figure 5.1). In other words, wormholes connect
two space-regions on a different path, potentially shorter than the regular path. Fur-
thermore, one can think of both mouths of a wormhole to have clocks that are initially
1“This contradicts my feeling for physics in the most vivid sense.”
2Translated by Anna Beck [103]: “that we would have to consider as possible a transfer mechanism
whereby the achieved effect would precede the cause.”
3Translated by Anna Beck [103]: “this result, in my opinion, does not contain any contradiction form
a purely logical point of view.”
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Figure 5.1. The two black ovals denote the two mouths of a wormhole. The distance
on the regular space might be longer than the distance through the wormhole (dashed
tube).
P
0
1
2
3
4
5
0
1
2
3
4
S
Figure 5.2. This space-time diagram shows the word-lines of the two mouths of a
wormhole in the future of some space-like surface P. The left mouth is stationary while
the right mouth undergoes the effect of time dilation. The numbers on the word-lines
indicate the state of their internal clocks. These points are identified. In the future of
the surface S (the dashed lines describe the future light cone of point 2 on the left),
a CTC comes into existence. For instance, if one travels in ordinary space-time from
point 3 from the left world-line to the right one, and enters the right mouth, then one
exits the wormhole at point 3 on the left world-line again. This CTC is indicated by
the arrows.
synchronized, and that if one enters one mouth at some time t, then one exits the
other mouth at time t, and vice versa; without loss of generality we assume that trav-
eling through the wormhole is instantaneous. By taking one mouth of a wormhole
on a rocket and by traveling at some very high velocity, one can apply a time dilation
(the twins-paradox). Then, by coming back next to the other mouth, the wormhole
describes a CTC (see Figure 5.2). The mouth that traveled is younger when compared
to the other mouth. By entering the mouth that did not travel, one time-travels to the
future, and by entering the mouth that did travel, one time-travels to the past.
From the logical point of view, the grandfather antinomy could easily be imple-
mented by having access to CTCs as described here. Novikov suggested (see Section 1.2
and Section 2.2) that series of contradictory events (e.g., the grandfather antinomy)
simply do not arise. Does this mean that some initial conditions are ruled out because
they lead to inconsistent dynamics? This would be rather odd: It would mean that the
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existence of CTCs in our future would prohibit us to perform operations that would
otherwise be possible.
5.2 Logical and physical principles
The Novikov principle of self-consistency, as briefly discussed above, is the following.
Principle 1 (Novikov’s principle of self-consistency). “[E]vents on a CTC are already
guaranteed to be self-consistent [. . . ]” [123].
This means that events do not only have to be consistent with their past, but also
with their future (in a CTC, future events can influence past events). Basically, on a CTC,
every event is before as well as after every other event on the same CTC. So, the principle
of self-consistency asserts that “a local solution to the equations of physics can occur in
the real Universe only if it can be extended to be part of a global solution” [123]. By
this principle, inconsistent dynamics do not arise at all; they are forbidden. However,
this principle might have severe implications. The problem is that “[i]n general, self-
consistency constraints the initial data [. . . ]” [123]. As an illustration, suppose that
someone tries to kill his or her grandfather before this person was even born (see Sec-
tion 1.2 and Section 3.3.1). Now, instead of killing the grandfather directly, this person
programs a robot to do so. This robot thereafter travels to the past, finds the grand-
father, and kills him. If the robot would succeed, then we have the logical problem of
the grandfather antinomy. Now, since such an inconsistent series of events is excluded
by this self-consistency principle, it means that the person who plans to assassinate his
or her grandfather is restricted in programing the robot in such a way that it will not
kill the grandfather. Can this issue be resolved in the sense that we do not have to
impose constraints on the initial data? This questions suggests another principle: the
no-new-physics principle.
Principle 2 (No-new-physics principle). The physical laws, and in particular the set of
possible physical operations, in a local space-time region remain the same no matter
whether CTCs exist outside of that region or not. By the weak no-new-physics principle
we replace outside with in the future.
This principle can be understood as a generalization of Einstein’s relativity principle
which states that the physical laws are invariant for all reference frames. Echeverria,
Klinkhammer, and Thorne [97] gave evidence that in the presence of CTCs in the future
of a local region, the weak no-new-physics principle and Novikov’s principle of self-
consistency can simultaneously be uphold. These authors looked for an initial trajectory
of a billiard ball that enters a CTC in its future, such that Novikov’s principle of self-
consistency would forcefully rule out that initial trajectory — and by this, the weak
no-new-physics principle wold be violated. Surprisingly, they did not find any such
contradictory initial trajectory. In contrast to the weak principle, the (strong) principle
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Figure 5.3. A CTC comes into existence in the future of some space-like surface P on
which some initial conditions are set. Furthermore, an experimenter sitting in some
local region L can influence the system that travels on the CTC.
asserts that the set of possible operations remains invariant also in the presence of a
CTC around such a local region (see Figure 5.3). There, Friedman et al. [123] conclude
that “initial data [. . . ], where the CTCs reside, are constrained.”
Besides these principles above, we can formulate another principle that one wishes
to uphold.
Principle 3 (Uniqueness principle). There exists a unique self-consistent solution.
This principle, in the general relativity setting, basically reflects the Cauchy prob-
lem. If all initial data has been provided, then there exists a unique solution to the
dynamics. Echeverria et al. [97] showed that “[i]n contrast with one’s naive expec-
tation that dangerous trajectories might have multiplicity zero and thereby make the
Cauchy problem ill posed (‘no solutions’), it is shown that all dangerous initial trajecto-
ries in a wide class have infinite multiplicity and thereby make the Cauchy problem ill
posed in an unexpected way: ‘far too many solutions”’ (see also Reference [122]). This
principle can also be understood as a requirement to avoid the information antinomy
(see Section 3.3.1). In the CTC model we are going to present, Principle 3 is show to
be a consequence of the Principles 1 and 2. So, it is not a principle in the sense of an
axiom, but a property that we wish to have — and we get it for free.
Note the close relation of these three principles to the assumptions used in the pre-
vious chapter. There, two of the main assumptions where that all local operations are
possible (Assumption (C)) and that there exists a global probability distribution over all
non-free variables (Assumption (LC)). Assumption (C) can be identified with the princi-
ple of no-new-physics, and Assumption (LC) with Novikov’s self-consistency principle.
Then again, these assumptions lead us to conclude that, in the deterministic case, there
exists a unique fixed point (Theorem 5) — this can be identified with Principle 3. In
the spirit of the previous chapter, we introduce this following definition:
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Definition 16 (Logically concistent CTC). A CTC that satisfies the Principles 1, 2, and 3
is called logically consistent.
Finally, we formulate a last principle that one wishes to uphold.
Principle 4 (Reversible dynamics). All dynamics can be embedded into reversible dy-
namics where potentially additional degrees of freedom are considered.
This principle is satisfied by all our current physical theories (even in quantum the-
ory, if one takes the relative state formulation — see Section 2.1.5), and has a natural
motivation from thermodynamics: If the principle would be violated, e.g., if some de-
grees of freedom are miraculously lost (without heat dissipation), then the second law
can be violated. This is nicely illustrated by Maxwell’s demon [177] and by the res-
olution of the paradox by Bennett [45]. See also the article by Wolf [250] for a nice
account of reversibility and thermodynamics. Just as the uniqueness principle follows
from the first two, this one does so as well. Reversible dynamics allow one to tell a
story and to answers questions like: What is the trajectory of the objects, how do they
interact? Furthermore, one can think of an implementation of such a CTC with billiard
balls; very much in the spirit of the work by Echeverria et al. [97]. In such a case,
the operations are implemented by placing walls in space, where the billiard balls get
reflected and potentially collide with themselves and with their younger selfs.4
5.3 Logically consistent closed time-like curves
We present a novel model of closed time-like curves. Similar to Echeverria, Klinkham-
mer, and Thorne [97], we assume a space-like surfaceP where initial conditions are set.
In the future of that space-like surface, a CTC comes into existence, e.g., by applying
the twins paradox to a wormhole (see above). The findings of Echeverria et al. were,
as described before, that the existence of a CTC in the future of P does not change
physics at P; the weak no-new-physics principle is uphold. Here, we go beyond the
studies of Echeverria et al. in the sense that we ask whether CTCs are compatible with
arbitrary local operations in arbitrary locations (see Figure 5.3). In principle, one could
imagine an experimenter sitting in-between the two mouths of a wormhole, and by this
act on the systems that travels on the CTC. Such interactions might allow an experi-
menter to influence the billiard balls that were studied in the works of Echeverria et al.
to introduce a contradiction. In order to cover these cases, we additionally assume
the existence of a local region L where experimenters can perform arbitrary operations
(see Figure 5.3). Now, by the no-new-physics principle, not only physics at P but also
physics at L should remain unchanged if there exists a CTC in the future of P and
4This has been explored by Fredkin and Toffoli [120] in the setup without CTCs to demonstrate the
universality of such a model.
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f j
o j
i j
Figure 5.4. Visualization of a local region j in a space-time diagram. The lower arc is
the past boundary, and the top arc is the future boundary of that region. The boundaries
are assumed to be space-like. The states on these boundaries are i j and o j. Within the
local region, any deterministic operation from I j to O j is allowed.
around L. In this study, we do not consider specific physical objects, like billiard balls,
but look at classical deterministic dynamics at an abstract level.
The results we show are that there exist deterministic CTCs that obey the requested
principles (see Principles 1, 2, 3). Furthermore, such CTCs can be made reversible (see
Principle 4). By the latter, the dynamics can also be read in the opposite direction —
just as in general relativity.
5.3.1 The model
We consider a fixed number N of distinct local space-time regions (called local regions)
where every region is composed of a past space-like boundary and a future space-like
boundary. It is crucial that the number of local regions is fixed — as will become clear
later. Every local region is labeled by an integer 1≤ j ≤ N . The state space of the past
space-like boundary of some region j is denoted by I j (input), and the state space of the
future space-like boundary of the same region isO j (output). These spaces, as opposed
to the study in the previous chapter, could potentially be continuous, e.g., O j = R.
States at these boundaries are denoted by i j ∈ I j and o j ∈ O j . From the no-new-
physics principle, we assume that any deterministic local operation f j from I j to O j is
implementable in the region j. Thus, a local region can be visualised as in Figure 5.4.
Let L j := { f j : I j → O j}, i.e., L j is the set of all local operations in that region. Since
a local region could contain additional degrees of freedom besides of those on the
space-like boundaries, an operation f j could be a “reduced” local operation where more
degrees of freedom are considered. Thus, f j is not assumed to be reversible. We employ
the same notion as in the previous chapter: Collection of objects are represented by
simply dropping the index, e.g., L := L1 × L2 × · · · × LN . Note that L is not the set
of all functions from I to O, but only those of the form f = ( f1, f2, . . . , fN ). Whatever
happens outside of these local regions is modeled by another function w. This function
describes the dynamics of those degrees of freedom only that are at the boundary of
the local regions. Other degrees of freedom are ignored. Furthermore, this dynamics
potentially contains a CTC. Thus, w is a function
w :O→ I .
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We call this function process function.5
The no-new-physics principle implies that all operations f ∈ L are allowed, and
Novikov’s principle of self-consistency implies that for every such operation f there
exists a consistent evolution. This is formalized as the existence of a fixed point
i = (i1, i2, . . . , iN )
for every choice of f :
∀ f ∈ L,∃i ∈ I : i = w ◦ f (i) . (5.1)
From this, the uniqueness principle follows:
Theorem 11 (Unique fixed point). For every choice of local operations f ∈ L and for
every function w that satisfies Equation (5.1), the fixed point of w ◦ f is unique. In other
words: The uniqueness principle follows from Novikov’s principle and from the no-new-
physics principle.
Proof. Let P[N] be the proposition of the theorem where the number of local regions
is fixed to N . We prove this theorem by induction over the number of regions N . The
base case is P[1], and the induction step is P[N − 1] =⇒ P[N].
In the case where we consider one local region only, the process function w must be
a constant. Otherwise, there would exist a local operation f ∈ L such that w ◦ f would
not have any fixed point. Assume towards this contradiction that w is not a constant.
This means there exist at least two distinct o, p ∈O such that
k = w(o) 6= w(p) = ` .
Now, we construct the local operation f
f : I →O
i 7→ f (i) =
¨
o for i 6= k
p otherwise.
By that, the composed function w ◦ f has no fixed point.
Since w is a constant, for every f ∈ L, the composed function w ◦ f has a unique
fixed point. This proves the base case. Furthermore, this proves that if the input to
a local region is a function of the output of the same region, then there exists a local
operation such that the composed function has no fixed point.
5This function can also be derived by starting from some functionω as a function of all local operations
only (see Reference [36]).
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Towards proving the induction step, we define the reduced process function w fN
of w≡ (w1, w2, . . . , wN ) as
w fN ≡ w fN1 , . . . , w fNN−1
w fNj :O1 × · · · ×ON−1→ I j
o′ 7→ w j

o′1, . . . , o′N−1, fN
 
wN
 
o′
 
.
This reduced process function w fN is the process function w where the local operation
the local region N is fixed to fN . Since by the above considerations (base case), the
input to a local region must be independent of the output of the same region, the
value fN (wN (o′)) is well-defined.
We now show that the reduced process function w fN satisfies Equation (5.1). For-
mally, we show
∀ f ∈ L,∃i ∈ I : i = w ◦ f (i)
=⇒
∀ f ′ ∈ L1 × · · · ×LN−1, fN ∈ LN ,∃ j ∈ I1 × · · · × IN−1 : j = w fN ◦ f ′( j) .
For every region k ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}, the fixed point of w ◦ f restricted to that region
is ik. We show that ik is also the fixed point of region k of w
fN ◦ ( f1, . . . , fN−1):
w fNk

f1 (i1) , . . . , fN−1 (iN−1)

= wk

f1 (i1) , . . . , fN−1 (iN−1) , fN (iN )

= ik .
Now, we show the contrapositive of the induction step: ¬P[N] =⇒ ¬P[N−1]. For
that, assume that P[N] is false. This means there exists a function f ∈ L, such that w◦ f
has more than one fixed point. Let a 6= b be two fixed points of w ◦ f , and assume
without loss of generality that they differ in the first component a1 6= b1. From this
follows that w fN has also two fixed points a′ = (a1, . . . , aN−1) and b′ = (b1, . . . , bN−1).
This concludes the proof.
5.3.2 Reversibility
In the previous chapter, we showed that environments from the deterministic-extrema
polytope (set D) can be made reversible. In this chapter on CTCs, we look at determin-
istic CTCs described by function. Thus, we could simply invoke Theorem 7, and by this,
every logically consistent CTC could be made reversible. However, that theorem holds
for discrete and finite degrees of freedom. Here, we essentially show the same theorem
in the relativity setting and for continuous variables. In the same spirit as Theorem 7,
we add two local regions: a source and a sink. The source (see Figure 5.5a) consists of
a single space-like boundary. At that boundary, initial conditions are set. The sink (see
Figure 5.5b) consists of single space-like boundary as well. In contrast to the source,
the sink cannot set initial conditions, but can only observe the degrees of freedom of
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Figure 5.5. (a) A source is a space-like boundary that is an output-only region (emitter).
(b) A sink is a space-like boundary that is an input-only region (receiver).
that boundary. These regions can be understood as a special case of the local region
(see Figure 5.4): Here, the degrees of freedom of the output or of the input region are
nonexistent.
By the following theorem, the reversibility principle is seen to follow from Novikov’s
principle of self-consistency and from the no-new-physics principle.
Theorem 12 (All logically consistent CTCs can be made reversible). Every function
w :O→ I
that satisfies Condition (5.1) can be embedded into a reversible function
w′ :O×Osrc→ I × Isink
that satisfies Condition (5.1) as well. The CTC w is recovered from w′ by some o˜ ∈ Osrc
where
∀o ∈O : w′(o, o˜src) = (w(o), gsink(o))
for some invertible gsink.
Proof. This proof uses Theorem 11. We set Osrc ≡ I and Isink ≡ O. The reversible
CTC w′ is defined as
w′ ≡ (w′1, w′2)
with
w′1(o, osrc) = w(o) + osrc = i ,
w′2(o, osrc) = o = isink .
The inverse w′−1 ≡ (w′−11 , w′−12 ) of w′ is
w′−11 (i, isink) = isink = o ,
w′−12 (i, isink) = i −w(isink) = osrc .
We need to show that w′ satisfies Condition (5.1). The local operation of the source
region has the form fsrc :∅→Osrc, where∅ is the empty set. Such an operation can be
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understood as a state preparation, and is fully characterized by a state osrc ∈Osrc. The
local operation of the sink region is fsink : Isink→ ∅ (this can be interpreted as a mea-
surement); thus, we can just omit it. With the two additional regions, Condition (5.1)
becomes
∀( f , osrc) ∈ L×Osrc,∃(i, isink) ∈ I × Isink : (i, isink) = w′( f (i), osrc) .
This is the same as the requirement that
i = w′1( f (i), osrc) = w( f (i)) + osrc , and
isink = w
′
2( f (i), osrc) = f (i) .
The latter equation has a fixed point: isink = f (i). To see that the former equation has
a fixed point, we rewrite the operation +osrc as a function:
piosrc : I → I ,
i 7→ i + osrc .
Thus, we have
i = piosrc ◦w ◦ f (i) .
Since i is supposed to be a fixed point, we can shift the operations and ask for a fixed
point i′ of
i′ = w ◦ f ◦piosrc(i′) .
Such a fixed point must exist because w is assumed to have a fixed point for every local
operation f ; the operation f ◦piosrc is a valid local operation as well, i.e., f ◦piosrc ∈ L.
5.3.3 Example of a logically consistent closed time-like curve
This example is based on one of the extremal points of the polytope studied in Sec-
tion 4.4 (see also Section 4.6.2). Assume the number of local regions to be N = 3. For
the sake of better presentation, we rename these three local regions S1, S2, S3 with Al-
ice, Bob, and Charlie. We also use different symbols for the states and the state spaces.
The state space on Alice’s past boundary is X , and a state is given by x ∈ X . For her
future boundary, we use the state space A with a state a ∈ A. Respectively, the state
spaces of Bob’s past and future boundary are Y,B, and for Charlie: Z,C. Here, we look
at continuous variables, i.e., we assume all state spaces to be R. Thus, a CTC in this
setting, is a function
w : R3→ R3 ,
(a, b, c) 7→ (x , y, z) .
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In particular, and in the spirit of the extremal point presented in Section 4.6.2, the
CTC w implements the dynamics given by
x = Θ(−b)Θ(c) ,
y = Θ(−c)Θ(a) ,
z = Θ(−a)Θ(b) ,
where Θ(t) = 1 for some t > 0, and 0 otherwise. So, the sign of every output deter-
mines the signaling direction between the remaining two regions. For instance, if a is
positive, then y = Θ(−c), yet z = 0 — Charlie’s input does not depend on Bob’s out-
put. Then again, for a negative, we have y = 0 and z = Θ(b) — now, Charlie’s input
depends on Bob’s output but Bob’s input is a constant.
Now, we embed w into a reversible CTC. For that purpose, we have to introduce two
local regions: a source which has a future boundary only, and a sink which has a past
boundary only. The state space on each boundary is R3. The reversible CTC w′ is
w′ : R6→ R6 ,
(a, b, c, e0, e1, e2) 7→ (x , y, z, s0, s1, s2) ,
where (x , y, z) are defined as
x = Θ(−b)Θ(c) + e0 ,
y = Θ(−c)Θ(a) + e1 ,
z = Θ(−a)Θ(b) + e2 ,
and where the sink obtains the output of the parties:
s0 = a , s1 = b , s2 = c .
This setup is shown in Figure 5.6.
Alice, Bob, and Charlie are allowed to implement any dynamics from a real degree
of freedom to another real degree of freedom. The state at the past boundary of ev-
eryone depends non-trivially on the state at the future boundary of the remaining two
parties. This leads to a causal loop: By considering their local dynamics, which links x
to a, y to b, and z to c, we see that the states at the past (future) boundaries depend
on themselves. That is, (x , y, z) depends on (a, b, c), which in turn determines (x , y, z).
This loop leads to conclude that every party is both, in the past and in the future of
every other party. Yet, all four principles required are fulfilled. Moreover, the last two
principles are seen to follow from the first two. Thus, we have presented a CTC that is
completely harmless from the logical and physical point of view.
We briefly put an eye on the assumption that we fixed the number of parties before-
hand. Imagine, local regions are allowed to pop up everywhere, and that in every local
region, the no-new-physics principle holds. By this, we can just take the CTC described
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fR fS fT
a b c
x y z
x , y, z
e0, e1, e2
Figure 5.6. A reversible CTC. Alice (R) can invoke an arbitrary operation from R to R
which describes the dynamics fR of real degrees of freedom from her past to her future
boundary. The same holds for Bob (S) and Charlie (T ). The ovals denote the CTC,
where all degrees of freedom are scrambled up.
in Figure 5.6 and place an additional local region just before the CTC. If an experimenter
would act freely at such a local region, then she could just undo the “scrambling up”
of the degrees of freedom, in such a way that a contradiction arises. However, if we
assume a fixed number of local regions, then every local region is considered, and the
presented results can be shown.
Such a CTC, in the finite-dimensional case, is also consistent with quantum me-
chanics, as is shown in Section 4.8.2. This is done by replacing every classical space
with a Hilbert space. In the quantum setting, a CTC is reversible if it describes a uni-
tary process from the output spaces of the parties to their input spaces. A CTC, then
again, is logically consistent, if for all all quantum operations within the local regions,
no contradiction arises.
5.4 Other models of closed time-like curves
We present two models of closed time-like curves that do not incorporate the formalism
from general relativity, but where such CTCs are simply assumed to exist. These two
models are different in the sense that they solve the Principles 1, 2, 3 in different ways,
and lead to different evolutions. The reversibility principle is violated in both models.
In Section 5.5, we compare these models to our model of CTCs.
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U
ρCR
ρ′CR
ρCV
Figure 5.7. Closed time-like curve in the Deutschmodel: The stateρctc of the causality-
violating system is a fixed point of the evolution.
5.4.1 Deutschian closed time-like curves
Deutsch [93] analyzed CTCs without taking the approach of general relativity, but by
abstracting away the relativity formalism and by considering some degrees of freedom
only. The main message of Deutsch is that CTCs can be modeled consistently within
quantum theory. The standpoint of quantum theory is taken, because Deutsch shows in
the same work that if one takes classical systems in terms of bits, then inconsistencies
do arise.
The basic idea of his model is the following. Assume two systems, CR and CV,
undergo a joint evolution U . The system CR, is causality respecting, which means that
it does not travel on a CTC. The other system, CV, is causality violating, which means
that is does travel on a CTC. The states ρCR,ρCV of these systems describe the values of
the degrees of freedom. After the evolution, the states of these systems areρ′CR andρ′CV,
and the system CV travels to the past where it enters the joint evolution (see Figure 5.7).
At this point, Deutsch introduces the condition of consistency, namely that the causality-
violating system is in the same state before and after the evolution, i.e., ρCV = ρ′CV
must hold. This condition ensures that the system CV is not in contradictory states.
Thus, by plugging in some ρCV where system CV is in state ρCV after the evolution U ,
one can describe the evolution of system CR from ρCR to ρ
′
CR (see Figure 5.7). The
initial conditions of that model are the state of the system CR and the choice of the
evolution U .
Let us briefly look at the case where the systems are modeled by bits, e.g., where
ρCR,ρ
′
CR,ρCV ∈ {0,1} ,
and thus where the evolution U takes the form
U : {0, 1} × {0, 1} → {0,1} × {0,1} .
We give an example of an unproblematic evolution, of an evolution where the possible
input states for system CR are restricted, and one where every input on CR leads to a
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contradiction. These examples show that some initial conditions have to be excluded
in the classical case — which contradicts the principle that physics locally, should not
depend on the global embedding (see Principle 2). For the first example, assume the
following evolution
U : (ρCR,ρCV) 7→ (ρCR, 0) .
The state after the evolution is (ρCR, 0). Thus, a consistent state for the CV system
exists:
ρCV = 0 .
Furthermore, for any ρCR, the evolution U combined with the CTC describes an evolu-
tion from ρCR to itself.
The second example is
U : (ρCR,ρCV) 7→ (ρCR,ρCR ⊕ρCV) .
For ρCR = 0 every ρCV is consistent: U(0,ρCV) = (0,ρCV). However, for ρCR = 1, every
choice of state on the second system is contradictory: U(1,ρCV) = (1,ρCV⊕1). Here, an
experimenter is restricted in setting up the initial conditions in such a way that ρCR = 0;
this is the only allowed initial state of the causality-respecting system.
The last example is the unconditional bit-flip operation on the CV system:
U : (ρCR,ρCV) 7→ (ρCR,ρCV ⊕ 1) .
Here, no choice of the initial state of the causality-respecting system exists such that
the evolution is consistent.
In contrast to this classical case just discussed, Deutsch shows that in the quantum
case, there always exists a consistent evolution. In this setup, the systems CR and CV
are quantum systems and U is a map from quantum states to quantum states. Further-
more, we assume U to be unitary. Let the states of the systems CR,CV, be the density
operators ρCR ∈ S(HCR) and ρCV ∈ S(HCV). The consistency condition in the quantum
setup is thus
ρCV = TrCR
 
U (ρCR ⊗ρCV)U†

, (5.2)
and the final state ρ′CR of the causality-respecting system is computed by
ρ′CR = TrCV
 
U (ρCR ⊗ρCV)U†

. (5.3)
The consistency condition (5.2) ensures that the grandfather antinomy does not arise.
But what about the information antinomy? It is easy to see that for some choices of U
and ρCR there exists multiple states ρCV that satisfy the consistency condition (5.2). To
overcome this latter antinomy, Deutsch suggests to select the ρCV state as the one that is
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consistent in the above sense and maximizes the entropy. Intuitively, the system travel-
ing on the CTC should contain as little information as possible. However, Deutsch [93]
himself admits that by doing so “the second [antinomy] is mitigated.” This model is
henceforth called D-CTC.
D-CTC satisfies Novikov’s principle of self-consistency, and the no-new-physics prin-
ciple. The uniqueness principle is satisfied in an ad-hoc manner — by selecting the fixed
point with maximal entropy. The last principle, the reversibility principle, is not satis-
fied. Because of the trick to single out a single state on the CTC (to fulfill the uniqueness
principle), dynamics are non-linear, as is shown in the next paragraph. By that, if one
sends an unknown quantum state through the D-CTC, then that state might undergo a
transformation which is not reversible.
Let us point at some properties of the D-CTC model. First of all, it is clear that the
evolution of the causality-respecting system is non-linear: The output ρ′CR depends on
the input ρCR and on the fixed point ρCV, which depends on the input ρCR as well. This
non-linearity is scrambled up with the selection of the CTC state with the highest en-
tropy. It has been shown that this model allows to distinguish non-orthogonal quantum
states perfectly [60, 61], to clone perfectly [11, 61], to violate the Holevo bound [60],
and that a computer that is modeled with D-CTCs can solve PSPACE-complete prob-
lems in polynomial time [6]. Most strikingly, D-CTCs allow to solve the Halting prob-
lem [7]; D-CTCs are super-Turing machines.
Aaronson and Watrous [6] furthermore showed that in the classical case, such a
computer could solve PSPACE-complete problems in polynomial time as well. Here,
by classical we mean that the systems involved are not quantum states but probability
distributions. Note the difference to what we meant by classical at the beginning of
this discussion. Deutsch excluded probability distributions, in lieu thereof, he assumed
that the state of the classical system is “always an element of a certain fixed basis, the
computational basis” [93]. In Aaronson’s and Watrous’ work, in contrast, a probability
distribution is allowed to be a fundamental state, where the probabilities do not reflect
mere ignorance. Such states are called “proper mixtures.”
5.4.2 Postselected closed time-like curves
Another idea to model CTCs in the field of quantum information is by teleportation [46,
199, 208, 229, 230]. In quantum theory, it is possible to teleport a quantum state from
one location to another [47]. What we mean by teleport is that the state of the system
is never in-between the two locations. Rather, classical information has to be sent from
one location to the other, and furthermore, both locations need to share an entangled
quantum state. In this model of CTCs (P-CTC), a quantum state is teleported to the past.
Now, this sounds like we would have to send classical information from the future to
the past to establish such a CTC. This issue is overcome by the means of post-selection
— which is essentially the same as sending information to the past.
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U
ρCR
ρ′CR
Figure 5.8. Post-selected closed time-like curve: One part of a maximally entangled
state undergoes a joint evolution with the causality-respecting system. After that evo-
lution, the causality-violating system is teleported to the past via post-selection.
As in the D-CTC model, we assume two quantum systems, a causality-respecting
one (CR) and a causality-violating one (CV). Both systems jointly undergo an evolution,
and thereafter, the causality-violating system is teleported to the past, where it enters
the evolution (see Figure 5.8). Mathematically, the evolution of the causality-respecting
system is expressed by
ρ′CR =
CρCRC
†
Tr (CρCRC†)
, with C = TrCV U . (5.4)
A detailed description of the P-CTC model is given, e.g., by Brun and Wilde [59].
The P-CTC model of closed time-like curves satisfies, just as D-CTC does, Novikov’s
principle of self-consistency, and the no-new-physics principle. The uniqueness princi-
ple is also satisfied. Yet, just as D-CTC, P-CTC leads to non-linear dynamics, posing a
problem for the reversibility principle.
The reason for the non-linearity is that the post-selection introduces a renormal-
ization which in general depends on the input state and on the evolution. This model
has many similar, yet weaker, features than D-CTC [59]. For instance, it allows to
solve problems that are PP-complete in polynomial time [170] (the class PP is as-
sumed to be strictly contained within PSPACE). A classical analogue of the P-CTC
model has also been formalized [48]. Its complexity theoretic power is identified by
the class BPPpath [2, 170, 171]. So, this model is inequivalent to D-CTC [171].
5.5 Relations to other CTC models
Our model of logically consistent closed time-like curves is different from the other
models of CTCs just presented. We show in which way they are different, and in which
way they are equal to our model. This is done in the quantum formalism solely.
One way to relate these models is to take a logically consistent process matrix and to
transform it into a P-CTC or D-CTC dynamics. Since process matrices lead to interesting
94 5.5 Relations to other CTC models
C
S1 S2
O′1
I ′1
O′2
I ′2
O1 O2
I1
I1
I2
I2
Figure 5.9. The two parties S1 and S2 interact with two separate systems. A system of
each party undergoes some joint evolution C , and is thereafter sent to the past (dashed
lines), where it enters the laboratories of the parties.
dynamics (non-causal correlations, CTCs) for at least two parties, we restrict ourselves
to this two-party case.
As it turns out, the process-matrix formalism is a special of the P-CTC model. To see
this, we take any logically consistent process matrix and show that it can be cast into
the P-CTC model. Then again, we simulate P-CTC dynamics with process matrices and
show that some dynamics lead to process matrices that are not logically consistent.
For the other CTC model, D-CTC, we show that the dynamics predicted by process
matrices are different from the D-CTC model. This is done, just as for the comparison
with P-CTC, by taking a logically consistent process matrix and by showing that it cannot
be cast into D-CTC directly. Some D-CTC dynamics, however, can be simulated in the
process matrix framework. We show this by simulating a special case of D-CTC in P-
CTC.
There are essentially two ways in how to embed the two parties involved in a
process-matrix dynamics in a CTC. Either, both parties are space-like separated, or one
party is before the other. In both cases, we assume that every party interacts with two
systems, and that only one system of every party undergoes some CTC dynamics. By
that, we obtain a map from the inputs to the outputs (the untouched systems) where
the CTC dynamics can be understood as auxiliary. In the first case, after both parties
interacted with their respective systems, the systems undergo the CTC dynamics, and
enter the laboratories of both parties. This setup is shown in Figure 5.9. In the lat-
ter case, one party interacts with a system, which thereafter is sent to the other party.
There, the second party interacts with the system, after which, the system falls into the
CTC. The CTC produces the input system to the first party (see Figure 5.10).
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Figure 5.10. Party S1 first interacts with a systemwhich enters the laboratory of party S2
at a later time. Around party S2 some transformation happens (R). After that transfor-
mation, the system travels to the past (dashed line), where it enters the laboratory of
party S1.
C
I1 I2
O1 O2
= W
I1 I2
O1 O2
Figure 5.11. By swap operations on both sides one obtains the canonical channel C
from a process matrix W .
5.5.1 Canonical transformations
We give a definition of a canonical channel and a canonical comb which are built from
a process matrix W involving two parties. These canonical transformation are then
plugged into the P-CTC or D-CTC model. In these definitions, two parties S1 and S2
are involved with the respective input systems I j , I
′
j and output systems Oj , O
′
j , with j ∈{1,2}. The non-prime systems are those that interact with the process matrix. For
the canonical transformations, the input and output systems have the matching dimen-
sions dI ′j = dOj and dI j = dO′j .
Definition 17 (Canonical channel). The canonical channel is obtained by taking a two-
party process-matrix W ∈ L(HI1 ⊗HO1 ⊗HI2 ⊗HO2) and by applying a swap operation
for each party (see Figure 5.11). The Choi map of the canonical channel is
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Figure 5.12. By a swap operation on one side one obtains the canonical comb R from
a process matrix W .
C = W T
where the transposition changes the back-in-time W to a forward-in-time C .
For some input state ρ on the systems O1, O2, the canonical channel outputs the
state
ρ′I1,I2 = TrO1,O2

ρTO1,O2
⊗ 1I1,I2

C

.
Since a process matrix is a CPTP map, it is clear that this canonical channel is a CPTP
map as well.
Definition 18 (Canonical comb). The canonical comb is obtained by taking a two-party
process-matrix W ∈ L(HI1 ⊗HO1 ⊗HI2 ⊗HO2) and by applying a swap operation for
one party only (see Figure 5.12). The resulting quantum comb is
R = W TI1,O1 ,
where the superscript TI1,O1 denotes a transposition of the systems I1 and O1. This
transposition changes the back-in-time flavor on the systems I1, O1 to forward-in-time.
Again, since W is a CPTP map, it is clear that R is a comb. Quantum combs were
introduced in the works by the Pavia group [68–70]. A comb can be seen as a super-
operator: It transforms quantum channels to quantum channels, whereas a operator
transforms quantum states to quantum states.
5.5.2 From process matrices to P-CTCs
Theorem 13 (Process matrices describe P-CTC transformations). The dynamics of a
process matrix coïncides with the dynamics of the P-CTC model with the canonical channel.
The same holds for the canonical comb.
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O1 O2
S1 S2
O′1 O′2
I ′1 I ′2
=
W
O1 O2
S1 S2
O′1 O′2
I ′1 I ′2
= WS1 S2
O′1 O′2
I ′1 I ′2
Figure 5.13. The canonical channel in the P-CTC model is the same as the process-
matrix W .
R S2
O′2
I ′2
S1
O1
O′1
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O′1
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I ′2O
′
1
I ′1
= WS1 S2
O′2
I ′2
Figure 5.14. The canonical comb in the P-CTC model is the same as the process-
matrix W .
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Proof. The proof is given by Figures 5.13 and 5.14. The partial ovals on the bottom
of the figures represent maximally entangled states, and the partial ovals on the top of
the figures the post-selection to the same states. Lines that enter (leave) an entangled
state (a post-selection) can be connected.
Thus, the canonical transformations of every process matrix represent valid P-CTC
dynamics.
5.5.3 From process matrices to D-CTCs
In the D-CTC model, the system on the CTC is associated with a density operator — it
is always in the product state with the rest. This is the reason why the process-matrix
framework yields different predictions for the transformations. The predictions are
different in both cases, if we embed the canonical channel, as well as if we embed the
canonical comb.
Theorem 14 (Process matrices do not descrie D-CTC transformations). If process matri-
ces are transformed to canonical channels or canonical combs, then these transformations
do not coïncide with the D-CTC predictions.
Before we prove this theorem, we need to describe the D-CTC dynamics in this
setup. For simplicity, we assume that the causality-respecting input systems are triv-
ial, i.e., dI ′1 = dI ′2 = 1. These input systems can simply be embedded into the local
operations of both parties.
From process matrices to D-CTCs: Canonical channel
We start by describing the Choi map Tchannel of the canonical channel embedded in
the D-CTC model. The map Tchannel is a CPTP map from I˜ (the inputs to the parties)
to (O′, I) (the output of the parties and the output of the canonical channel, see Fig-
ure 5.15). According to our notation, we refer to the collection of objects whenever we
drop the indices referring to local regions (parties). The spaces of the systems I˜ j and I j ,
for j ∈ {1, 2} are isomorphic. Here, as opposed to the discussion of the D-CTC model
above (see Section 5.4.1), we use different labels for the systems entering and leaving
the CTC to avoid ambiguities. The reason for this subtlety is that Tchannel is a Choi map
as opposed to a unitary — as above — where it is not ambiguous.
The Choi map Tchannel is an element from the set L(H I˜⊗HI⊗HO′). It is constructed
by composing the maps of both parties in parallel, and by then composing those in
sequence with C . The composition of Choi maps is introduced in the preliminaries (see
Appendix). The local operation of party S j is the Choi map L˜ j which is an element
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O′1 O′2O1 O2
I1 I2
I˜1 I˜2
Figure 5.15. The canonical channel C plugged into the D-CTC model yields a new
CPTP map Tchannel (dashed box).
in L(H I˜ j ⊗HO′j ⊗HOj ) for j ∈ {0,1}. By this, we arrive at
Tchannel = (L˜1 ⊗ L˜2) ? C
= TrO
 
L˜1 ⊗ L˜2
TO (C ⊗ 1O′)
= TrO
 
L˜1 ⊗ L˜2
TO  W T ⊗ 1O′ .
The D-CTC model then predicts the output state
ρO′ = Tr I˜ ,I

ρˆT
I˜
⊗ 1I ,O′

Tchannel

,
where ρˆ I˜ is the solution to the consistency equation (fixed point):
ρˆI = Tr I˜ ,O′

ρ˜T
I˜
⊗ 1I ,O′

Tchannel

,
ρˆI = ρˆ I˜ .
From process matrices to D-CTCs: Canonical comb
Here, we construct the Choi map Tcomb of the canonical comb embedded in the D-
CTC model. The local operation of party S1 is the Choi map L˜1 which is an element
in L(H I˜1 ⊗HO′1 ⊗HO1). The Choi map of the local operation L2 of party S2, then again,
is an element in L(HI2 ⊗HO′2 ⊗HO2). This Choi map Tcomb is an element in
L(H I˜1 ⊗HI ⊗HO′) ,
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Figure 5.16. The canonical comb R plugged into the D-CTC model yields a new CPTP
map Tcomb (dashed box).
it maps quantum states from I˜1 to O
′, I1 (see Figure 5.16), and is given by
Tcomb = L˜1 ? R ? L2
= TrI2,O

L˜
TO1
1 ⊗ 1I ,O2,O′2
 
RTI2 ⊗ 1 I˜1,O′

L
TO2
2 ⊗ 1 I˜1,I1,O1,O′1

= TrI2,O

L˜
TO1
1 ⊗ LTO22 ⊗ 1I1
 
RTI2 ⊗ 1 I˜1,O′

= TrI2,O

L˜
TO1
1 ⊗ LTO22 ⊗ 1I1
 
W TI ,O1 ⊗ 1 I˜1,O′

.
The consistency condition asks for the fixed point
ρˆI1 = Tr I˜1,O′
  
ρˆ I˜1 ⊗ 1I1,O′

Tcomb

,
with ρˆI1 = ρˆ I˜1 . The D-CTC model predicts the following state as the output:
ρO′ = Tr I˜1,I1
  
ρˆ I˜1 ⊗ 1I1,O′

Tcomb

.
From process matrices to D-CTCs: Conclusion
In contrast to both cases above (canonical channel and comb), the process-matrix
framework predicts the output
ρO′ = TrO,I ((L1 ⊗ L2) (W ⊗ 1O′)) ,
where local operation L j is L˜ j where the system I˜ j is renamed I j . This output differs from
the predictions of D-CTC in both setups (canonical channel and comb). One example
of a process matrix W that yields different predictions for D-CTC is the process matrix
described in the work by Oreshkov, Costa, and Brukner [194].
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5.5.4 Simulating P-CTCs with process matrices
Here, we show that every P-CTC can be simulated by a process matrix. However, in
some cases, the resulting process matrices are not logically consistent. This is eas-
ily understood: The P-CTC model describe CTCs in the single party scenario as well,
but the process-matrix framework does not. In this section, we study this single party
case. Party S has two input systems I , I ′ and two output systems O, O′, where the non-
prime systems are causality violating, and the prime systems are causality respecting (as
above). The local operation of party S is the CPTP map expressed as a Choi operator L,
which is an element of L(HI ⊗HI ′ ⊗HO ⊗HO′).
Theorem 15 (Simulating P-CTC with process matrices). The logically-inconsistent pro-
cess matrix
W = ρTI ′ ⊗ 1O′ ⊗ |ψ〉〈ψ|I ,O , with
|ψ〉= 1p
d I
dI−1∑
i=0
|i〉I ⊗ |i〉O
simulates a P-CTC with the dynamics from the system I ′ to O′ The state of output system O′
is calculated according to process-matrix formalism with an additional normalization
ρ′O′ =
TrI ′,I ,O (LW )
Tr (LW )
.
Proof. We look at the case where the local operation L is the Choi map of some uni-
tary U . This Choi map is written as
L =
 
1I ′,I ⊗ UO′,O
 |φ〉〈φ|1I ′,I ⊗ U†O′,O ,
where
|φ〉=∑
k,`
|k,`〉I ′,I ⊗ |k,`〉O′,O ,
with appropriate dimensions. By the following calculation, we see that the expression
in the theorem is equal to one used in the P-CTC model (see Equation (5.4)):
TrI ′,I ,O (LW )∝
∑
i, j,k
`,m,n
Tr
 |i〉〈k|ρTI ′Tr (| j〉〈`|m〉〈n|)TrO  U | j, i〉〈`, k|U†(|m〉〈n| ⊗ 1)
=
∑
i, j,k,`
Tr
 |i〉〈k|ρTI ′TrO  U | j, i〉〈`, k|U†(|`〉〈 j| ⊗ 1) .
We express ρI ′ as
ρI ′ =
∑
x ,y
αx ,y |x〉〈y| .
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Now, we can write
TrI ′,I ,O (LW )∝
∑
i, j,k
`,x ,y
αx ,y Tr (|i〉〈k|y〉〈x |)TrO
 
U | j, i〉〈`, k|U†(|`〉〈 j| ⊗ 1)
=
∑
j,`,x ,y
αx ,y TrO
 
U | j, x〉〈`, y|U†(|`〉〈 j| ⊗ 1)
=
∑
j,`,x ,y
a
αx ,y(〈a| ⊗ 1)U | j, x〉〈`, y|U†(|`〉〈 j|a〉 ⊗ 1)
=
∑
`,x ,y,a
αx ,y(〈a| ⊗ 1)U |a, x〉〈`, y|U†(|`〉 ⊗ 1)
= CρI ′C
† ,
where
C = TrO U .
5.5.5 Simulating D-CTCs with P-CTCs
Under some restrictions of the local operation, the D-CTC dynamics can be simulated
with the P-CTC model. To achieve that, however, we need to introduce some non-
linear entanglement-breaking channel into the P-CTC model. Here, we assume a single
party with input systems I ′ and I , and output systems O′ and O. The local operation
of the party is denoted by U , and is assumed to be a unitary transformation from I , I ′
to O, O′. As above, the non-prime systems are causality violating, while the others
are not. The unitary transformations U that we consider are restricted to satisfy the
following equation:
ρ′O′ = TrO

U

ρI ′ ⊗ 1IdI

U†

= TrO
 
U
 
ρI ′ ⊗ρ′I

U†

,
with ρ′O′ = ρ′I . In words, the fixed point ρ′ is obtained by a single use of the unitary
on the maximally-mixed state. This boils down that the CPTP map from I to O, i.e.,
the CPTP map on the causality-violating systems, if written by Kraus operators {Ek}K,
satisfies ∑
k∈K
EkE
†
k =
∑
k,k′∈K
EkEk′E
†
k′E
†
k . (5.5)
This equations, expressed in words, reads that the outputs of the CPTP map after the
first and a second application on the maximally mixed state are equal.
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U
C
B
ρI ′
ρ′O′
Figure 5.17. Simulating D-CTC with P-CTC.
Theorem 16 (Simulating D-CTCs with P-CTCs). In the post-selected model of CTCs, an
additional system C is required with which the output on the CTC is teleported to the past.
The evolution of a system interacting with a D-CTC, with the constraint (5.5), is simulated
in the P-CTC model if after the local operation the entanglement-breaking channel B
B : S(HO′ ⊗HO ⊗HC)→ S(HO′ ⊗HO ⊗HC)
σ 7→ TrO′,C σ⊗ TrOσ
is applied (see Figure 5.17).
Proof. We calculate the final state of the system O′. This is done according to the P-CTC
model [171]. The state ρ′O′ is (before renormalization)
ρ′O′ =
 
1O′ ⊗ 〈Φ|O,C

B
 
UI ′,I ⊗ 1C
  
ρI ′ ⊗ |Φ〉〈Φ|I ,C

U†I ′,I ⊗ 1C
  
1O′ ⊗ |Φ〉O,C

,
where |Φ〉 is the maximally entangled state entangling the systems I , C , and respec-
tively, O, C . The output of the entanglement breaking channel B is σO ⊗σO′,C with
σO = TrO′,C
 
UI ′,I ⊗ 1C
  
ρI ′ ⊗ |Φ〉〈Φ|I ,C

U†I ′,I ⊗ 1C

(5.6)
∝ TrO′

UI ′,I (ρI ′ ⊗ 1I)U†I ′,I

.
Thus, we get
ρ′O′ =
 
1O′ ⊗ 〈Φ|O,C
  
σO ⊗σO′,C
  
1O′ ⊗ |Φ〉O,C

∝∑
i, j
 
1O′ ⊗ 〈i, i|O,C
  
σO ⊗σO′,C
  
1O′ ⊗ | j, j〉O,C

=
∑
i, j
〈i|σO| j〉 (1O′ ⊗ 〈i|C)σO′,C (1O′ ⊗ | j〉C) .
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If we plug in σO′,C , we get
ρ′O′∝
∑
i, j
〈i|σO| j〉TrO
 
(U ⊗ 〈i|C)
 
ρI ′ ⊗ |Φ〉〈Φ|I ,C
  
U† ⊗ | j〉C

=
∑
i, j,k,`
〈i|σO| j〉TrO
 
(U ⊗ 〈i|C)
 
ρI ′ ⊗ |k, k〉〈`,`|I ,C
  
U† ⊗ | j〉C

=
∑
i, j,k,`
〈i|σO| j〉TrO
 
U
 
ρI ′ ⊗ |k〉〈`|I U†
 〈i|k〉〈`| j〉 .
From the last line, it follows that in the sum we have the identities i = k and j = `. So,
we obtain
ρ′O′∝
∑
i, j
〈i|σO| j〉TrO
 
U (ρI ′ ⊗ |i〉〈 j|I)U†

.
Now, we simply shift the expression 〈i|σO| j〉 in-between the |i〉〈 j| and get
ρ′O′∝ TrO
 
U (ρI ′ ⊗σO)U†

.
This last equation is the same as the one used for the D-CTC model (see Equation (5.3))
with the fixed point σO (see Equation (5.6)).
5.6 Discussion
Closed time-like curves (CTCs) are world lines where, if objects would travel on them,
then they would bump into themselves. By allowing objects to influence their younger
selfs, CTCs become eligible to the grandfather antinomy (see Section 1.2 and Sec-
tion 3.3.1). Surprisingly, space-time geometries that are consistent with general rel-
ativity that contain CTCs exist. How should one interpret this discovery? Should we
conjecture that “[t]he laws of physics do not allow the appearance of closed time-like
curves,” just as Hawking [149] did, and see CTCs as a mathematical artefact? Or should
we consider CTCs as physically possible as long as they do not lead to contradictions?
The main part of this chapter consists in studding CTCs under a set of natural
principles that one wishes to uphold. The main principle is Novikov’s principle of self-
consistency. This principle asserts that only self-consistent dynamics is possible. As ar-
gued by Novikov [190] himself, CTCs do not conflict this principle. Another principle
is the no-new-physics principle. The weak form of this principle asserts that physics at
some space-like region should remain invariant under the existence or absence of CTCs
in the future of that region. Echeverria, Klinkhammer, and Thorne [97] gave strong
evidence that this principle could always be uphold. Here, we go beyond the studies
of Echeverria et al. [97] and ask to uphold the strong version of the no-new-physics
principle. In its strong version, this principle asks for physics within local regions to re-
main invariant no matter whether CTCs exist around these regions or not. Thus, local
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regions are allowed to influence the systems traveling on CTCs in an arbitrary way —
as if they would not travel on any CTC. Our main contribution is that these principles
do not rule out CTCs. Furthermore, these principles imply that the Cauchy problem is
well-defined (see Principle 3), and that every such CTC can be embedded into a larger
dynamics that is reversible (see Principle 4). These results put CTCs in a different light:
CTCs do not only arise as solutions to Einstein’s equations of general relativity, but they
are reversible and respect a series of natural assumptions. By this, we showed that the
existence of CTC in nature seems less improbable as previously believed. Furthermore,
one does not need to consider quantum dynamics in order to uphold consistency.
Additionally, we showed how our model of CTCs differs from other formulations.
The main difference is that in contrast to the other models, our model is linear. Non-
linearity leads to many peculiarities (see References [9, 127, 204] for some peculiari-
ties), not present in our model.
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Chapter 6
Self-referential model of
computation
In the previous two sections, we studied loops in terms of non-causal correlations and
closed time-like curves. We saw that in both cases, loops exist that are unproblematic
in the sense of the assumptions placed in Section 4.1 for the former, and in the sense
of the physical and logical principles described in Section 5.2 for the latter. Here, we
extend these studies to computation: What computations become possible if we intro-
duce loops, and what is the computational power of such a model? The answer to the
second questions is used to make statements about the physicality of closed time-like
curves (CTCs); the existence of CTCs in nature, where the CTCs behave as described in
the previous chapter, is less implausible when compared to the commonly used models
for CTCs (more on this in the following section).
Traditional models of computation like the Turing machine [238, 239], the circuit
model, or the billiard computer [120] are designed to have a linear, i.e. causal, time-
flow. This means that fundamental operations are carried out one after the other (or in
parallel). Some programs, then again, are designed in such a way that the output of
some system is fed back. An example where feed-back loops are present is an autopilot
system of an aircraft. There, some factors like the altitude are measured, after which
the power setting and the rudder for instance are readjusted, which then again has
an influence on the altitude of the aircraft. This feed-back process continues until the
autopilot is turned off. However, such feed-back loops differ qualitatively from causal
loops. In the latter, an “effect is the cause of its own cause” while in the former, the
cause-effect chain grows: The adjusted altitude is not the cause for the described change
of the aircraft settings, but it is the cause for the upcoming change of the settings.
Causal models of computation can be described by Markov chains (see Figure 6.1).
By this we mean the following. The state of the computational device at time t can
be described by ρt . The successor state, i.e., the state after ρt is ρt+1 etc. Further-
more, every state depends on the previous state solely, i.e., ρt+1 depends on ρt only. In
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ρ0 ρ1 · · · ρm−1 ρm
Figure 6.1. Traditional computation can be modeled by a Markov chain where a
state ρt+1 depends on the previous state ρt only.
ρ0
ρ1ρm
ρm−1
Figure 6.2. Self-referential computation can be described by a Markov chain that is
closed; by a cycle where “future” events can influence “past” ones.
stark contrast, we understand a self-referential model of computation as a model where
“future” states potentially can influence “past” ones. When we put this into the Marko-
vian picture, we can say that a program on a self-referential model can be described
by Markov “bracelets” or cycles (see Figure 6.2). Here, the state ρt+1 depends on the
state ρt — just as for causal circuit —, but additionally, ρ0, i.e., the “initial” state, de-
pends on ρm, i.e., the “final” state. Note that here the terms “initial” and “final” are
ambiguous. Basically, for every pair of neighbouring states the earlier could be called
“final” and the later “initial.”
In terms of a circuit model that consists of gates and wires, a self-referential circuit
is a circuit where some outputs of same gates are connected to their inputs (potentially
through other gates). Put differently, a circuit can be understood as a graph where
the gates are nodes and the wires are directed edges. We call such a graph the graph
associated to the circuit. A self-referential circuit is a circuit where its associated graph
contains cycles.
6.1 From complexity theoretic considerations to closed time-
like curves
We start by some considerations on complexity theory. The class P is the set of all
languages that are decidable by a deterministic Turing machine in polynomial time.
Formally, a language L ⊆ Σ∗ is a set of words over some alphabet Σ, and a word x
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is a string x ∈ Σ∗ of arbitrary length. A language L is said to be in P if there exists
a deterministic Turing machine that takes some input x ∈ Σ∗ and decides membership,
i.e., it answers “yes” whenever x ∈ L holds, in a running time that is polynomial in
the length of the input: |x |. The class NP, then again, is similar to the class P with
the sole difference that a nondeterministic Turing machine is considered, as oppose to a
deterministic one. A nondeterministic Turing machine is a Turing machine that runs all
paths of computation simultaneously. More intuitively, a language L ⊆ Σ∗ is said to be
in the class NP if there exists a deterministic Turing machine such that for every x ∈ L
there exists a witness w ∈ Σ∗, and if x and w are used as input to the deterministic Turing
machine, then it outputs “yes” in a running time that is polynomial in |x |. Thus, P is
the class of all decision problems that can be solved efficiently, i.e., in polynomial time,
and the class NP consists of all decision problems where membership can be verified
efficiently.
Among computer scientists and mathematicians it is believed that P 6= NP; there
exist problems where a solution can be verified easily, yet it is hard to come up with
the solution (see the blog post by Aaronson [4] for an overview over P versus NP).
If P= NP, then this
“hätte [. . . ] Folgerungen von der grössten Tragweite. Es würde nämlich of-
fenbar bedeuten, dass man trotz der Unlösbarkeit des Entscheidungsprob-
lems die Denkarbeit des Mathematikers bei ja-oder-nein Fragen vollständig
durch Maschinen ersetzen könnte”1 [137].
This furthermore suggests the so-called “NP-hardness Assumption” [1].
Conjecture 1. No physically realizable model of computation can solve NP-hard prob-
lems efficiently.
This conjecture allows to make statements about the physical realizability of closed
time-like curves (CTCs). Such statements are obtained by studying the computational
power of a computational model that incorporates CTCs, e.g., a model that has access
to CTCs. If such a model can solve NP-hard problems efficiently, then closed time-like
curves are unphysical under this conjecture.
Deutsch’s [93] model of closed time-like curves (D-CTC) (see Section 5.4.1) was
also examined in terms of computation. As Aaronson and Watrous [6] showed, this
model can solve PSPACE-complete problems in polynomial time. Aaronson [3] gave
some intuition for that result. The class PSPACE is the class of problems solvable by a
polynomial amount of space. Now, since D-CTC can solve the same problems efficiently
in time, and since with CTCs one can go back in time, the D-CTC model renders time
reusable, just as space is.
1As translated in Reference [137]: “would have consequences of the greatest significance. Namely,
this would clearly mean that the thinking of a mathematician in the case of yes-or-no questions could be
completely replaced by machines, in spite of the unsolvability of the Entschidungsproblem.”
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coUP
coNP
UP
NP
PostBQP
PSPACE
EXP
P
Figure 6.3. Schematic representation of some complexity classes. Our focus in the
later part of this chapter is on the intersection between UP and coUP (marked with
crosses).
Even more strikingly, the same is shown for the classical variant of D-CTC. Let us
denote by BQPDCTC the class of decision problems efficiently, i.e., in polynomial-time,
solvable with a quantum D-CTC, and likewise PDCTC for the classical special case of
D-CTC.2 So, Aaronson and Watrous [6] showed PDCTC = BQPDCTC = PSPACE. Most
recently, Aaronson et al. [7] proved that the D-CTC model can solve the halting problem.
The other widely used model for CTCs is based on post-selection and teleportation
(P-CTC) (see Section 5.4.2). Also here, the computational power of P-CTC was stud-
ied. Let BQPPCTC be the class of all decision problems efficiently solvable in the P-CTC
model, and let PPCTC be the classical counter part. It was shown [2, 170, 171] that
BQPPCTC = PostBQP= PP , and
PPCTC = BPPpath .
The class BPPpath is the classical analogue of PostBQP [144]. By the relations (see
also Figure 6.3)
NP ⊆ BPPpath ⊆ PostBQP ⊆ PSPACE ⊆ EXP ,
the P-CTC model is believed to be computationally weaker than D-CTC.
Thus, the D-CTC and the P-CTC models allow for efficient computation of problems
that are NP-hard — which is at odds with the conjecture above. This renders both,
the D-CTC and P-CTC model, unphysical. In contrast to these results, we show that
2Note that the complexity zoo [5] refers to these classes as PCTC and BQPCTC as opposed to PDCTC
and BQPDCTC as defined here. We nevertheless stick to this latter notation to make it for the reader easier
to distinguish these classes from the P-CTC classes.
111 6.2 Under- and overdetermination
NOT
Figure 6.4. This circuit is overdetermined: No consistent assignment of a bit to the
wire exist.
the CTC model presented in Chapter 5 is not at all that powerful. Rather, the class of
decision problems efficiently solvable by such CTCs is upper bounded by UP∩coUP,
which is believed to be strictly contained within NP. In formulas, if PCTC is the class
of all decision problems solvable in polynomial time with a Turing machine augmented
with the CTCs from Chapter 5, then
PCTC ⊆ UP∩coUP . (6.1)
The class UP [241] (see also [197]) is similar to NP with the difference that the prob-
lems are restricted to have a unique proof for membership. One of our main technical
results of this chapter is that
PSelfRef = UP∩coUP ,
i.e., the computational power of self-referential circuits is characterized by UP∩coUP.
The upper bound in Equation (6.1) follows from the fact that the self-referential model
uses a subset of the principles from Section 5.2. Therefore, our model of CTCs is not
ruled out by computer-science arguments. By this, the existence of such CTCs in nature
seems less implausible than D-CTCs or P-CTCs. At this point, and with the last main
chapter of this thesis, we arrive at the conclusion that we cannot rule out CTCs by logical,
physical, or computational arguments. Let us now construct the tools to arrive at this
conclusion.
6.2 Under- and overdetermination
There are two main problems when we connect some output of a gate to itself. These
problems are in fact antinomies: logical problems (see Section 1.2 and Section 3.3.1).
The first problem is the problem of overdetermination — see also the grandfather anti-
nomy. A circuit is said to be overdetermined if the bits on the wires take contradictory
values. An example of such a circuit is the NOT-gate on bits, where the output is con-
nected to the input (see Figure 6.4). The NOT-gate describes the following function
NOT : {0, 1} → {0, 1}
a 7→ b = ¬a .
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ID
Figure 6.5. This circuit is underdetermined: Both bits 0 and 1 are possible; the circuit
does not specify the bit on the wire.
If the output of that gate is connected to its input, we get the additional identity
a = b .
Both equations together form a system of equations that is overdetermined.
The other problem is the problem of underdetermination, which is essentially the
information antinomy. In such a case, the bits on the wires are not defined by the circuit.
This is illustrated by the circuit which consists of the identity gate ID, and where the
output is connected to the input (see Figure 6.5). Here, the gate describes the function
ID : {0,1} → {0,1}
a 7→ b = a ,
and by connecting the output with the input we additionally require for
a = b .
Such a system of equations is underdetermined: The variable a is undefined. The prob-
lem with underdetermination seems slightly more subtle than overdetermination. The
latter is not possible because otherwise 0 must be equal 1 — a contradiction. The for-
mer, then again, does not compute the output; the output of the circuit, or the bits on
the wires, cannot be specified. Deutsch [93] refers to the information antinomy as “cre-
ationism:” The bits are not specified by the model but, if that would be possible, would
arise ex nihilo.3
Definition 19 (Logically consistency of circuits). In the spirit of the previous two chap-
ters, we call a circuit logically consistent if and only if the bits on the wires are not
overdetermined and not underdetermined.
This definition does not restrict the circuits to be causal, and in fact, we show that
this assumption of logical consistency is strictly weaker than the assumption of a linear
time-flow. What follows from this definition is that a self-referential circuit is logically
consistent if it has a unique fixed point on the “looping” wires. No overdetermination is
the same as saying there is at least one fixed point. Then again, no underdetermination
asks for not more than one fixed point.
3The full quote of Deutsch [93] reads: “It is a fundamental principle of the philosophy of science that
the solutions of problems do not spring fully formed into the Universe, i.e., as initial data, but emerge
only through evolutionary or rational processes. In adopting this evolutionary principle we reject such
antirational doctrines as creationism [. . . ].”
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6.2.1 Put in context with closed time-like curves and non-causal correla-
tions
We briefly compare the requirements of no under- and no overdetermination with the
assumptions used for the non-causal correlations, and with the principles used in the
discussion of the CTCs.
Our CTCs were built up on four principles (see Section 5.2). These were Novikov’s
principle of self-consistency, the no-new-physics principle, the uniqueness principle,
and reversible dynamics (actually, the latter two principles follow from the former two).
Novikov’s principle asserts that consistent dynamics arise only. This is basically the same
as requiring that no overdetermination takes place. The no-new-physics principle asks
for all operations to be possible within a local space-time region. This assumption is
dropped for the model of computation presented here. We drop this assumption be-
cause we do not incorporate the notion of parties that can freely choose their operations
within a local region. Rather, local regions are replaced by fixed gates, and the term
logical consistency applies to the circuit as a whole. The uniqueness principle can be seen
as following from the assumption of no over- and no underdetermination. And finally,
we do not make any assumptions on reversibility in the modeled studied here.
Thus, this self-referential model of computational uses a subset of the principles for
the closed time-like curves. This means that every closed time-like curve obeying the
principles from Section 5.2 can be transformed into such a circuit. Physically, one can
think of some space-like surface P where the circuit is designed. Now, if in the future
of P there exists a CTC (as in Figure 5.2), then this designed circuit can implemented
on that CTC where it is evaluated.
When we compare this model of computation with the framework for non-causal
correlations, then we see that the model for correlations could in some cases be more
powerful. The reason for this is that the framework allows for processes that are intrin-
sically probabilistic — they cannot be expressed as convex combinations of deterministic
ones. Therefore, not every setup in the framework for non-causal correlations can be
translated into a self-referential circuit. This has the consequence that PSelfRef is not
necessarily an upper bound on the computational power of non-causal correlations.
The so-called fine-tuned environments (see the polytope presented in Example 6) might
have a higher power. This is not examined and is left as an open question.
6.2.2 Put in context with Gödel’s incompleteness theorems
Under- and overdetermination can also put in a different light. Gödel [130] showed
in his seminal work that “every formal system containing arithmetic” [136] cannot be
complete and consistent at the same time. If a formal system contains sentence that
can be proven within that system to be true as well as false, then the system is called
inconsistent. Then again, if the formal system contains sentence that cannot be proven
neither true nor false, then such a system is incomplete. Overdetermination is similar to
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inconsistency in the Gödel sense; some bit on a wire is both, 0 and 1. Underdetermination
is similar to incompleteness in the Gödel sense; there exist bits that are not specified.
6.2.3 Put in context with anthropic computing
These considerations on under- and overdetermination already give us a hint on how
such circuits might be programed. Suppose you are given a causal circuit that pro-
duces a guess for a solution to some problem. At this stage of discussion is seems
as if an incorrect guess (let us assume we can verify the guess) can be eliminated by
introducing an overdetermination — a logical contradiction. This is very much like
guessing the solution to a problem and killing ones own grandfather if a wrong guess
was produced; a computational model termed “anthropic computing” [1] or “quan-
tum suicide” [232]. Aaronson proposed the name “anthropic computing” in analogy to
the anthropic principle in cosmology: The probability of being alive depends on the
guess. In that model, one could solve NP-complete problems in polynomial time.
In DeWitt’s [95] and Deutsch’s [94] interpretation of the Hermann-Everett interpre-
tation [111, 152] of quantum theory, a quantum measurement leads to a branching of
the universe, where every possible measurement result occurs in some universe. If our
guess is subject to quantum randomness, then we either end up in a universe where the
guess was correct or where the guess was wrong. In the case we end up in a branch
where the guess is correct, we solved the problem. However, if we end up in a branch
with a wrong guess, then we could just commit suicide (please do not try this!) — and
by this stop our conciousness to persist in that branch. By that, our conciousness ends
up in those branches only where the guess was correct. However, this requires that we
can verify the guess and, additionally, that conciousness persists in the other branches
after the suicide in one branch. One very sad “quantum suicide” was in fact carried out
by Everett’s daughter: “In her suicide note she wrote that she was going off to meet her
father in a parallel universe” [172].
6.3 Model
The self-referential model of computation is inspired by the framework of correlations
without causal order (see Chapter 4). There, we studied the correlations arising when
parties are not subject to a a priori causal order. Furthermore, the parties are allowed
to perform arbitrary operations, and we asked for the probabilities to be well-defined
for any choice or operations. The latter led to the notion of environment which con-
nects the parties in one or another way. Here, in contrast, this notion of parties and
environment is replaced by gates. Gates, then again, are not experimenters that can
freely choose their interactions; gates are fixed. A circuit in this model consists of gates
and wires connecting these gates. As said before, the gates can be connected arbitrarily
as long as the circuit as a whole is logically consistent.
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Figure 6.6. An example of a causal circuit with two inputs and two outputs.
Let us state some definition that should make the discussion more precise. We can
always built up a self-referential circuit by starting from a causal one.
Definition 20 (Causal circuit). A causal circuit C is a circuit that consists of gates and
wires connecting these gates, where furthermore the associated graph is acyclic. With-
out loss of generality, and if not otherwise stated, we assume that the wires carry bits,
and that number of input wires equals the number of output wires. Additionally, all
input wires are labeled with successive integers (possibly negative ones as well). The
output wires, then again, are labeled with the same integers. Such a circuit can, further-
more, be identified with a function (we use lowercase letters to denote these functions)
c :A×X →A×X ,
where the set A is the set of possible inputs to the wires with non-negative labels, and
the set X is the set of possible inputs to the negatively labeled wires. The negatively
labeled wires are transformed to loops in a later part of this work. Since the number
of input and output wires are the same, c maps A×X to itself.
An example of a causal circuit is given in Figure 6.6. A self-referential circuit C′ is
constructed from a causal circuit C.
Definition 21 (Self-referential circuit). Given a causal circuit C, the self-referential cir-
cuit C′ is obtained by connecting the output wires with the input wires that have the
same negative label. Furthermore, we add a “read-out” wire that carries as many bits k
as the negatively labeled output wires of C and where the state c on those wires is
added to the “read-out” wire modulo k. The “read-out” wire is labeled with the succes-
sive positive integer.
We adopt Definition 19 of logical consistency.
Definition 22 (Logically consistent circuit). From the definition of logical consistency
above, a self-referential circuit C′ constructed from a causal circuit C is logically consis-
tent if and only if
∀a ∈A,∃!(a′, x) ∈A×X : c(a, x) = (a′, x) .
Here, the variable x represents the value on the looping wires, the variable a is the
input, and the variable a′ is the output from C′.
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−1
0
−1
0
⊕
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Figure 6.7. An example of a self-referential circuit built from the causal one depicted
in Figure 6.6.
B c
a x⊕
Figure 6.8. The black box B is guaranteed to have a unique fixed point. This fixed
point is found by transforming B to a closed circuit and by reading out the value on
the wire.
As an example, the circuit shown in Figure 6.7 is logically consistent if for every
input on the wire labeled 0 and 1, the “looping” wire (label −1) has a unique fixed
point.
6.4 Query complexity
Suppose you are given some black box B that takes one input a ∈ B and produces one
output x ∈ B. Furthermore, you are guaranteed that the black box B has a unique fixed
point. In the traditional circuit model, |B|−1 queries to the black box are needed in the
worst case to find the fixed point. Now, the self-referential model described above can
give us the fixed point by one query. This is shown in Figure 6.8. One might question
whether indeed the black box is queried only once. But this can be seen to be the case
for the following reason: Any other query would be inconsistent.
But how should we proceed if we are given a black box B2 where we are guaranteed
that it has two fixed points, c and c′? The above recipe to find the unique fixed point of
a black box fails. The problem is that since we have two fixed points, the self-referential
circuit B′2 constructed from the causal one B2 is underdetermined — both fixed points
could potentially travel on the looping wire. However, by some trick similar to “quan-
tum suicide,” it is possible to find these fixed points in two queries. This is shown in
Figure 6.9. There, the gate G acts in the following way:
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⊕
Figure 6.9. The black box B2 is guaranteed to have two fixed points. These are found by
independently transforming the black boxes to closed circuits, and then by enforcing
that the values on the closed circuits are different and ordered. This ensures a unique
fixed point of the whole circuit.
g : B4 × {0,1} → {0, 1}
(a, b, a′, b′, e) 7→
¨
0 if a′ 	 a < b′ 	 b ,
e⊕ 1 otherwise,
where 	 is subtraction modulo |B|, and where ⊕ is addition modulo 2. If the fixed
points obtained from the two black boxes are the same or ordered decreasingly, then
the gate G introduced a contradiction — “killing the grandfather” — by flipping the
bit e. Otherwise, if the fixed points are different and given in the increasing order, then
the gate outputs 0. By this, the only fixed point that exists on all looping wires is such
that the above loop carries the smaller fixed point, the bottom loop carries the larger
fixed point, and the loop connected to G carries 0.
6.5 Computational complexity
A decision problem Π is often cast as the membership problem of a language L ⊆ Σ∗
with alphabet Σ. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, we choose Σ = {0,1}.
An instance of a decision problem Π is a string x ∈ Σ∗, and the question is: Is x a
word of L, i.e., does x ∈ L hold? An algorithm that solves a decision problem outputs
either “yes” or “no.”
Search problems, then again, are mostly defined via binary relations. Such a prob-
lem Π is associated with a binary relation R ⊆ Σ∗ × Σ∗. An instance of Π in that
case is some x ∈ Σ∗, and the question is: What (if there exists one) is y ∈ Σ∗ such
that (x , y) ∈ R? An algorithm that solves a search problem Π outputs y if there exists
a y satisfying (x , y) ∈ R, and returns “no” otherwise.
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By the expression |x | we denote the length of some string x ∈ Σ∗. For the upcom-
ing definitions, we need to introduce the following two notions: polynomial decidability
and polynomial balancedness. A binary relation R is called polynomially decidable if there
exists a deterministic Turing machine deciding the language {(x , y) ∈ R} in polynomial
time. In other words, by this we mean that there exists a deterministic algorithm that
solves the decision problem for the language L= {(x , y) ∈ R}. Then again, a binary re-
lation R is called polynomially balanced if there exists a polynomial q such that (x , y) ∈ R
implies |y| ≤ q(|x |). This notion ensures that the length of the solution to an instance x
of a search problem is polynomially bounded by the length of the instance.
In the following definitions, we assume that for every problem Π and for every
string x ∈ Σ∗, we can check in polynomial time whether x is an instance of Π or not.
Note that x might be mall-formed. In the case where x is not an instance of Π, then we
abort. An introduction to common concepts in complexity theory — as those just stated
— can be found in the textbooks by Papadimitriou [197] and by Arora and Barak [18].
We now define the algorithm that takes as input some bit string x and, based on that,
generates a self-referential circuit. In this complexity theoretic setup, we have to restrict
ourselves to a set of basic gates from which the circuits are constructed. Otherwise it
would be impossible to study complexity classes; one could then just define the gates
to implement some function that could, therefore, be regarded as black box. The basic
blocks the following circuits are constructed from are the AND, the OR, the NOT, and
the FAN-OUT (copy) gate. These four gates are universal in terms of computability.
Definition 23 (Deterministic SRefCirc algorithm). A deterministic SRefCirc algorithmA
is a polynomial-time deterministic algorithm that takes as input a bit string x ∈ {0, 1}∗
and outputs a Boolean causal circuit Cx over AND, OR, NOT, and FAN-OUT, such that
the self-referential circuit C′x is logically consistent, i.e.,
∃!y : cx(y) = y .
If the first bit of the fixed point y is a 1, i.e., if y = 1z for some z, then we say that A
accepts x , otherwise, A rejects x . The algorithm A decides a language L ⊆ {0, 1}∗ if A
accepts every x ∈ L and rejects every x 6∈ L. Furthermore, the algorithmA decides a bi-
nary relation R ⊆ {0, 1}∗×{0,1}∗ if for every x ∈ {0, 1}∗ the pair (x , y), with cx(y) = y ,
is in R.
This definition can now be used to define the two complexity classes PSRefCirc and
FPSRefCirc. The former complexity class is a class of decision problems, and the latter a
class of search problems. Our main focus is then to characterize these classes in terms
of other classes. In particular, we are interested in the separation of these classes from
the class NP and from the class FNP (see Section 6.1).
Definition 24 (PSRefCirc and FPSRefCirc). The class PSRefCirc contains every language that
is decidable by any deterministic SRefCirc algorithm. The class FPSRefCirc contains every
binary relation that is decidable by any deterministic SRefCirc algorithm.
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As it turns out, we can relate these classes to UP and to the complement thereof.
Definition 25 (UP and coUP). The class UP (Unambiguous Polynomial-time) contains
all languages L for which a polynomial-time verifier V : {0,1}∗→ {0, 1} exists such that
for every x , if x ∈ L then ∃!y : V (x , y) = 1, and if x 6∈ L then ∀y : V (x , y) = 0. The
class coUP consists of all languages L where the complement of L is in UP.
The complexity class UP was first defined by Valiant [241]. It basically contains all
search problems where membership (non-membership for coUP) of x in L can be proven
efficiently by a unique witness y . Note the close connection between the class UP
and NP: The latter class is the same as the former with the sole difference that multiple
witnesses for membership are allowed in NP. So, NP is defined as UP where the
uniqueness quantifier is replaced by an existence quantifier.
In the following theorem, we show that PSRefCirc equals UP∩coUP. Known prob-
lems in UP∩coUP are integer factorization (more precisely, the decision problem ana-
logue thereof: Does N has a factor greater than k?) [116] and parity games [161]. In
Section 6.6, we design a self-referential circuit that factorizes integers in polynomial
time. An implication of the following theorem is that UP∩coUP can be understood in
terms of fixed point.
Theorem 17. PSRefCirc = UP∩coUP.
Proof. We prove this identity by showing that the left class in contained in the right
and vice versa. Let us start with PSRefCirc ⊇ UP∩coUP. Assume a language L is
in UP∩coUP. This means that there exist two polynomial-time verifiers Vyes and Vno
(one for UP and one for coUP) such that for every x , if x ∈ L, then
∃!w : Vyes(x , w) = 1∧∀w′ : Vno(x , w′) = 0 ,
and if x 6∈ L
∀w : Vyes(x , w) = 0∧ ∃!w′ : Vno(w, x ′) = 1 .
Now, we construct a deterministic SRefCirc algorithm A that decides the language L.
The algorithm A takes some x ∈ {0,1}∗ and generates the self-referential circuit C′x
from the causal circuit Cx shown in Figure 6.10. The subcircuits Vyes,Vno implement
the verifiers Vyes, Vno. Because L is assumed to be in UP∩coUP, we can construct and
run these subcircuits in polynomial time. The circuit Cx acts in the following way:
cx : {0, 1} × {0, 1}q(|x |)→ {0, 1} × {0, 1}q(|x |) ,
(b, w) 7→

(0, w) Vno(x , w) = 1 ,
(1, w) Vyes(x , w) = 1 ,
(b⊕ 1, w) otherwise,
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Figure 6.10. This closed circuit constructed from this causal circuit Cx is used to re-
duce a problem from UP∩coUP to PSRefCirc. The wire that carries the witness w for
membership or non-membership consists of q(|x |) bits.
where q is a polynomial. This circuit C′x is logically consistent because it contains
a unique fixed point. If x ∈ L, then there exists a unique w with Vyes(x , w) = 1,
and cx(1, w) = (1, w). Otherwise, there exists a unique string w with Vno(x , w) = 1,
and cx(0, w) = (0, w).
The converse (PSRefCirc ⊆ UP∩coUP) holds for the following reason. First, as-
sume L is in PSRefCirc. Thus, we have an algorithm A that, for every x , produces the
logically consistent circuit C′x . We design both verifiers Vyes and Vno to act as
Vyes :(x , z) 7→ cx(z) = z ∧ z = 1w ,
Vno :(x , z) 7→ cx(z) = z ∧ z = 0w .
In words, both verifiers check whether z is a fixed point of Cx , and additionally check for
the first bit. If z is a fixed point and the first bit of z is a 1, then x ∈ L. Otherwise, if z is
a fixed point and the first bit of z is a 0, then x 6∈ L. So, for both cases, membership and
non-membership, a unique witness exists that is polynomial in the size of the instance,
and by that L ∈ UP∩coUP.
So much for decision problems. An analogous theorem for search problems can be
stated as well. For that, we introduce the functional variants of the complexity classes
discussed before.
Definition 26 (FUP). A binary relation R is in FUP (Function UP) if and only if R is
polynomially decidable, polynomially balanced, and ∀x : |{y | (x , y) ∈ R}| ≤ 1.
Informally, a problem is in FUP if for every instance there exists at most one solu-
tion.
Definition 27 (F(UP∩coUP)). A pair (R1, R2) of relations is in F(UP∩coUP) if and
only if both relations are polynomially decidable, polynomially balanced, and for every
instance x
(∃!y : (x , y) ∈ R1 ∧∀z : (x , z) 6∈ R2)⊕
(∀y : (x , y) 6∈ R1 ∧ ∃!z : (x , z) ∈ R2)
121 6.5 Computational complexity
holds. The exclusive-or (⊕) asks for either yet not both expressions to be true.
Note that the output of a search problem in F(UP∩coUP) is some string w that
satisfies either (x , w) ∈ R1 or (x , w) ∈ R2 but not both. Furthermore, as we formulated
it, the string w does not indicate in which relation the pair (x , y) appears. Since both re-
lations are polynomially decidable and polynomially balanced, however, we can check
in polynomial time whether y is a solution of R1 or R2. This brings us to the following
class, which is equal to F(UP∩coUP).
Definition 28 (TFUP). A binary relation R is in TFUP (Totally FUP) if and only if R
is polynomially decidable, polynomially balanced, and ∀x ,∃!y : (x , y) ∈ R.
The class TFUP is the analog to TFNP= F(NP∩coNP) [178]. This is the class of
total relations that are polynomially decidable and polynomially balanced.
Theorem 18. TFUP= F(UP∩coUP).
Proof. Let R be a relation in TFUP and R1, R2 two relations such that for every x:
(∃!y : (x , y) ∈ R1 ∧∀z : (x , z) 6∈ R2)⊕
(∀y : (x , y) 6∈ R1 ∧ ∃!z : (x , z) ∈ R2) .
The inclusion TFUP ⊆ F(UP∩coUP) can be seen by setting R1 = R and R2 = ;. The
converse is obtained by setting R = R1 ∪ R2.
We now show that the class of search problems efficiently solvable by self-referential
circuits coïncides with TFUP.
Theorem 19. FPSRefCirc = TFUP.
Proof. We prove this identity in a similar way to Theorem 17. First, we show the in-
clusion TFUP ⊆ FPSRefCirc. By definition, a binary relation R that is in TFUP is poly-
nomially decidable and polynomially balanced. Therefore, there exists an algorithm D
that takes two inputs x , y , runs in polynomial time in |x |, and if (x , y) ∈ R then D out-
puts “yes,” otherwise, D outputs “no.” Furthermore, for every instance x there exists
a unique y with (x , y) ∈ R. The deterministic SRefCirc algorithm A, upon receiving x ,
generates the self-referential circuit C′x that is constructed from the causal circuit Cx ,
which then again acts as
cx : y 7→
¨
y (x , y) ∈ R ,
y ′ otherwise,
where, if y = bz with b ∈ {0, 1}, then y ′ = (b ⊕ 1)z, i.e., the first bit gets flipped
in the case of (x , y) 6∈ R. Therefore, for every x we have a self-referential circuit C′x
with a unique fixed point (logically consistent). The fixed point, furthermore, is the
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solution of the search problem: cx(y) = y → (x , y) ∈ R. The converse inclusion re-
lation FPSRefCirc ⊆ TFUP is shown as follows. Suppose we are given a relation R that
is decidable by a deterministic SRefCirc algorithm A. We now need to show that R is
polynomially decidable, polynomially balanced, and that every instance x has a unique
solution. Indeed, R is polynomially decidable because Cx is generated in polynomial
time in |x |. Furthermore, R is polynomially balanced because the circuit Cx with in-
put y runs in polynomial time in |x |. Finally, Cx has a unique fixed point — it is logically
consistent. Thus, the algorithm D that decides R simply returns “yes” if cx(y) = y and
“no” otherwise.
6.6 Example: Integer factorization
Integer factorization is a search problem that is in TFUP [116]. Therefore, we are able
to construct a self-referential circuit that factorizes some number N in polynomial time.
The solution to the search problem is the decomposition of N into a product of prime
numbers.
The SRefCirc algorithm A outputs, on input N ∈ Z, a circuit CN with which the
number N = pe11 p
e2
2 . . . can be decomposed into its prime factors p1, p2, . . . along with
its exponents e1, e2, . . . . We give a description of CN as an algorithm. Clearly, this
algorithm can be transformed into a circuit. The following algorithm runs in a time
polynomial in the instance size n = dlog Ne.
Algorithm 1 Factoring N
Input: b ∈ {0, 1}, a1, a2, . . . , an, e1, e2, . . . , en ∈ K
Output: b′ ∈ {0,1}, a1, a2, . . . , an, e1, e2, . . . , en ∈ K
1: w←¬b, a1, a2, . . . , an, e1, e2, . . . , en
2: for i = 1 to n− 1 do
3: if (ai < ai+1)∨ (ai 6= 1∧ ai = ai+1) then
4: return w
5: end if
6: end for
7: for i = 1 to n do
8: if (ai = 1∧ ei > 1)∨ ai 6∈ PRIME∪ {1} then
9: return w
10: end if
11: end for
12: if ae11 a
e2
2 . . . a
en
n 6= N then
13: return w
14: end if
15: return 0, a1, a2, . . . , an, e1, e2, . . . , en
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Algorithm 1 takes as input 1 bit and 2n numbers in K = {1,2, . . . , N −1}, where ev-
ery number is represented as an n-bit string. On line 3 we check whether the first n num-
bers are ordered. On line 8 we check whether ei is 1 whenever ai = 1, and whether ai is
indeed prime (or 1). A deterministic primality test can be performed in polynomial time
as was recently shown [10]. Finally, on line 12 we check whether the decomposition is
correct. If all tests are passed, then the algorithm returns 0, a1, a2, . . . , an, e1, e2, . . . , en
where
∏n
i=1 a
ei
i = N , otherwise, the algorithm flips the first input bit. This algorithm
and, therefore, the circuit CN , has a unique fixed point
0, p1, p2, . . . , pm, 1
n−m, e1, e2, . . . , em, 1n−m ,
where p1 > p2 > · · ·> pm are primes and ∏mi=1 peii = N .
6.7 Discussion
We designed a circuit model of classical computation where all circuits are not under-
nor overdetermined. Since we did not assume that a circuit has to be causal, a gate
can be connected to itself (potentially through other gates). This, however introduces
“loops” to such circuits. The assumption of no under- and no underdetermination then
again ensures that the so-called self-referential circuits have unique fixed points. This
leads to the following implications.
The assumption of no under- and no underdetermination is strictly weaker than the
assumption of a causal ordering of the gates. We demonstrated this by showing an
advantage in query complexity when compared to causal circuits (see Section 6.4).
Furthermore, we were able to precisely characterize the computational complex-
ity of such circuits. For decision problems, we obtained that PSRefCirc = UP∩coUP,
and for search problems, the analogous identity FPSRefCirc = TFUP. The former class
is a subset of NP: UP∩coUP ⊆ NP. Furthermore, strict inclusion is conjectured be-
cause UP∩coUP is not believed to contain any complete problems [227]. This means
that the closed time-like curves (CTCs) described in Chapter 5, which use a superset
of the assumptions posed here, cannot solve NP-hard problems. If one presupposes
the NP-hardness assumption, i.e., no physically realizable model of computation can
solve NP-hard problems, then the CTCs from Chapter 5 are innocent from a computer-
science perspective. This result contrasts the power of other model of CTCs (the D-CTC
and the P-CTC models) as they are able to solve NP-complete problems in polynomial
time.
A key assumption in current cryptographic schemes is the difficulty of integer fac-
torization. This problem is known to be in UP∩coUP [116], and is thus solvable in
polynomial time with our model (see Section 6.6). Yet, as the CTC model uses a strict
superset of the assumptions used here, it is not clear whether it is possible to factorize
integers with such CTCs.
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The identification PSRefCirc = UP∩coUP gives a more intuitive understanding of the
latter complexity class: The solutions to the problems within that class can be expressed
by a unique fixed point of some transformation that is carried out in polynomial time.
Similar complexity classes to that one are FIXP and linear-FIXP = PPAD [109]. In
the latter, multiple fixed points are allowed, and in FIXP the fixed points are even
allowed to be irrational. The problem to find a Nash equilibrium in the two-party
setting is known to be linear-FIXP-complete [109], and for three or more parties, it
becomes FIXP-complete.
Since one can also factorize integers efficiently with quantum computers [225, 226],
it is natural to ask how BQP relates to PSRefCirc. Unfortunately, little is known on that
relation at the moment. Another question we can pose here is: What is the quantum
analogue of the model presented here and what are the respective complexity classes?
And finally, to come back to CTCs: Is it possible to embed every self-referential circuit
in the CTC model described in Chapter 5?
Chapter 7
Application in other fields
We briefly show how the results from the previous chapters can be applied to different
fields. We present non-causal correlations (see Chapter 4) in a model without prob-
abilities. Probabilities, if not interpreted as ignorance, represent counterfactualities:
events that did not occur, yet probabilities express what would have happen if “etwas
geschehen wäre, was nicht geschehen ist”1 [228].
Furthermore, we present a local-realistic model that explains quantum (and beyond)
correlations by the help of closed time-like curves (see Chapter 5).
Finally, we extend the results from the Chapter 6 to the philosophy of language:
self-referential sentences that are self-consistent.
7.1 Kolmogorov complexity
In this matter of causality it is a great
inconvenience that the real world is
given to us once only. We cannot
know what would have happened if
something had been different. We
cannot repeat an experiment
changing just one variable; the hands
of the clock will have moved, and the
moons of Jupiter.
John Stewart Bell [43]
A drawback of a formalism that incorporates probabilities beyond ignorance is that
these probabilities are tied to events that did not happen. When performing an exper-
iment, the result is not a probability distribution, but a series of results. A frequency
analysis of the recorded outcomes can thereafter used to approximate the probability
1“something had happened that did not happen.”
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distribution over the different events. Clearly, this makes only sense if the identical ex-
periment is repeated several times. But in what sense can one claim that an experiment
is identical to another one? After all, the preceding experiments already produced out-
puts that we noted down in a lab log; so, a repeated experiment cannot be identical.
Surely, one can claim that the lab log has no influence on the systems measured and on
the measurement apparatuses. However, we can refrain from the use of such a claim
by replacing the notion of probabilities with the one of the Kolmogorov [164, 169]
complexity.
The Kolmogorov complexity K(x) of some bit string x is defined as the shortest
program for a fixed Turing machine that outputs x . Note that the running time is
not considered here; this notion of complexity rather captures the structure of the bit
string x . A clear drawback of that approach is the fundamental impossibility to compute
the Kolmogorov complexity itself.
To be more accurate, let us fix some universal Turing machine U , with respect to
which we define the Kolmogorov complexity. For an infinite bit string
x = (x0, x1, . . . ) ∈ {0,1}∞ ,
we define x[n] as the bit string with identical bits on the first n positions, and with 0s
on the rest:
x[n] := (x0, x1, . . . , xn−1, 0, 0, . . . ) .
This allows us to study the asymptotic behavior in n→∞ of the Kolmogorov complexity
of such a string. We define
K(x)≈ n :⇐⇒ lim
n→∞

K
 
a[n]

n

= 1 ,
and
K(x)≈ 1 :⇐⇒ lim
n→∞

K
 
a[n]

n

= 0 .
A bit string x that satisfies K(x) ≈ n is called incompressible. The intuition behind this
naming is that for every additional bit of x we would like to compute, the program
needs to be extended by a bit, asymptotically. In other words, the shortest program
that outputs x simply recites x . Then again, a bit string x where K(x) ≈ 0 holds is
called computable: A program of finite length suffices to compute an arbitrary number
of digits of x . An example of a computable string is the binary expansion of pi, and an
example of an incompressible string is Chaitin’s [66] constant Ω which is also known
as the halting probability. Incomputable bit strings are also called algorithmically ran-
dom [66] — which can be understood as a notion of randomness without probabilities.
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I jinput
Ojoutput
relation R j
Figure 7.1. A party is modeled by a pair of bit strings and a relation that is satisfied by
the blocks of these bit strings.
The conditional Kolmogorov complexity K(x | a) is defined in a similar way, where the
asymptotic behavior of K(x[n] | a[n]) for n→∞ is considered.
Interestingly, this Kolmogorov approach allows one to show similar statements as in
the probability picture [79, 82]. If the inputs to the so-called PR box [205] are incom-
putable, then the outputs of that box must be incomputable as well [249–251]. Further-
more, the PR box leads to complexity amplification as we have shown elsewhere [35].
Here, we focus on the interplay between Kolmogorov complexity and the notion of
causality and the resulting non-causal effects.
7.1.1 Operational definitions
A party is thought of as an experimenter performing some operation (see also Defi-
nition 6). We refrain from describing the experimenters choice or the outcomes by
probability distributions, but instead stick at a description of the actual data only. Ac-
tual data are represented by bits strings and an infinite repetition of some experiment
by an infinite bit string. In this section, we restrict ourselves to infinite repetitions (by
that, the Kolmogorov complexity becomes independent of the choice of the universal
Turing machine U). This picture takes away all the dynamics and collapses to a static
view: we are only interested in the complexity of the bit strings that satisfy some re-
lations. A party S j is modeled with two infinite bit strings, I
j (input) and O j (output),
where these bit strings are forced to satisfy the relation R j on every successive block of
finite length k j , i.e.,
∀q ≥ 0 :

(I jqk j , I
j
qk j+1
, . . . , I jqk j+k j ), (O
j
qk j+1
, O jqk j+2, . . . , O
j
qk j+k j
)

∈R j .
The relation R j is called local operation of party S j (see Figure 7.1).
We define I j to be the cause of O j .2 Whenever we consider more than one party, we
relate the bit strings among all parties with some global relation E , that acts on finitely
sized blocks as well.
Definition 29 (Consistency with respect to local operations). A global relation E is
called consistent with respect to the local operations if bit strings for all involved parties
exist, where the bit strings mutually satisfy the local relations as well as E .
2Note that this definition is arbitrary, but will prove itself helpful in later statements.
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A
B
C D
Figure 7.2. An example of a causal scenario with four parties: (A, B)  C  D. The
arrows point from the algorithmic cause to the algorithmic effect.
For two parties S j and Sk, we use the following definition of causal past and causal
future (see Definition 6 for the counterfactual version thereof).
Definition 30 (Algorithmic causal past and algorihmic causal future). Party S j (Sk) is
said to be in the algorithmic causal past (future) of party Sk (S j) if and only if
K(I k | O j) 6≈ K(I k) 6≈ 0 .
This relation is expressed by S j  Sk.
Intuitively, the relation S j  Sk holds if and only if the input of Sk is incomputable,
yet less incomputable with the help of the output of S j . This can be decomposed into
the two statements:
• The input of Sk cannot be computed by Sk herself: K(I k) 6≈ 0, and
• the input of Sk depends on the output of S j: K(I k | O j) 6≈ K(I k).
Note that in the definition of causal past and causal future in Chapter 3, we postulated
the distinction between free and non-free variables. Here, this distinction manifests
itself in the distinction between input and output bit strings, and by the associated
causal order between them.
7.1.2 Causal scenario
Using the model described above, we express a scenario where the relations between
the parties are causal. A causal scenario is a scenario where the algorithmic causal
relations between the parties reflect a partial ordering of the parties (see Figure 7.2).3
A crucial implication of a causal scenario is that at least one party is not in the algorithmic
causal past of any other party. If a scenario is not causal, then we call it non-causal (see
Figure 7.3).
We briefly describe a bit-wise communication channel from S1 to S2. The resulting
algorithmic causal relation will be S1  S2. Such a communication channel is described
3Transitivity follows from the assumption of a fixed causal relation between the input and output bit
string of a party.
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B
C D
Figure 7.3. An example of a non-causal scenario.
I1
O1
I2
O2
R1 R2C
Figure 7.4. The global relation C ensures that the output of S1 equals the input of S2.
by the global relation C:
C = {(0, x , x , y) | x , y ∈ {0,1}} .
The whole setup (see Figure 7.4) is now described by the bit strings I1, O1, I2, O2 where
∀q ≥ 0 :(I1qk1 , I1qk1+1, . . . , I1qk1+k1−1), (O1qk1 , O1qk1+1, . . . , O1qk1+k1−1) ∈R1 ,
∀q ≥ 0 :(I1qk2 , I2qk2+1, . . . , I2qk2+k2−1), (O2qk2 , O2qk2+1, . . . , O2qk2+k2−1) ∈R2 ,
∀q ≥ 0 :I1q , O1q , I2q , O2q  ∈ C .
If we assume that both output bit strings are independent and incompressible, i.e.,
K(O1, O2)≈ 2n ,
then it follows that the input bit string of S1 is the zero string I
1 = (0, . . . ), and I2 = O1.
Since K(I2) ≈ n and K(I2 | O1) ≈ 0 hold, it follows from the definition of algorithmic
causal past that S1  S2. Conversely, K(I1)≈ 0 implies S2 6 S1. In words, the “sender”
is in the algorithmic past of the receiver and not vice versa. The global relation C is
clearly consistent with respect to any choice of the local operations of the parties (unless
for the special case whereR1 is a trivial relation that forces I1 to be different from zero
at every bit position).
7.1.3 Non-causal scenario
We discuss two non-causal scenarios. Assume the global relation E between two par-
ties S1, S2 is
E = {(x , y, y, x) | x , y ∈ {0, 1}} .
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O1
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R1 R2E
Figure 7.5. The global relation E represents a two-way channel that restricts the possible
local relations R1,R2.
Such a global relation describes a two-way channel (see Figure 7.5). If we assume that
the output bit strings of both parties are independent and incompressible, then we end
up with the relation S1  S2  S1. However, if we fix the local operations of both parties
to be
R1 = {(x , x) | x ∈ {0, 1}} ,
R2 = {(x , x ⊕ 1) | x ∈ {0, 1}} ,
i.e., the input and output bit strings are the same for S1 and flipped for S2, then no bit
strings mutually satisfy all required conditions. Thus, E is inconsistent with respect to
this choice of local operations — this particular case can be seen as an instantiation of
the grandfather antinomy.
We now study a bit-wise global relation E ′ that leads to a non-causal scenario, yet
that is consistent with respect to any bit-wise local operation. The latter is achieved by
assuming that every party independently selects a bit-wise relation out of all four:
K0,0 = {(a, 0) | a ∈ {0,1}} ,
K0,1 = {(a, 1) | a ∈ {0,1}} ,
K1,0 = {(a, a) | a ∈ {0,1}} ,
K1,1 = {(a, a⊕ 1) | a ∈ {0, 1}} .
If the relation K0,0 is applied, then the bit on the output bit string is a constant 0,
etc. Assume three parties S1, S2, S3 where every party holds an incompressible and
independent bit string C1, C2, C3, i.e., K(C1, C2, C3) ≈ 3n. The idea is that these bit
strings select the local relation to be applied on a given bit position, i.e. for party S j
∀q ≥ 0 : I jq, O jq ∈ KC j2q ,C j2q+1 .
An example is given in Figure 7.6. Since every pair of bits appears equally often in C j
(asymptotically speaking), and since the C j strings are independent, all possible com-
binations of binary relations between the input and output bits of the parties arise. The
global relation E , discussed above, is clearly inconsistent with this set of local opera-
tions.
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1000 01 11 100 · · ·C j
0 1 1 0 1 · · ·I j
0 0 1 1 1 · · ·O j
Figure 7.6. Example of a C j and the related I j , O j from some party S j.
However, the following bit-wise global relation is consistent with that choice of local
operations:
E ′ = {((b⊕ 1)c, a, (c ⊕ 1)a, b, (a⊕ 1)b, c) | a, b, c ∈ {0,1}} .
This global relation is motivated by the example for non-causal correlations from Sec-
tion 4.6.2. If we assume that all input bit strings are independent an incomputable,
i.e.
K(I1, I2, I3)≈ 3n ,
then the only bit strings that satisfy all relations have the property
K(O1)≈ K(O2)≈ K(O3) 6≈ 0 ,
K(O1 | I2, I3)≈ K(O2 | I2, I3)≈ K(O3 | I1, I2)≈ 0 .
Therefore, the algorithmic causal relations
(S2, S3) S1 ,
(S1, S3) S2 ,
(S1, S2) S3 ,
are implied. These algorithmic causal relations are in contradiction with a party being
in the algorithmic causal past of every other one, and by that, this scenario is non-
causal. This global relation, furthermore, is consistent with any choice of binary local
relations.
7.2 Bell non-local correlations from classical closed time-like
curves
In the introduction (see Section 2.1), we extensively discussed local-realistic models
and presented the quest to find such a model for quantum correlations. Then again, in
Section 2.2 and in Chapter 5 we elaborated on the possibility of closed time-like curves
and studied their dynamics. It is natural to ask whether classical (without making use
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of any quantum system) closed time-like curves allow for Bell non-local correlations.
In other words, can Bell non-local correlations be simulated in a geometry of general
relativity that contains closed time-like curves? This question is similar in nature, yet
in our opinion much more realistic, to Lanczos’ [165] speculation that the fundamental
indistinguishability of elementary particles (lets say electrons) is a consequence of the
existence of a single ur-electron, whilst all electrons are copies thereof that traveled
through a closed time-like curve. Possibly one could understand entangled quantum
systems in that way: The single systems are connected through closed time-like curves.
Here, we show that Deutsch’s [93] formulation of closed time-like curves (CTCs)
is a local-realistic model for quantum (and beyond) correlations. Deutsch initially pre-
sented his model to show that CTCs can be made consistent with quantum states (see
Section 5.4.1). As for classical states, two possible paths have been explored. If, by
classical states one understands bits as opposed to random variables, then, as shown
by Deutsch [93], some choices of initial conditions lead to inconsistencies that cannot
be overcome. If, on the other hand, one uses random variables, then the very same
formalism as Deutsch presented can be applied (see, e.g., Reference [6]).
7.2.1 Deutsch CTC model with random variables
Let CR be a classical system that is causality respecting, whose state is described by the
probability distribution PCR. Likewise, we denote by CV the causality violating classi-
cal system, which is in the state PCV. The CV system travels on a CTC. Suppose now
both systems, CR and CV, undergo some joint evolution PCR′,CV′|CR,CV. The output sys-
tems thereafter are in the states PCR′ and PCV′ , respectively (as calculated according to
probability theory). In general, these states are correlated:
PCR′,CV′ =
∑
r,v
PCR′,CV′|CR=r,CV=v PCR(r)PCV(v) .
The Deutsch consistency condition is
PCV =
∑
r ′
PCR′=r ′,CV′ .
This condition ensures that the system traveling on the CTC does not “kill the grand-
father.” In other words, the distribution PCV is a fixed point of the evolution with the
input PCR. Note that there might exist more than one fixed point. In that case, as Deutsch
suggested, the problem of the information antinomy (see Section 3.3.1) is mitigated by
selecting the fixed point that maximizes the entropy, which we denote by ρCV. The final
state of the CR system (ρCR′) is predicted by plugging in ρCV into the evolution (see
Figure 7.7):
ρCR′ =
∑
r,v,v′
PCR′,CV′=v′|CR=r,CV=v PCR(r)ρCV(v) .
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PCR′,CV′|CR,CV
PCR
PCR′
ρCV
Figure 7.7. The output of the stochastic operation on the right side equals the input on
the right side. The distribution ρCV is the distribution satisfies the just stated condition
and that maximizes the entropy.
PR
BA
X Y
Figure 7.8. Alice and Bob, each, provide a bit to and receive a bit from the box, such
that the parity of the outputs equals the product of the inputs.
7.2.2 PR box correlations from classical closed time-like curves
We present the setup with Deutsch CTCs based on random variables to reproduce
PR box correlations. The PR box, named after Popescu and Rohrlich [205], is a sys-
tem that idealizes Bell non-local correlations beyond the quantum regime. The box
takes two binary inputs, A, B, from Alice and Bob, respectively, and produces two bi-
nary outputs, X , Y , to Alice and Bob, respectively (see Figure 7.8), such that the PR
condition
AB = X ⊕ Y
is satisfied.4 Moreover, the PR box as a stochastic operation is defined as
PPRX ,Y |A,B(x , y, a, b) =
δab,x⊕y
2
. (7.1)
The behavior of this box cannot be simulated by Alice and Bob having access to shared
classical information only, and where they do not communicate.
However, if Alice and Bob have additional access to a classical CTC whose dynamics
is predicted by Deutsch’s model, then they can simulate such a box by local interactions
4In the introduction, we already mentioned that expressions to describe a Bell inequality (see Sec-
tion 2.1.3).
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X Y
A B
Λ1 Λ2
PR
M1 M2
Λ′1 Λ′2
Figure 7.9. A PR box is simulated locally in the common future of Alice and Bob.
The outputs of the PR box thereafter travel back in time trough a Deutschian closed
time-like curve. The dashed lines represent the light cones. Time flows from bottom
to top.
only. The latter means that both parties do not communicate, unless they are in the
vicinity of each other. We quickly present the model, and thereafter discuss some fea-
tures thereof.
Assume that the laboratories of Alice and Bob are space-like separated (they cannot
talk to each other). Alice chooses an input A she wishes to input to the PR box, and
so does Bob: B. Both inputs are random variables. Furthermore, every party receives
some random variable (Λ1 and Λ2, respectively) from their common past. Now, Alice
simply uses X = Λ1 as her output and Bob uses Y = Λ2 as his output, and, as a surprise,
the PR box condition AB = X ⊕Y holds (as we are going to see). The inputs A, B of both
parties are sent to the common future, where they undergo some interaction. Once
the variables arrived in the common future, any interaction between them is possible;
for what should prevent any local interaction? We choose the local interaction in the
common future of Alice and Bob to be such that it simulates a PR box. This means, after
the local interactions, the random variables are in a state as predicted by the PR box with
inputs A, B. The pair of random variables thereafter enters a mouth of a wormhole to
travel back in time, where it emerges in the common past of both parties as Λ1 and Λ2.
There, the random variables are split and each party receives one of them. This setup
is depicted in Figure 7.9.
Mathematically, this setup is the following. Alice, and Bob, each perform an oper-
ation that swaps both of their random variables:
PSWAPQ′,R′|Q,R(q′, r ′, q, r) = δq′,rδr ′,q .
Thereafter, the PR box (see Equation (7.1)) is applied to the systems that later enter
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the CTC. Thus, the total dynamics can be expressed by
PX ,Y,Λ′1,Λ′2|A,B,Λ1,Λ2(x , y,λ
′
1,λ
′
2, a, b,λ1,λ2) =
∑
µ1,µ2
PPR
Λ′1,Λ′2|M1,M2(λ
′
1,λ
′
2,µ1,µ2)×
PSWAPX ,M1|A,Λ1(x ,µ1, a,λ1)P
SWAP
Y,M2|B,Λ2(y,µ2, b,λ2)
=
∑
µ1,µ2
δµ1µ2,λ′1⊕λ′2
2
δx ,λ1δµ1,aδy,λ2δµ2,b
=
δab,λ′1⊕λ′2
2
δx ,λ1δy,λ2 .
For a given input of the parties PA, PB, the consistency condition is
ρΛ′1,Λ′2(λ
′
1,λ
′
2) =
∑
a,b,x ,y,λ1,λ2
δab,λ′1⊕λ′2
2
δx ,λ1δy,λ2 PA(a)PB(b)ρΛ′1,Λ′2(λ1,λ2)
=
∑
a,b
δab,λ′1⊕λ′2
2
PA(a)PB(b) ,
which yields a unique solution.
For deterministic input distributions
P ′A(a) = δa,a¯ ,
P ′B(b) = δb,b¯ ,
the solution becomes
ρΛ′1,Λ′2(λ
′
1,λ
′
2) =
δa¯ b¯,λ′1⊕λ′2
2
.
Thus, for an deterministic input, the solutionρΛ′,Λ′ simply carries the output of a PR box
when queried with these inputs. When this solution is plugged in to calculate the distri-
bution over X and Y , one finds that PX ,Y = ρΛ′1,Λ′2 . Thus, the output from the PR box is
simply forwarded to the parties, and the reduced probability distribution PX ,Y |A,B, when
queried with deterministic inputs, yields the PR box distribution.
That this is the case can also be seen by noting that the swap operations performed
by the parties renders the CTC to an open time-like curve [202]: The systems that travel
on the CTC do not self-interact.
At this point, one might wonder what happens if the parties perform other opera-
tions than the swap. One can show that for any operation they choose to perform, the
resulting distribution is always non-signaling. This means that by diverting from the
above protocol, each party will never be able to send signals at a velocity faster than
light to the other — in accordance with the theory of relativity.
Moreover, what can ask what happens if the implemented operation in the common
future of the parties does not simulate a PR box, but is a swap operation, for instance.
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In that case, clearly, the setup would become signaling: A travels to the common future
of Alice and Bob, there it swaps position with B, falls in the wormhole, and emerges
in the common past of both parties to travel to Bob. One might mitigate this issue of
signaling by enforcing that Λ2 should contain no information about A, and vice versa,
i.e., by a non-signalling assumption.
Since in the simulation protocol described above, one output of the PR box does not
contain any information about any input, the just proposed non-signaling assumption
still allows the parties to generate PR box correlations in a local way.
The above protocol to generate PR box correlations resembles very much the ap-
proach of parallel lives [54] (see Section 2.1.5). There, the “correct” parties meet such
that the correlations are obtained. Here, instead of sending physical systems, the par-
ties themselves could meet in the common past and fall into the wormhole. By this,
the reason for having PR correlations at this moment is that the parties will meet in the
future. So, the correlations are “borrowed” from the future and observed in the past.
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All Cretans are liars.
attributed to Epimenides from
Crete [218]
In Chapter 6, we constructed a model of computation where all values are neither
under- nor overdetermined. These assumptions reflect the necessity of avoiding the
grandfather as well as the information antinomy. We saw that, in the case of the com-
putational model, self-referential expressions are possible under these requirements.
The same approach can be pursued in language. The famous liar paradox5 reads
“I am lying.” ,
which, from a logical point of view and for the purpose of this section, is equivalent to
P : “This sentence is false.” .
If the proposition P were to be true, then P states that P must be false, which then
again would imply P to be true, etc. So, the liar paradox introduces a contradiction in
its own statement — which is essentially the grandfather antinomy.
Once this analogy to the grandfather antinomy is identified, we can ask for a sen-
tence analogous to the information antinomy:
Q : “This sentence is true.” .
5It is actually an antinomy.
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If the sentence Q were to be true, then it would say of itself, that it is true — no con-
tradiction. Then again, if Q were to be false, then it says of itself that it is false —
again no contradiction. However, for what is crucial in the information antinomy, all
information at hand do not specify the truth value of Q, making it useless for most other
purposes than for using in this and the previous two sentences of this thesis.
But is it possible to come up with a sentence, or a list of sentences, that are self-
referential, yet where the grandfather and information antinomies do not arise? We
propose the following two sentences:
R1 :“The truth values of this and the following sentence are different.”
R2 :“The truth values of this and the following sentence are the same.”
This system of sentence has now a unique assignment of truth values to R1 and R2.
At this point let us briefly present a similar system of sentences by the French
philosopher Jean Buridan [62], to prove the existence of “god:”6
B1 :“The flying spaghetti monster exists.”
B2 :“Neither of the two sentences is true.”
Assume B2 to be true. From this follows that B2 is false, which is the grandfather
antinomy. The other possibility is to assume B2 to be false. By that, at least one sentence
must be true: The flying spaghetti monster exists. The grandfather nor the information
antinomy arises in this system of sentences.
Note that this bypasses Tarski’s [231] approach to truth in language, where a meta
language is needed in order to make non-contradictory self-referential statements. That
Tarski’s approach is in some cases too restrictive, was also demonstrated by [140] (see
also Reference [141]), who construct similar systems of sentences.
One might wonder whether more interesting self-referential statements were possi-
ble — not necessarily in language, but for instance in set theory. Would it be possible
to define sets by referring to themselves, such that the sets are well-defined? If yes,
would these sets be consistent with ZFC set theory? We leave this question open.
6We slightly alter the example to “prove” the existence of the Pastafarian’s god.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and open question
We explored some parts of the logically consistent world beyond the causal. By beyond
the causal we mean that the assumption of causal structures being acyclic and definite is
dropped. As a replacement, we used the assumption of logical consistency: Probabilities
or dynamics are not contradictory and well-defined. A necessity to perform studies in
this field is a definition of causal relations; this was done in the chapter On causality.
A first result of this expedition is: The classical and logically consistent world beyond
the causal is non-empty. This result can be understood as the spark for this thesis:
How does this world look like? We explored this classical world from three points
of view: correlations, time travel, and computation. By having local assumptions of
classical nature only, we described a framework for correlations without causal order.
The resources of this framework were then characterized in two ways: by polytopes
and by fixed-point theorems. The latter characterization gave some insight on logical
consistency and allowed us to describe reversible dynamics.
From that, we went over to the realm of general relativity and used the tools at
hand to study closed time-like curves. Whilst geometries with closed time-like curves
are consistent with general relativity, noting (not to say little) with respect to their
physical nature and the associated dynamics is known. We were able to extend previous
results on closed time-like curves — these results show the innocence of closed time-like
curves with respect to logical problems. We started these studies at the assumptions
that any dynamics must be consistent, and that physics in local regions remain invariant
under the existence or absence of closed time-like curves. From these two assumptions
we were able to show that the Cauchy problem is always well-posed: unambiguous
dynamics are predicted from the boundary conditions. Note that this was not the case in
previous considerations of closed time-like curves (see, e.g., Reference [122]). A second
result strengthens the compatibility of closed time-like curves with general relativity:
All dynamics can be made reversible. This at hand, we explicitly described some closed
time-like curves dynamics between three local space-time regions, where every region
is in the future and in the past of every other region. We then compared our model with
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previously known models of closed time-like curves, and showed that while the other
models are problematic in some ways (non-linear, not reversible, ad-hoc solutions to
the Cauchy problem), ours is not.
From this, we continued to study the computational power of the framework for
the non-causal correlations and of the closed time-like curves. For that purpose, we
designed a circuit model of computation that allows for causal loop. The model of
computation is shown to lead to advantages in query complexity and in computa-
tional complexity, when compared to the traditional circuit model. We identified the
complexity class of problems efficiently solvable by that model, and it turned out to
be UP∩coUP ⊆ NP — a class which is believed to be not too powerful, yet it contains
the problem of integer factorization. This class is believed to be strictly contained in NP
and strictly contain P. The results found here, can be used to strengthen the statement
that closed time-like curves are unproblematic: They do not violate the NP-hardness
assumption which conjectures that no physically realizable model of computation can
solve NP-complete problems. The previously designed models for closed time-like
curves, however, are drastically more powerful (PSPACE, and BPPpath), and violate
this assumption by far. At the end of the chapter on this model, we explicitly designed
a circuit to factorize integers efficiently within that model.
We continued with a short chapter on the applications of these results to different
fields. One of the main messages of this thesis is that self-referentiality is tame and in
some cases it can even be helpful, but not too helpful. So, in that chapter we showed
the compatibility of our results with the notion of Kolmogorov complexity — the same
statements can be made; we showed how some closed time-like curves could be used
in order to simulate Bell non-local correlations with classical information and local in-
teractions only; and finally, we briefly mentioned self-referentiality in language, e.g.,
the liar paradox.
8.1 Open questions
Be briefly state some open question that we group is two classes: computer science and
the foundations of physics. One of the main questions in the foundation of physics is
to ask: Which processes are in principle physically realizable? Currently it is unclear
whether the dynamics described in this thesis are realizable or whether they are just an
artefact of the theories. Yet, the study of these dynamics, even if they were not to exist,
have some other implications and open the question: Can we simulate quantum theory
within general relativity with a circular space-time geometry? We gave some partial
answer to this second question in the last chapter. Towards a better understating of the
interplay between quantum and relativity theory, a better understanding of the concept
of “time” seems necessary (see, e.g., References [108, 126, 143, 195, 209, 254]).
A questions in computer science to look at is: What information-processing tasks
become possible or more efficient with the models studied here? For instance, it is not
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known whether any of the models presented does allow for some advantage in cryp-
tographic setups. Another question is to study quantum closed time-like curves and the
computational power thereof. Finally, what are the relations of UP∩coUP to P,BQP,
and to NP? Our results give an interpretation of UP∩coUP in terms of fixed points,
which might be a new path towards relating this class to others.
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Preliminaries and notation
This chapter discusses the mathematical language and the notations used. Some parts
of this thesis deal with quantum theory. For that reason, we give a short introduction
to quantum information.
The reader who is familiar with quantum information — or not interested— might
safely skip this chapter. These preliminaries are held to a minimum and might serve as
a reference.
1 Probability theory
We use Latin uppercase letters for random variables, e.g., A. The sample space of a
random variable A is denoted by its calligraphic letter A. Latin lowercase letters are
used for actual values of random variables. So, a random variable A can take any
value a ∈ A. The probability distribution over a random variable A is expressed by PA
and the probability that the random variable A takes value a is PA(a) or PA=a. The
expression PA|B is the conditional probability distribution for A given B. The respective
probabilities, then again, are denoted by PA|B(a, b) with a ∈A and b ∈ B.
If not otherwise stated, finite sample spaces of random variables are assumed to
consists of natural numbers from 0 on increasing, i.e., a random variable A with |A|= n
is assumed to have the sample space A = {0, 1,2, 3, . . . , n− 1}. Thus, binary random
variables are assumed to have the sample space {0,1}.
1.1 Matrix and vector representation
Let Q, R be two random variables with the respective sample spaces Q = {q0, q1, . . . },
and R= {r0, r1, . . . }, and with the probability measures PQ, PR.
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Definition 31 (State, operation, evolution, composition, value, and probabilty as vec-
tors and matrices). A state ~PQ is a probability vector
~PQ =

PQ (q0)
PQ (q1)
PQ (q2)
...
 .
An operation PˆR|Q is a stochastic matrix
PˆR|Q =

PR|Q(r0, q0) PR|Q(r0, q1) PR|Q(r0, q2) · · ·
PR|Q(r1, q0) PR|Q(r1, q1) PR|Q(r1, q2) · · ·
PR|Q(r2, q0) PR|Q(r2, q1) PR|Q(r2, q2) · · ·
...
...
...
. . .
 .
A state ~PQ evolves through the operation PˆR|Q by the matrix-vector product
~PR = PˆR|Q~PQ .
States and operations are composed by the Kronecker product ⊗.
The value r j that the random variable R can take is modeled by the vector
~rTj =
 
0 . . . 0 1 0 . . . 0

,
where the 1 is placed such that ~r j represents the deterministic distribution PR(r) = δr,r j .
We define ~0T as the vector (1, 0) and ~1T as the vector (0, 1)— they represent both values
a binary random variable can take.
For a given state ~PR, the probability that the value r j is found is
PR(r j) = ~r
T
j
~PR .
Examples
We discuss two examples to illustrate.
Example 10. Let R and Q be binary random variables, and the operation PˆR|Q be the
operation that reads out the value from Q and flips it, i.e.,
PˆR|Q =

0 1
1 0

.
Now, if the state ~PQ is
~PQ =

1
0

,
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then the state after the operation PˆR|Q is
~PR = PˆR|Q~PQ =

0
1

.
The probability that state ~PR takes value 0 is
PR(0) = ~0
T ~PR = 0 .
Example 11. Again, assume that the random variable R is binary, and assume that the
random variable Q can take four values: Q= {0, 1,2, 3}. We define the operation
PˆR|Q =

1 0 12
1
2
0 1 12
1
2

.
This operation outputs the same value as the input on inputs 0 and 1. For the other
inputs, the output state are uniformly distributed. So, if the input state is
~PQ =

1
2
0
0
1
2
 ,
then the output state is
~PR = PˆR|Q~PQ =
3
4
1
4

.
If we take two binary random variables Q1 and Q2, such that
~PQ1 =

1
0

, ~PQ2 =
1
2
1
2

,
and give them as input to the operation PˆR|Q, where Q = (Q1,Q2), then the output is
evaluated as
~PR = PˆR|Q(~PQ1 ⊗ ~PQ2) = PˆR|Q

1
2
1
2
0
0
= 121
2

.
2 Quantum theory
Quantum theory is constructed out of four axioms: the definition of states, the definition
of composition of states, the definition of evolution, and the definition of measurement.
Before we briefly discuss these axioms, we introduce the concept of the Hilbert space
and Dirac’s bra-ket notation. For an introduction to quantum information, we direct
the reader to the textbook by Nielsen and Chuang [184].
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2.1 The Hilbert space and Dirac’s bra-ket notation
A Hilbert space is a complex vector space where the inner product (·, ·) is defined. In
this thesis, we consider finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces only. For two Hilbert spacesHA
andHB we use L(HA,HB) to denote the set of linear maps fromHA toHB. Likewise, we
use L(HA) for the set of liner maps fromHA to itself. We use dA to denote the dimension
of the Hilbert space A. Furthermore, we use 1 to denote the identity map, or 1A to refer
to the identity map for system A. Dirac’s notation is a notation for the following two
operators. For a vector ψ ∈HA, we use |ψ〉 ∈ L(C,HA) to describe the linear operator
|ψ〉 : a 7→ aψ ,
with a ∈ C. The operator |ψ〉 is called ket. Its adjoint (|ψ〉†) is called bra and is denoted
with 〈ψ| ∈ L(HA,C). The bra operator acts as
〈ψ| : φ 7→ (ψ,φ) .
Sometimes we amend bras or kets with subscripts to indicate quantum system, i.e., |ψ〉A
is an operator from the set L(C,HA).
By combining a bra 〈ψ| ∈ L(HA,C) with a ket |φ〉 ∈ L(C,HA) we get a bra-ket:
〈ψ| · |φ〉= 〈ψ|φ〉 ∈ L(C) ,
or a ket-bra:
|φ〉〈ψ| ∈ L(HA) .
The trace of a matrix M is the sum of its diagonal entries and is expressed by Tr M .
2.2 Axioms
Axiom 1 (Quantum state). A pure quantum state of a quantum system A is a ket oper-
ator |ψ〉 constructed from a unit length vector ψ ∈ HA. The set of all pure states of a
system A is denoted by P(HA) ⊂ L(C,HA). If we wish to express the state of a subsys-
tem, or incorporate ignorance in a description of a quantum state, then this state is not
necessarily a pure one, but might be mixed. A mixed quantum state (also called density
operator) of a quantum system A is an operator ρ form the set L(HA) which is con-
strained to be positive, i.e., ρ ≥ 0, and to have unit trace: Trρ = 1. By S(HA) ⊂ L(HA)
we refer to the set of all density operators from the set L(HA). A mixed state ρ is a
convex combination of orthogonal pure states |φ1〉, |φ2〉, . . . with the respective prob-
abilities p1, p2, . . . :
ρ =
∑
i
pi|φi〉〈φi| .
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For the two-dimensional Hilbert space H = C2 we use
|0〉 :=

1
0

, |1〉 :=

0
1

,
as the standard basis.
Axiom 2 (Composition). Hilbert spaces are composed with the tensor product: ⊗.
Axiom 3 (Evolution). A unitary operator U is an element in L(HA) such that
U†U = UU† = 1A ,
and where
U1A = 1A .
The first condition ensures reversibility and the second conditions preserves the inner
product.
By this axiom, a unitary U maps orthogonal pure states to orthogonal pure states.
A unitary is applied to a pure state by U |φ〉, and to a mixed state by UρU†.
Axiom 4 (Measurement). A measurement is defined as a Hermitian operator called
observable O =
∑
x∈X Px , whereX represents the set of possible measurement outcomes
and where Px are orthogonal projectors. The probability that a measurement of state ρ
yields the result x is given by
PX (x) = Tr (Pxρ) .
The most general transformations from quantum states to quantum states
S(HA)→ S(HB)
are completely-positive trace-preserving (CPTP) maps. Such an evolution can be de-
scribed as a unitary evolution if one incorporates auxiliary quantum systems. A mea-
surement can be seen as a completely-positive (CP) map (S(HA)→ L(HB)), where the
trace of the output of the map is the probability for a particular CP map to be applied.
2.3 The CJ isomorphism and composition of Choi maps
The Choi-Jamiołkowski isomorphism [72, 160] is an isomorphism between CP maps
and linear operators on the tensor-product space. Given some CP map
" : S(HA)→ L(HB) ,
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the Choi map, as the map in the tensor-product space is called, is
M" = (1A⊗ ") |Φ〉〈Φ|A,A′ ∈ L(HA⊗HB) ,
where
|Φ〉A,A′ =
∑
i
|i〉A⊗ |i〉A′
is the unnormalized maximally entangled state, and where the system A′ is isomorphic
to A. Given some Choi map M ∈ L(HA⊗HB), the corresponding CP map is
"E : S(HA)→ L(HB) ,
ρA 7→ TrA
  
ρTA ⊗ 1B

M

,
where the superscript T denotes the transposition.
For a Choi map M ∈ L(HA⊗HB) to represent a CPTP map, the following condition
must hold:
TrB M = 1A .
For M to represent a CP map which is not CPTP
TrB M < 1
has to hold. The probability that some CP map Mk is applied to a input state ρA is
pk = Tr
  
ρTA ⊗ 1B

Mk

.
Since the probabilities have to sum to unity, it is clear that a CPTP map M can be written
the sum of a collection of CP maps {Mk}K:
1 =
∑
k∈K
pk =
∑
k∈K
Tr
  
ρTA ⊗ 1B

Mk

= Tr
  
ρTA ⊗ 1B

M

.
We briefly describe how to compose two Choi maps in sequence — which is called
the link product. For a full introduction, we refer the reader to the article by Chiribella,
D’Ariano, and Perinotti [68]. Let M , N be to Choi maps where the system A is (part of)
the output from M as well as (part of) the input to N . The composition of these two
maps yields the Choi map
C = A? B = TrA
 
M TAN

,
where the superscript TA denotes a transposition of the system A. Furthermore, we
omitted possible identity operators in the above equation. Choi maps, like other quan-
tum transformations, are composed in parallel by the tensor product.
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3 Polytopes
A d-dimensional convex polytope P (or simply polytope) is a convex set of points in Rd
with a finite number of extremal points. An extremal point e of P is a point that
cannot be written as a convex combination of other points from the polytope, i.e.,
if e = λx + (1 − λ)y with x , y ∈ P and 0 < λ < 1, then e = x = y . Every polytope
can be represented by the set of its extremal points. Then, all points of the polytope
can be expressed by a convex mixture of these extremal points. Such a representation
is called V-representation, where V stands for vertex. Another way to represent a poly-
tope is by the set of half-spaces: The intersection of these half-spaces is the polytope.
This representation is called H-representation. To switch from the H-representation
to the V -representation one can use algorithms like the double-description method.1
The idea of that method is the following. The pair (A, R) of matrices is called double
description pair if
Ax ≥ 0⇔∃λ≥ 0 : x = Rλ .
The columns of A are the half-spaces, and the rows of R are the extremal points of a
polytope P. By Minkowski’s theorem [180] and by Weyl’s theorem [248], a polytope
can be represented either by A or by R. The double-description method is an iterative
algorithm to compute R from A, where one starts with a few half-spaces (a few columns
from A) and in every iteration, the number of half-spaces is increased. The Fourier-
Motzkin [119, 183] elimination algorithm is more general than the double-description
method. This method has been implemented in the software cdd+ [124].
The inverse problem, which is the dual of the double-description method, can be
solved by a convex-hull algorithm [21, 23] which is essentially the dual of the double-
description method. This follows from Faraks’ [113] lemma which states that (A, R) is
a double-description pair if and only if (RT , AT ) is a double-description pair. By that
lemma, one can simply transpose the vectors to obtain a convex-hull algorithm.
For a textbook on convex polytopes see Grünbaum [139].
1This method was independently discovered by Chernikova [67].
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Epilogue: Anti-realism
After having completed this thesis, I1 feel inclined to continue by going back to the
pre-Socratic time, to start a discussion on what is called anti-realism [25, 96]. At this
point, we would like to warn the reader: What is going to come is a personal account,
sometimes vague, and potentially displeasing to some readers.
Anti-realism in epistemology is often linked to the notion of “truth.” An anti-realist
attitude towards the notion of “truth,” is that any form of “absolute truth” is denied.
In a weaker form, it can also be understood as the attitude that not transcendental
“truth” exists, beyond any perception or thought process. Furthermore, any true (or
wrong) statement must be verifiable in principle [25]. This does not mean that true
statements cannot be formed, or shown. Rather, the notion of “truth” is tightly bound to
the context, e.g., formal system, language, cultural-historic context, etc. Such contexts,
however, are built up by governments, societies, research groups, or even individuals,
giving a “subjective” taste.
In epistemology, anti-realism could be defined as follows:
Definition 32 (Anti-realism, as defined in Reference [25]). What we actually can think
or say about the world depends fundamentally on our perspective on the world.
Opposed to that, the realist point of view asserts that “truths” exist that are inde-
pendent of the viewer, language, etc., which are a property of “reality” (which exists
independent of the observer, see Section 2.1.1). So, the anti-realist’s point of view is
that “truths” depend on our perspective and abilities, whilst the realist’s point of view
is that “truth” is “out there” independent of any perspective or observer.
We start with a discussion on Parmenides’ didactic poem, let Nietzsche talk about
Parmenides, and list some anti-realists statements. The purpose of that is to briefly
illustrate anti-realism, to thereafter combine that view with the beginning of this thesis:
the motivations.
Here, this endeavour is taken because anti-realism is thoroughly an intriguing con-
cept, and “there was never any argument to show that the modern and more totalitarian
1These are the only four occurrences of singular first person pronouns in this thesis to refer to the
author; I am not sure whether anyone else is inclined or even interested to these upcoming thoughts, yet,
since this my thesis, I take that freedom to follow this impulse.
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notion of truth has advantages, and what the advantages are” [117]. In the following,
longer quotes are placed, because the originals are — in our opinion — worth reading.
4 Parmenides of Elea
Parmenides was a Greek philosopher from Elea (Elea was an ancient city whose ruins are
found next to the town Aseca, province of Salerno, Italy) who lived around−500. In his
poem [86] (unfortunately fragments thereof only survived, see also References [198,
213]), he describes an insight he had possibly at “einen Moment der allerreinsten,
durch jede Wirklichkeit ungetrübten und völlig blutlosen Abstraktion”2 [188]. In an
artistic form, Parmenides describes himself as visiting the goddess Dike, who passes
the “knowledge” of the “being” to him. After welcoming him, Dike says: “It is indiffer-
ent to me whence I begin, for to that place I shall come back again” [86]. By this, Dike
indicates that a sole line of thought is possible, whereas the alternative is “wholly with-
out report.” Thereafter, Dike describes the two lines of thought: The path where one
treats presences as being, and absences as not being; and the other path where absences
are also considered as being. On the first path, one considers the “being” as existent
and the “not being” as inexistent. In other words, the “being” is, and the “void” is not.
On the other path, the “being” and the “void” are, yet, as Dike tells Parmenides, “you
can neither know what is not (for it is impossible) nor tell of it.” So, she concludes,
this alternative path is impossible; for how can something that is not be? By this oldest
occurrence of a proof of contradiction in recorded history, she indicates that the other
path is the only one. From this point on, Dike proceeds by deriving the properties of
“what is” (again, with proofs of contradiction):
• The “being” did not come into existence. Out of what should it have been created?
• The “being” is indestructible, for it cannot cease existence and be transformed
into the “void” — there is no “void.”
• The “being” is one thing as otherwise it would have parts. But to have parts,
there must be some distinction among the parts (absence in one, presence in the
other).
• etc.
To cut a long story short3, the “being” has no other attribute than that it is.
Our appearance of the world, however, has to be distinguished from the “being;”
we, e.g., have the perception of space and time. So, how can our perception be put in
2As translated in Reference [186]: “a moment of purest absolutely bloodless abstraction, unclouded
by any reality.”
3Plato [203] dedicated a whole book to these derivations, where he lets Parmenides and his pupil Zeno
debate with the young Socrates.
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agreement with the “being?” Here, Dike answers that the appearance emerges because
the “mortals” (note that Dike is a goddess) are “two-headed, . . . [to]whom this has been
accepted as both being and not being the same and not the same.” For the mortals,
“all those things will be a name [. . . ], confident that they are real, suppose
to be coming to be and perishing, to be and not to be, and to change their
place and alter their bright aspect to dark and from dark to bright. [. . . ]
For they resolved to name two [f]orms (of which it is wrong to name only
one, wherein men have gone astray) [. . . ].”
To conclude, the “being” has no attributes other than it is, and experience is illusion
arising from being two-headed: We name the “void,” yet the “void” does not exist, and
by that we obtain the illusions of objects.
5 Nietzsche’s view on Parmenides
We briefly consult Nietzsche [188], who probably gave one of the most accurate (def-
initely, pleasing) description of Parmenides’ poem. Nietzsche describes the young Par-
menides as being suspicious of separating the world into a world which is, and another
which is not.
“Verglich er zum Beispiel Licht und Dunkel, so war die zweite Qualität er-
sichtlich nur die Negation der ersten; [. . . ] so daß vor seinem Blicke sich
unsre empirische Welt in zwei getrennte Sphären schied, in die der posi-
tiven Eigenschaften — mit einem lichten, [. . . ] Charakter — und in die der
negativen Eigenschaften.”4
Nietzsche’s Parmenides concludes that both “spheres” must interact in order for some-
thing to come into existence. But, one day, as Nietzsche writes,
“prüfte er seine beiden zusammenwirkenden Gegensätze, deren Begierde
und Haß die Welt und das Werden konstituiert, das Seiende und das Nicht-
seiende, die positiven und die negativen Eigenschaften — und er blieb plöt-
zlich bei dem Begriffe der negativen Eigenschaft, des Nichtseienden, miß-
trauisch hängen. Kann denn etwas, was nicht ist, eine Eigenschaft sein?
Oder prinzipieller gefragt: kann denn etwas, was nicht ist sein?”5
4As translated in Reference [186]: “Comparing, for example, light and dark, he found the latter ob-
viously but the negation of the former. [. . . ] Thus before his gaze our empirical world divided into two
separate spheres, the one characterized by light, [. . . ], and the other by the opposite, negative qualities.
The latter really express only the lack, the absence of the former, positive ones.”
5As translated in Reference [186]: “he tested his two interactive contradictories, whose mutual desire
and hatred constitute the world and all coming-to-be. He tested the existent and the nonexistent, the
positive and the negative properties — and suddenly he found that he could not get past the concept
of a negative quality, the concept of non-existence. Can something which is not be a quality? Or, more
basically, can something which is not, be?”
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In that, Nietzsche sees Parmenides to come of age from “merely participat[ing] in a
universal crime against logic,” to a radical world view where
“jede Mühe verschwendet [ist], die man sich mit dieser erlogenen, durch
und durch nichtigen und durch die Sinne gleichsam erschwindelten Welt
gibt.”6
Nietzsche as an anti-realist, criticizes Parmenides:
“[Parmenides] erschloß, daß es existieren müsse: ein Schluß der auf der
Voraussetzung beruht, daß wir ein Organ der Erkenntnis haben, das ins
Wesen der Dinge reicht und unabhängig von der Erfahrung ist. Der Stoff
unseres Denkens ist nach Parmenides gar nicht in der Anschauung vorhan-
den, sondern wird anderswoher hinzugebracht, aus einer außersinnlichen
Welt, zu der wir durch das Denken einen direkten Zugang haben.”7
Thus, as, Nietzsche sees it, Parmenides is not an anti-realist in the above sense. Rather,
in his poem, Parmenides aims at making absolute statements about “what there is,”
even though it is inaccessible and independent of the observer. For Nietzsche, this
concept of “being” is empty:
“Die Worte sind nur Symbole für die Relationen der Dinge untereinander
und zu uns und berühren nirgends die absolute Wahrheit: und gar das Wort
‘Sein’ bezeichnet nur die allgemeinste Relation, die alle Dinge verknüpft
[. . . ]. Durch Worte und Begriffe werden wir nie hinter die Wand der Rela-
tionen, etwa in irgendeinen fabelhaften Urgrund der Dinge, gelangen, und
selbst in den reinen Formen der Sinnlichkeit und des Verstandes, in Raum,
Zeit und Kausalität gewinnen wir nichts [. . . ]. Es ist unbedingt für das
Subjekt unmöglich, über sich selbst hinaus etwas sehen und erkennen zu
wollen, so unmöglich, daß Erkennen und Sein die sich widersprechendsten
aller Sphären sind.”8
6As translated in Reference [186] “[a]ll effort spent upon this false deceitful world which is futile and
negligible, faked into a lying existence by the senses [. . . ] therefore wasted [is].”
7As translated in Reference [186]: “[Parmenides] concluded its existence from the fact that he was
able to think it. This is a conclusion which rests on the assumption that we have an organ of knowledge
which reaches into the essence of things and is independent of experience. The content of our thinking,
according to Parmenides, is not present in sense perception but is an additive from somewhere else, from
an extra-sensory world to which we have direct access by means of our thinking.”
8As translated in Reference [186]: “Words are but symbols for the relations of things to one another
and to us; nowhere do they touch upon absolute truth. Above all, the word ‘being’ designates only the
most general relationship which connects all things [. . . ]. Through words and concepts we shall never
reach beyond the wall of relations, to some sort of fabulous primal ground of things. Even in the pure
forms of sense and understanding, in space, time and causality, we gain nothing that resembles an eternal
verity. It is absolutely impossible for a subject to see or have insight into something while leaving itself
out of the picture, so impossible that knowing and being are the most opposite of all spheres.”
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At the pre-Socratic time, as Nietzsche writes, Parmenides’ approach might have been
acceptable. After Kant, however, any attempt to derive the “absolute” from a subjective
concept is “certainly reckless ignorance” [186].
6 Anti-realists’ statements in other fields
We present some statements that go in this direction in order to make the subject more
clear by demonstration. This denial of absolute truth is a building block of Nietzsche’s
philosophy, which is prominent in his work Über Wahrheit und Lüge im außermoralischen
Sinne [189]. Nietzsche wrote this work when he was 29, but it got published only
posthumously. We demonstrate his standpoint with the following quote.
“Wenn ich die Definition des Säugethiers mache und dann erkläre, nach
Besichtigung eines Kameels: Siehe, ein Säugethier, so wird damit eine
Wahrheit zwar an das Licht gebracht, aber sie ist von begränztem Werthe,
ich meine, sie ist durch und durch anthropomorphisch und enthält keinen
einzigen Punkt, der ‘wahr an sich’, wirklich und allgemeingültig, abgesehen
von dem Menschen, wäre.”9
In philosophy of science, Feyerabend [118] can be considered as an anti-realist:
“Untersucht man nämlich, was ein bestimmter Denkstil unter [‘Wahrheit’
und ‘Wirklichkeit’] versteht, dann trifft man nicht auf etwas, was jenseits
des Denkstils liegt, sondern auf seine eigenen grundlegenden Annahmen:
Wahrheit ist, was der Denkstil sagt, daß Wahrheit sei. So war es einmal
wahr, daß die griechischen Götter existierten, aber heute ist das für viele
Menschen Unsinn.”10
Here, we see that Feyerabend considers the notion of “truth” and “reality” as attached
to a school of thought. So, it is impossible to transcend that school of thought to arrive
at other notions — a theory, a school of thought, already defines what it understands
under “truth” and “reality.”
Then again, the psychologist Watzlawick can be understood as being as favoring
anti-realism (or instrumentalist):
9As translated in Reference [187] “If I give a definition of ‘mammal’ and then, after inspecting a camel,
declare, ‘Behold, a mammal,’ a truth has indeed been brought to light, but one of limited value, by which
I mean it is thoroughly anthropomorphic and contains not a single point that would be ‘true in itself,’ real
and universally valid, apart from man.”
10“If one examines what a particular school of thought considers as ‘truth’ and ‘reality,’ then one does
not find something beyond the school of thought, instead, one finds its own fundamental assumptions:
Truth is what the school of thought says it is. So, it was once true that the Greek gods existed, but today,
for most people this is nonsense.”
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“Aber der Zweck wissenschaftlicher Forschung ist und kann nicht die Ent-
deckung der Wahrheit sein. Für die ewige Wahrheit ist kein Platz in der
Wissenschaft — vor allem nicht auf einem Gebiet, das so unerfaßbar ist
wie das seelische und geistige Erleben des Menschen. Das einzige brauch-
bare Kriterium ist die größere Wirksamkeit eines Ansatzes im Vergleich zu
einem anderen” [244].
Finally, the psychoanalyst Žižek [255] notes that we are fooled to believe in some
“reality,” even in the case where we see the “stage machinery” behind it:
“The mystery is that even if we know that it’s only staged, that it’s a fic-
tion, it still fascinates us. That’s the fundamental magic of it. You witness a
certain seductive scene, then you are shown that it’s just a fake, stage ma-
chinery behind, but you are still fascinated by it. Illusion persists. There is
something real in the illusion, more real than in the reality behind it. [. . . ]
It is that rather, in a way, there is more truth in this appearance. Appearance
has an effectivity, a truth of its own.”
7 Esquisse of a synthesis
First, Nietzsche and Parmenides can be brought closer by the following. Observe that
the critique of Nietzsche is that Parmenides relies on some “organ of knowledge which
reaches into the essence of things.” Then again, it is not Parmenides who talks to us,
but the goddess Dike. In that sense, Dike is the “organ of knowledge.” However, form
a “two-headed” point of view, this knowledge is inaccessible; very much in the spirit
of Kant [163]. So, on the one hand Parmenides describes “what there is,” but on the
other, he denies its accessibility.
To connect the concept of anti-realism with this thesis, one cold see the sketched
approaches of relative, retro, and emergent causality (see Section 2.1.5), as valid ap-
proaches to science without any further request to capture some underlying truth — a
kind of toy models (after all, any theory is not more than a toy model; a theory is not
“reality”). The conditions for a statement to be true would in that case be given by the
model itself. Yet, these sketched approaches are a response to the requirement of local
realism. But here, local realism is to be understood as a condition that fits our classical
way of thinking; a condition we are comfortable with. Some generations to the future
— one could have hoped that this was the case already now — quantum theory could
become easier to “understand” when compared to classical ones. So, the quest for a
local realistic theory to describe quantum correlations is a quest that clearly leads to
new insights, but it should not be seen in a too serious way: local realism is just some
definition we made and we are comfortable with now.
Anti-realism can also be seen as an extreme case of the approach titled emergent
causality. In the latter, classical qualities, from bits to space and time, would be the
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product of perception (a concept not clear at all), without presupposing that these qual-
ities exist a priori. In the former, the conditions for what counts as true is emergent.
The emergent causality approaches can also — in a wide sense — be identified with Par-
menides’: The “is” is some “blob” without classical qualities, and by being two-headed,
the classical qualities arise. One could — by allowing one self to broaden the sense
even more — even identify two-headedness with coarse graining. In the description of
Parmenides, two-headedness means that one attributes “nothingness” to what is, and
vice versa. In the process of coarse graining, then again, some quantities are ignored.
A formulation of quantum theory that fits Parmenides’ model in some way,11 is the
one by Page and Wootters (see References [195, 254]). There, the “blob” is the timeless
wavefunction, and any observation is only an observation relative to “clock time.” In
more detail, one can construct a quantum state over multiple systems, where one sys-
tem is called “clock.” Now, if one entangles the “clock” with the rest, then it is possible
to interpret the evolution of the “rest” as relative to the “clock time:” the state of the
“clock” system. This can be understood as an extension of Everett’s [111, 112] relative
state formalism: where “clock time” has been incorporated into the description. This
entangled state is not evolving any more, yet, a subjective evolution takes place — an
intriguing idea.
Because we are (partially) comfortable with the ongoing school of thought, and def-
initely fascinated by quantum theory, we conduct research in this field. For large parts it
is this tension of quantum theory against the traditional school of thought that drives re-
search in this field; the tension between quantum concepts (quantum effects) and their
incompatibility with what we are so much used to. By consulting Feyerabend [118]:
“Die Wahl eines Stils, einer Wirklichkeit, einer Wahrheitsform, Realitäts-
und Rationalitätskriterien eingeschlossen, ist die Wahl von Menschenwerk.
Sie ist ein sozialer Akt [. . . ],”12
we see that science is also a sociological act.
By stating this anti-realist point of view, we do not (1) claim ourselves anti-realists,
nor (2) trivialize theoretical problems. Against (1): no one knows; and (2): we chose
to work in this field for some reason. We end this epilogue: An anti-realist point of
view does not at all render scientific work less important, but allows one to approach
science in a more playful, less “truth-seeking” way.
11Parmenides was quite vague, so in retrospect many things can be understood as following his poem.
Here, we just focus on the emergence of qualities from a state of affairs where these qualities are inexistent.
12“The choice of a style, an objectivity, a form of truth, including conditions for reality and rationality,
is the choice of people. It is a social act,”
